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RESUMO: 
Entre 1857, ano da Revolta dos Cipaios e consequente ocupação definitiva da Índia 
pelos Britânicos, causando o fim do poder político muçulmano, e 1947, data da sua 
independência e Partição em dois Estados, União Indiana e Paquistão, o sub-
continente indiano sofreu grandes transformações. 
 
Esta foi uma época rica em pensamento reformista islâmico, dando origem a um 
intenso debate que ultrapassou as suas fronteiras geográficas e antecipou questões 
posteriores que ainda hoje se colocam: condição das mulheres, papel da religião na 
política ou o fim do califado. 
 
A importância do estudo do Islão em contexto indiano advém do facto de um terço 
dos muçulmanos existentes hoje em dia no Mundo viverem nessa região e do facto de, 
no período agora em estudo, o império britânico ter sido a entidade política com mais 
muçulmanos precisamente porque a Índia estava sob administração da Grã-Bretanha. 
Por outro lado, no ano de 2007, que assinalou precisamente os 60 anos da 
Independência da União Indiana e Paquistão, bem como os 150 anos da Revolta dos 
Cipaios, houve quem considerasse que os Britânicos deveriam ter restituído aos 
muçulmanos, em 1947, o poder que lhes tinha sido retirado em 1857. 
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Utilizando o método de Islamologia Aplicada, de Mohammed Arkoun, e a 
contextualização histórica de conceitos, proposta por Quentin Skinner, esta 
investigação aborda três intelectuais desse período, Chiragh ‘Ali, Muhammad Iqbal e 
Sayyid Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi, bem como as suas obras consideradas mais importantes. 
 
Assim, através de estudos de caso e comparação qualitativa, nesta investigação 
analisamos, descrevemos e tentamos compreender os movimentos de reforma 
islâmica que surgiram na Índia entre os momentos finais da dinastia mogol (1857-
1858) e os momentos finais da presença britânica (1947), mais em particular os 
diversos modelos políticos e de Estado oferecidos por essas três figuras, comparando-
os entre si a vários níveis: a biografia, a obra, o pensamento, a herança e discípulos, 
bem como o legado deixado e debate que originaram em torno de questões como o 
papel da religião na política e/ou o modelo de Estado a ser seguido no mundo 
islâmico. 
 
Os diferentes modelos políticos oferecidos por cada um dos autores, e as concepções 
que tinham sobre a relação entre religião e política, reflectem uma diversidade de 
pensamento, frequentemente contraditória entre si. 
 
A tese conclui que o Islão, enquanto objecto de estudo das, e nas, ciências sociais, tem 
que ser repensado e redefinido, bem como os conceitos de Shari’a, Religião, Política, 
Estado, Igreja, Secularismo, Modernidade, pois cada um deles assume diferentes 
formas em diferentes contextos temporais e geográficos, incluindo naquilo que é 
chamado de Ocidente, e cada um deles interage com os outros numa multiplicidade de 
formas, não havendo modelos únicos ou essencialistas. 
 
 
ABSTRACT: 
Between 1857, year of the Sepoy revolt and subsequent occupation of India by the 
British, which caused the end of Muslim political supremacy, and 1947, year of its 
Independence and Partition into two states, India and Pakistan, the Indian sub-
continent went through great transformations. 
 
It was a very rich period of Islamic reformist thought, originating an intense debate 
which surpassed the geographical boundaries of India and anticipated future issues 
which are still being discussed today: the position of women, the role of religion in 
politics or the end of the caliphate. 
 
The importance of studying Islam in a South-Asian context derives from the fact that 
one third of all Muslims in the world live in this region, and from the fact that in the 
period that is now analysed the British Empire was the political entity with the largest 
Muslim population, due to the fact that India was under Great-Britain’s 
administration. On the other hand, in 2007, which was the year that marked the 60th 
anniversary of Independence for India and Pakistan, and the 150th anniversary of the 
Sepoy Revolt, there were people asserting that the British should have given back to 
Muslims, in 1947, the power taken in 1857. 
 
Using Mohammed Arkoun’s Applied Islamology, and historical contextualization, a 
method proposed by Quentin Skinner, this research focuses on three intellectuals of 
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that period, Chiragh ‘Ali, Muhammad Iqbal and Sayyid Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi, as well 
as on their most important works. 
 
This research, through case-studies and qualitative comparison, analyses, describes 
and tries to assess Islamic reform movements which sprang up in India between the 
final moments of the Mughal dynasty (1857-1858) and the final moments of the 
British presence (1947), especially the different political and State models offered by 
those three figures, comparing them at different levels: biographies, works, thought, 
heritage and disciples, as well as the legacy bequeathed and the debate that they 
originated around issues such as the role of religion in politics and/or the model of 
State to be followed in the Islamic world. 
 
The different political models offered by each one of the authors, and their 
conceptions about the relations between religion and politics, express a diversity of 
thought which is frequently at odds with one another. 
 
This thesis concludes that Islam, as an object of study of, and in, the social sciences, 
has to be rethought and redefined, as well as concepts such as Shari’a, Religion, 
Politics, State, Church, Secularism, Modernity. Each one of them assumes different 
forms in different temporal and geographical contexts, including what is usually 
called the West, and each one of them interacts with the others in a multiplicity of 
ways, with no single or essentialist model resulting from that interaction. 
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IATRODUCTIOA 
Opening remarks 
When this endeavour was first started, in 2007, two Muslim-majority 
countries, Afghanistan and Iraq, had been invaded in 2001 and 2003 respectively. One 
of the justifications used for the ensuing wars had been the events of 11th September, 
2001, which were among the most central defining moments in the representations of 
Islam and Muslim societies in recent times. However, and as Benjamin Soares and 
Filippo Osella show1, the stereotypes about Islam and Muslims have actually been 
remarkably resilient. The figure of the “mad mullah” who radicalized the 
“uneducated, naïve, but largely benign Muslim masses” in 19th century British 
accounts of Muslims’ anti-colonial politics, and 20th century French accounts of 
allegedly dangerous “Sufis” and/or “Wahhabis”, who threatened to lead ordinary 
Muslims in their West African colonies astray, are the genealogical antecedents of 
contemporary characterizations of “radical” Islam and Islamism in much Western 
media, public culture and even the academic world. Meanwhile, images of (veiled) 
Muslim women have acquired iconic status in the western imaginary as 
representations of the oppressed and subordinated Other par excellence. 
In K. Humayun Ansari’s assessment2 of the ways in which British historians 
analysed, imagined and depicted the “Orient” during the period starting in the late 18th 
century until early 20th century, they were often intertwined with growing British 
power and the parallel growth of European control over Muslim peoples, realities 
which began to shape historical accounts. Islam constituted a distinct type, a 
backward one, in terms of civilisation, cultural essence and core values. Imperial 
expansion, born out of human enlightenment and effort, became a dominant vision, 
supported by a growing evangelical public sentiment, which viewed the British 
Empire as the work of Providence and contributing to the British assumption of 
superiority over the East and to the justification of colonial rule. However, this 
                                                           
1 SOARES, Benjamin and OSELLA, Filippo. 2009. “Islam, politics, anthtropology” in Journal of the 
Royal Anthropological Institute (N.S.). London: Royal Anthropological Society, pp. S1-S2. 
 
2 ANSARI, K. Humayun. 2011. “The Muslim World in British Historical Imaginations: ‘Re-thinking 
Orientalism’?” in British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, V. 38, n. 1. Oxfordshire: Routledge, pp. 
73-93. 
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attitude was in contradiction with the “noble purposes” of British rule, which led John 
Robert Seeley (1834-1895) to ask, in his Expansion of England, first published in 
1883, how could Britain reconcile the despotism of the Indian Empire with the 
democracy enjoyed by the colonies of white settlers and British people themselves: 
“How can the same nation pursue two lines of policy so radically different without 
bewilderment, be despotic in Asia and democratic in Australia, be in the East at once 
the greatest Mussulman Power in the world and the guardian of the property of 
thousands of idol-temples, and at the same time in the West be the foremost champion 
of free thought and spiritual religion, stand out as a great military Imperialism to resist 
the march of Russia in Central Asia at the same time that it fills Queensland and 
Manitoba with free settlers?”3 
The important thing was to do Indians, Muslims and other Orientals, good in 
spite of themselves, a hegemonic assumption which the majority of Orientalists 
agreed with. 
 
Studying Islam 
In an interview given in 1976 to Diacritics, Edward Said (1935-2003), 
referring to Middle East studies, said that most Middle East experts were social 
scientists whose expertise was based on a handful of clichés about Arab society, Islam 
and the like, handed down like tatters, from the 19th century Orientalists, and that a 
whole new vocabulary of terms was bandied about: modernization, elites, 
development, stability were talked about as possessing some sort of universal validity, 
but that in fact they formed a rhetorical smokescreen hiding ignorance on the subject. 
For Edward Said, the new Orientalist jargon, i.e., of the 20th century, was hermetic 
discourse, which could not prepare one for what was happening in Lebanon, in the 
Israeli-occupied Arab territories, or in the everyday lives of the Middle Eastern 
                                                           
3 SEELEY, John Robert. 1911. The expansion of England: two courses of lectures. London: 
MacMillan and Co., p. 205. 
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peoples.4 Two years later, he would develop these and other themes in his seminal 
book Orientalism.5 
To illustrate the “state of the art” regarding Middle Eastern and/or Islamic 
Studies in the United States, Said would quote what Morroe Berger, President of the 
Middle East Studies Association (MESA) at the time, wrote in 1967 in the MESA 
Bulletin. For Berger, the modern Middle East and North Africa was not a centre of 
great cultural achievement, nor were they likely to become one in the near future. 
Therefore, the study of the region and their languages did not constitute its own 
reward as far as modern culture was concerned, neither was the region a centre of 
great political power, nor did it have the potential to become one. For him, the Middle 
East (less so North Africa) had been receding in immediate political importance to the 
United States, even in “headline” or “nuisance” value, relative to Africa, Latin 
America and the Far East. The contemporary Middle East seemed to be lacking the 
desirable traits attracting scholarly attention, which did not diminish the validity and 
intellectual value of studying the area nor did it affect the quality of the work scholars 
did on it. However, it did put limits, of which “we should be aware, on the field’s 
capacity for growth in the numbers who study and teach.”6 
As events in the past forty years have shown, the modern Middle East and 
North Africa never stopped being a focus of attention for political, economic and 
social reasons. And, of course, the Middle East and North Africa are now, more than 
ever, as current events show, of extreme immediate political importance not only to 
the United States but also to Europe. After the Iranian Revolution in the late 1970s 
and the widespread recognition of the limitations of the secularization thesis, many 
questioned the compatibility of Islam and Muslims with modernity, reinforcing the 
old “Orientalist” stereotypes by which the Middle East and/or Islamic world is 
                                                           
4 SAID, Edward W. 2005. Power, Politics and Culture: interviews with Edward W. Said. London: 
Bloomsbury, p. 34. 
 
5 SAID, Edward W. 1979. Orientalism. New York: Vintage. Besides being the title of his book, 
Orientalism was also the generic term that Edward Said employed to describe the Western view on the 
Orient (the Middle East and/or Islamic world), and was also the discipline by which that region and/or 
concept was, and is, approached systematically, as a topic of learning, discovery, and practice. It should 
be noticed that his book was published at the time the Revolution in Iran was taking place. 
 
6 BERGER, Morroe. 1967. “Middle Eastern and North African Studies: developments and needs” in 
MESA Bulletin, V. 1, n. 2 (November). Tucson: Middle East Studies Association, p. 16 cited in SAID, 
1979: p. 288. 
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viewed. Due to the ubiquity of different media, “Islam”, “Muslims” and “Arabs” have 
been more and more under the spotlights, and a series of questions arose, especially 
those related with politics: Is Islam against modernisation? Is Islam incompatible with 
Democracy?7 What are the consequences of an Islamic government for pluralism and 
for the rights of minorities and women? Should the West fear a transnational Islamic 
threat or a clash of civilisations? What is the relation between State and Religion in 
Islam?8 However, these questions were not new, and echoed the late 19th century, 
early 20th century ideas about “Islam” and the “Middle East”.9 In a countermove, 
others tried to prove that Islam could indeed be “modern” and compatible with 
democracy. Since 11th September, 2001, there has been much “culture talk” about 
Muslims and their politics wherever they happen to live in the world. So, it is not 
surprising to watch and hear many commentators’ essentializing impulses when the 
object of study is Islam or Muslims. 
However, while academic discourse and Western media alike have produced 
reified views of Islam and Muslims in abundance, such views have also emerged from 
within Islam itself, via Muslims’ interpretations and representations of their own 
religion as unitary, timeless, and unchanging. Representations are never simply 
reflections on or descriptions of reality, of social and religious processes, necessarily 
already “out there” in the world; they have generative power. In reshaping conceptual 
categories, they are oriented towards producing something which is given concrete 
ground, thereby intensifying a reality already alluded to in discourse itself. It is 
imperative to pay attention to the genealogies of discourses (academic, state, 
“official”, global, as well as of those in this research), which might become 
authoritative and normative, and through which politics in Muslim societies is 
comprehended, experienced, legitimated, or contested. It must also be remembered 
that seemingly authoritative discourses and disciplinary practices are neither 
                                                           
7 FULLER, Graham E. 2003. The future of political Islam. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 121-2. 
 
8 ESPOSITO, John L. 1997. “Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition” in Harvard 
International Review (Spring). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard International Relations Council; 
FULLER, Graham E. 2003; LAPIDUS, Ira M. 1975. “The Separation of State and Religion in the 
Development of Early Islamic Society” in International Journal of Middle East Studies, V. 6, n. 4 
(Oct.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 363-385. 
 
9 For further details see VATIN, Jean-Claude. 1980. “Introduction à «Islam, Religion et politique»” in 
Revue de l’Occident musulman et de la Méditerranée, V. 29, n. 1. Aix-en-Provence: MMSH-
IREMAM, pp. III-XIV. 
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totalizing, nor are their outcomes necessarily easily predictable. And it is also 
important to heed the warning of those who have argued against automatically 
privileging religion as the principal – or perhaps unique – foundation for Muslim 
identity and political practice.10 
The explosion in the research and study of the region, and its languages, in the 
past decades has been remarkable. The number of scholars, not only “Western” but 
also from the Islamic World, dealing with Islam, studying it and teaching about it has 
grown greatly. A “Muslim” scholar is now no longer considered just a “native 
informant”, to use Said’s expression, but someone who is, first and foremost, doing 
research from a vantage point, because of his or her background and personal 
experience, and first-hand acquaintance with the language, customs and other cultural 
and mental traits. Fields like Linguistics, Literature, History, Politics, Economics, 
Anthropology, Sociology, Geography, and Religion (of course), but also Society, 
Gender Studies, Media, Sexuality, and many others, are now mainstream. 
However (and Said drew our attention to this), one aspect of the electronic, 
postmodern world is that there has been a reinforcement of the stereotypes by which 
the Middle East and/or Islamic world is viewed. Television, cinema, and all the 
media’s resources have forced information into more and more standardized moulds, 
and that “standardization and cultural stereotyping have intensified the hold of the 
19th century academic and imaginative demonology of ‘the mysterious Orient’”.11 
It is generally considered that the expression “Middle East” was coined in 
1902 by Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), in an attempt to delineate a region from 
the Mediterranean to India.12 Since then, “Middle East” has become an expression to 
designate everything related with “Islam” and/or “Muslims”, and in recent years a 
linguistic and political development occurred when the term “Greater Middle East” 
was used to designate the region from Morocco to Afghanistan and, in some cases, to 
South-East Asia. Some scholars still consider the existence of the Middle East and/or 
                                                           
10 SOARES and OSELLA, 2009: S2. 
 
11 SAID, 1979: p. 27. 
 
12 MAHAN, Alfred Thayer. 1902. “The Persian Gulf in International Affairs” in +ational Review 
(September), pp. 27-45 cited in HALLIDAY, Fred. 2011. Shocked and Awed: How the War on Terror 
and Jihad have changed the English Language. London: I.B. Tauris, p. 268. 
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Islamic world as a coherent, single object of reality that can be grasped, and continue 
to analyse it through their framework, trying to fit external reality into it. According to 
Said, “the object of such knowledge is inherently vulnerable to scrutiny; this object is 
a ‘fact’ which, if it develops, changes, or otherwise transforms itself in the way that 
civilizations frequently do, nevertheless is fundamentally, even ontologically stable. 
To have such knowledge of such a thing is to dominate it, to have authority over it. 
And authority here means for ‘us’ [the West] to deny autonomy to ‘it’ [the Middle 
East and/or the Islamic world] since we know it and it exists, in a sense, as we know 
it.”13 
So, it comes as no surprise that some intellectuals, scholars, experts, pundits, 
journalists and opinion-makers talk about Islam and the Islamic world (with more 
than 1.5 billion people, dozens of different societies and languages, and spread all 
over the world) as if it were a simple object about which one could make grand 
generalisations on its history of fourteen-plus centuries, and commenting on the 
compatibility between Islam and Democracy, Islam and Human Rights, and Islam and 
Progress. Although knowledgeable scholars are increasingly appearing on mass media 
to give their opinions on what is happening in different places like Lebanon, 
Israel/Palestine, Tunisia, Libya, Syria, or Egypt, there are, however, some aspects 
related with the scholarly work done on those regions that still has traces of 19th and 
20th centuries’ Orientalism, particularly the concepts of Middle East and Islamic 
Studies themselves. 
As Said put it, “because we have become accustomed to think of a 
contemporary expert on some branch of the Orient, or some aspect of its life, as a 
specialist in ‘area studies’, we have lost a vivid sense of how until around World War 
II, the Orientalist was considered to be a generalist (with a great deal of specific 
knowledge, of course) who had highly developed skills for making summational 
statements. By summational statements I mean that in formulating a relatively 
uncomplicated idea, say, about Arabic grammar or Indian religion, the Orientalist 
would be understood (and would understand himself) as also making a statement 
about the Orient as a whole, thereby summing it up. Thus every discrete study of one 
bit of Oriental material would also confirm in a summary way the profound 
                                                           
13 SAID, 1979: p. 32. 
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Orientality of the material. And since it was commonly believed that the whole Orient 
hung together in some profoundly organic way, it made perfectly good hermeneutical 
sense for the Orientalist scholar to regard the material evidence he dealt with as 
ultimately leading to a better understanding of such things as the Oriental character, 
mind, ethos, or world-spirit.”14 
For a social scientist to be an expert in “Islamic Studies” is to study “Islam” as 
an object of social science and to know “Islam” as a fact. For him or her “there are 
still such things as an Islamic society, an Arab mind, an Oriental psyche”. Even those 
who specialize in the modern Islamic world anachronistically use texts like the 
Qur’an to read into every facet of contemporary Egyptian or Algerian society. “Islam, 
or a 7th century ideal of it constituted by the Orientalist, is assumed to possess the 
unity that eludes the more recent and important influences of colonialism, 
imperialism, and even ordinary politics.”15 Using history, social anthropology, 
political science, economy and geopolitics as disciplinary backgrounds, different 
authors such as Gilles Kepel16, Malise Ruthven17, and Bernard Lewis18, among others, 
still use “Orientalist” concepts in their attempts to analyse reality according to their 
own preconceptions. 
One of Said’s worries, regarding Orientalism, was the danger and temptation 
of employing its formidable structure of cultural domination by formerly colonised 
peoples upon themselves or upon others.19 For example, Fareed Zakaria20, Bassam 
Tibi21 or Abdelwahab Meddeb talk about “Islam” as if it had a geographical existence, 
                                                           
14 SAID, 1979: p. 255. 
 
15 SAID, 1979: pp. 301. 
 
16 KEPEL, Gilles. 2000. Jihad: expansion et déclin de l’islamisme. Paris: Gallimard. [Spanish 
translation used La yihad: expansión y declive del islamismo. Barcelona: Círculo de Lectores, 2001; 
English translation, Jihad: the trail of Political Islam. London: I.B. Tauris, 2002]. 
 
17 RUTHVEN, Malise. 2002. “Radical Islam’s failure” in Prospect 76 (July), pp. 30-35. 
 
18 LEWIS, Bernard. 2001. What went wrong? Western impact and Middle Eastern response. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press. 
 
19 SAID, 1979: p. 25. 
 
20 ZAKARIA, Fareed. 2009. “Learning to live with Radical Islam” in +ewsweek, March 09, pp. 12-19. 
 
21 TIBI, Bassam. 1998. The Challenge of Fundamentalism: Political Islam and the +ew World 
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or a political and theological structural unity, similar to that of the Roman Catholic 
Church. After writing The malady of Islam, where all the pessimistic clichés about 
Islam’s decadence and the dangers of Islamism were superficially analysed, 
Abdelwahab Meddeb seems to have been taken aback by recent events in the Arab 
world, particularly in his native country Tunisia, which led him to write Printemps de 
Tunis: la metamorphose de l’Histoire [Tunisia’s Springtime: History’s 
metamorphosis], now talking optimistically about other commonplaces like Universal 
values, non-violence, Democracy, the bankruptcy of “the clash of civilizations” and 
the “end of History” theories, and laïcité. The fact remains that none of his books 
helps us to understand the what, how, and why of such complex events.22 
Anshuman A. Mondal, in an article published in 2003,23 wrote that 
“[u]nderlying the difficulty that most Islamic states have in accommodating political 
liberalism is Islam itself. Islam’s 19th century reformers could not reconcile their faith 
with western modernity.” Not once did Mondal mention the impact of colonialism 
and the brutality with which, in some cases, colonial powers denied the “natives” the 
“sweet fruits” of Democracy and Liberalism, and how that attitude fuelled the feeling 
of rejection of everything coming from the West. Various discourses on Islam’s need 
of reformation are also put forward, something debated inside and outside of the 
Islamic world24, an argument echoing 19th century Orientalism and sociological 
theories on the absence of Reformation in Islam and the untiable knot between 
Religion and Politics, ignoring the centuries long tradition of islah (reform) in Islam 
and the fact that many Western countries used (and still use) religion to advance 
political goals. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
Disorder. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press. 
 
22 MEDDEB, Abdelwahab. 2002. La maladie de l’Islam. Paris: Seuil. [Portuguese translation used A 
doença do Islão. Lisboa: Relógio d’Água, 2005; there is also an English translation, The malady of 
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24 BEININ, Joel and STORK, Joe (eds.). 1997. Political Islam: essays from Middle East Report. 
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Kamran (eds.). 2002. Modernist and fundamentalist debates in Islam: a reader. New York: Palgrave 
Macmillan. 
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According to Anshuman A. Mondal, “Western critics often claim that the 
failure of Islam to modernise is due to the fact it has had no Reformation. The 
Reformation, it is said, loosened the intellectual shackles of medieval Christendom 
and led to the development of capitalism and the emergence of the rational individual 
as the basic constituent of society. The development of Protestantism is also seen as 
instrumental in the secularisation of European society. Together, these developments 
crystallised into political institutions that were constitutional and democratic.”25 
Timur Kuran, using this same line of reasoning, argues that what slowed the 
economic development of the Middle East was not colonialism or geography, but 
Islamic legal institutions from the 10th century onwards. By the 19th century, modern 
economic institutions began to be transplanted to the Middle East, but its economy 
has not caught up. Kuran does not explain what happened between the 11th and 18th 
centuries, and does not mention the fact that that “transplantation” was done using 
imperial violence and colonial brutality.26 
Max Weber (1864-1920) and Benjamin Kidd’s (1858-1916) theories on 
Protestantism, Capitalism, and forms of Government, developing Karl Marx’s theory 
of modes of production and Montesquieu’s stereotypes on Eastern despotism, were 
elaborated in the late 19th, early 20th century, a period of economical, social, political, 
military, institutional, scientific and cultural strength of some European countries, 
especially the “Protestant” ones, like Great Britain and Germany, or the French Third 
Republic, which was under Positivism momentum and applying laïcité. With their 
theories, Weber and Kidd (who was openly racist), were justifying the landscape of 
their own times with something they thought had happened with the Reformation, 
projecting on the past their historical situation, and also trying to explain the 
“backwardness” of Roman Catholic countries. 
The Reformation, which was a historical process of West European 
Christianity, in fact did not imply the loosening of the intellectual shackles of 
medieval Christendom. That movement was aimed at the abuses of the Catholic 
Church in Rome, and it produced a period of great political and religious violence 
                                                           
25 MONDAL, 2003: p.28. 
 
26 KURAN, Timur. 2010. The long divergence: how Islamic law held back the Middle East. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
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which only ended in 1648, with the Peace of Westphalia, putting an end to the Thirty 
Years’ War, and, even after that, religious hostilities continued with the revocation of 
the Edict of Nantes in 1685. In many Reformed countries it was unthinkable to be a 
subject of the Crown or a Prince without adhering to the religion of the ruler (cujus 
regio, ejus religio), and many Protestant countries still have State religions today 
(Great Britain, Denmark, Norway, Finland, or Sweden until 2000). 
According to the conventional wisdom, there is no separation between religion 
and the state in Islam. Ernest Gellner thus asserted that Islam “was the state from the 
very start”, and it was this theological character of Islam which rendered it a 
“dramatic, conspicuous exception” to the otherwise universal process of 
secularization.27 Most readings of “Islamic fundamentalism” aver that since Islam 
fuses religion and politics, the idea of the state flows from the inner logic of Islam. 
Across the disciplinary divides, it is a truism to assert that Islam, in contrast to other 
religions, does not make a distinction between religion and the state, or sacerdotium 
and regnum. The idea of an Islamic state, as the argument goes, flows from the 
theological character of Islam itself. This line of argument, also shared by influential 
Islamist ideologues such as Abul ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) and Egypt’s Sayyid 
Qutb (1906-1966), and which Irfan Ahmad calls the “fusion framework” 28, still 
informs, in different ways, most writings on Islam, especially “Islamic 
fundamentalism”.29 
                                                           
27 GELLNER, Ernest. 1992. Postmodernism, reason and religion. London: Routledge, pp. 5-9. 
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orientation. Chicago: University Press; WATT, William Montgomery. 1988. Islamic fundamentalism 
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However, if that is the case, if Islam does not separate religion from politics, 
how do we explain the fact that almost two-thirds of the member states of the 
Organisation of the Islamic Cooperation (formerly Conference) are states which 
consider themselves as secular and/or with a separation between religion and 
politics?30 Or how do we explain the fact that for different Muslim thinkers, such as 
the Indians Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), Chiragh ‘Ali (1844-1895) or Shibli 
Nu’mani (1857-1914), Islam indeed does make a separation between religion and the 
state, and theologically it did not entail an Islamic state, a line of thought which was 
further pursued by the Egyptian ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966) who presented this 
argument in the wake of the abolition of the Caliphate, in 1924? 
The conclusions of the above frameworks are radically different, even 
antagonistic. However, the methods employed to arrive at their respective conclusions 
are theological, for the method employed is a method which accords centrality to 
canonical religious texts, particularly the Qur’an and hadith (the Prophet 
Muhammad’s statements and actions), to derive a given conclusion. Central to this 
approach is a philological way of deciphering meanings of key words in the texts, 
especially the concept of Shari’a, which is thought to be something applied from 
Morocco to Indonesia. Usually translated as Islamic law, Shari’a means, literally in 
Arabic, path, way, and evokes, in abstract terms, the concept of Justice, Rule of Law. 
A growing corpus of literature in contemporary social sciences treats the 
contiguous landmass stretching from the Maghreb through southern Eurasia to China 
as a cogent unit of analysis. Since the “Islamic World” is an expression to designate 
the total of Muslim-majority countries and since Muslims are not restricted to the 
“Middle East”, which is, according to Orientalist clichés, the natural environment of 
Muslims, a new expression, the “Greater Middle East”, was coined to designate the 
region from Morocco to Afghanistan and, in some cases, to South-East Asia. 
                                                                                                                                                                      
and modernity. London: Routledge; and WEINER, Myron. 1987. “Political change: Asia, Africa and 
the Middle East” in WEINER, Myron and HUNTINGTON, Samuel (eds.). Understanding political 
development. Boston: Little Brown, pp. 33-64. 
 
30 For further details, see the official website of the Organisation, http://www.oic-oci.org/, and the legal 
frameworks of each member state. 
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In 2007, a book on the “Greater Middle East” (GME) was published,31 with 
the aim of presenting a comparative study of history, state–society relations, 
globalization, Islamism, nationalism, democracy, regionalism, revolution, war, 
energy, conflict, etc., of that region, defined as a sum total of the Middle East and 
North Africa, Afghanistan and Pakistan, the Central Asian republics and the 
Caucasus. The arguments used for that definition, GME, were three: 1) today’s 
Greater Middle East countries were part of the three great Islamic empires of Mughal 
India, Safavid Persia and the Ottomans; 2) as a result of pressures from colonial 
modernity, they experienced “sequential industrialization”, which perennially 
distorted state-society relations; and, finally, 3) this part of the world constitutes a 
power vacuum, where big powers compete with each other for fossil fuels and other 
resources.32 
In 2010 An Atlas of Middle Eastern Affairs was published.33 On section D, 
“States of the Middle East”, there is a list of countries which, according to the authors, 
form part of that region, with its western and eastern geographical extremities, 
Morocco and Afghanistan respectively. These two countries have different languages, 
different religious traditions, different political histories, different economic 
conditions, and, nonetheless, both are considered Middle Eastern. This 
epistemological instrument mimics the late 19th century ideas about the Orient. 
Gertrude Bell argued that it was due to the success of the British government in 
Egypt, as well as in the Persian Gulf and on the Indian north-west frontier that the 
East could hang together, and that if the British mission had been turned back from 
the gates of Kabul, “the English tourist would be frowned upon in the streets of 
Damascus.”34 
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The “Greater Middle East” is thus treated as a concept with actual, real 
existence as if there was some kind of political unity from one geographical extremity 
to the other, or as if by knowing, say, Tajik history one could understand events in 
Algeria, or by being an “expert” on Iranian history one could grasp the situation in 
Egypt. During the events leading to Mubarak’s resignation in 2011, it was common to 
ask if there was a risk of Egypt becoming like Iran, a “theocracy” with mullahs 
controlling the government and the State (it will not be discussed here if Iran really is 
a “theocracy” or if the mullahs, as a single body, really control the State and the 
government). It is difficult to understand this line of reasoning, since the two 
countries have different languages (one speaks an Egyptian dialect of Arabic, and the 
other speaks Persian), different traditions (one is Sunni and the other is Shi’a), 
different political histories (one was part of the Ottoman Empire and, then, under 
British control, the other remained more or less independent), and, finally, the ‘ulama 
(plural of ‘alim, scholar in Islamic Sciences) were never as strong in Egypt as the 
mullahs are in Iran. 
One of the objectives of this research is to question the validity of the 
theological approach to the understanding of the dynamics of politics and religion in 
Islam. The relation between religion and state formation has not been fully explored 
in the social sciences, due to the fact that, generally, most theorists have assumed that 
in modern times economic changes have led, and will lead, to the privatization of faith 
and secularization35, and, as a result, religion will not have an impact on state 
formation in a meaningful fashion and will most likely cease to command popular 
allegiance.36 However, a common complaint from political scientists involved in the 
study of religion is that religious issues have been largely overlooked by political 
science. Steven Kettel shows that political science publications involving religious 
topics have been significantly fewer than those engaging with subjects typically 
regarded as being more central to the discipline, and where they have engaged with 
                                                           
35 CASANOVA, José. 1994. Public Religions in the Modern World. Chicago and London: The 
University of Chicago Press, pp. 11–39. 
 
36 TURNER, Bryan S. 1988. “Religion and State-Formation: A Commentary on Recent Debates” in 
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religious issues, these articles have also focused on a limited number of subject areas 
and been concentrated in specific disciplinary subfields.37 
 
Studying Political Islam, or Islamism 
Several authors have expressed the view that, in most cases, what is called 
Islamic resurgence or revivalism is associated with Islamic militantism or 
fundamentalism, and that political movements are many times confused with a 
religious affirmation.38 Over the last few decades, Islam has become a central point of 
reference for a wide range of political activities, arguments and opposition 
movements. The term “political Islam” has been adopted by many scholars in order to 
identify this seemingly unprecedented irruption of Islamic religion into the secular 
domain of politics and thus to distinguish these practices from the forms of personal 
piety, belief, and ritual conventionally subsumed in Western scholarship under the 
unmarked category “Islam”. The claim that contemporary Muslim activists are putting 
Islam to use for political purposes seems, at least in some instances, to be warranted, 
since although parties that base their appeal on their Islamic credentials appear to 
exemplify this instrumental relation to religion, a problem remains: in what way does 
the distinction between the political and nonpolitical domains of social life hold 
today? 
There have been tremendous, innumerable websites, voluminous publications 
and many projects on Muslim fundamentalists and Islamic fundamentalism, and 
controversial and disputable issues regarding the terms “fundamentalist” and 
“fundamentalism” when used in relation with Islam or Muslim. However, for John L. 
Esposito, “the term Islamic fundamentalism, while commonly used, is regarded by 
many as misleading. The term fundamentalism is laden with Christian presuppositions 
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and Western stereotypes, and it implies a monolithic threat.” Hence, he suggested 
alternative, more useful terms like “Islamic revivalism and Islamic activism, which 
are less value-laden and have roots within a tradition of political reform and social 
activism.”39 
Macksood Aftab had already complained about the terms “fundamentalists” 
and “fundamentalism” used for Muslims because both terms have been deeply rooted 
in the western Christian tradition: “the term Fundamentalist is actually derived from a 
series of essays published from 1910 to 1915 under the title The Fundamentals 
written by British evangelists.  The purpose of this twelve-volume collection was to 
determine which churches, according to the authors, held up to genuine Christian 
doctrine and the ones that did not. Nevertheless the term Fundamentalist, in the 
Christian world, is synonymous with the ‘Bible Thumpers’ and the tele-evangelists.  
To apply the same terminology to Muslims is neither fair nor valid….  Therefore the 
media should stop using the word Fundamentalist to describe any and all Islamic 
organizations, or be more careful in its usage.”40 
Almost a decade earlier than Esposito and Aftab, William Montgomery Watt 
had commented on the term “fundamentalist” used for Islam or Muslim since it was 
more appropriate and applicable to Christianity.  Watt realized that “although it is 
inexact” to use the term “fundamentalist” for Muslims, the term is retained in the title 
of his book because it is “convenient” and “popular journalistic usage”. Watt 
acknowledged and stressed that the term “fundamentalist” was “primarily an Anglo-
Saxon Protestant term, especially applied to those who hold that the Bible must be 
accepted and interpreted literally.  The nearest French equivalent is integrisme, which 
refers to a similar but by no means identical tendency within Roman Catholicism.  In 
Islam, Sunnite fundamentalists accept the Qur’an literally, though in some cases with 
qualifications, but they have also other distinctive features.  The Shi’ites of Iran, who 
in a very general sense are fundamentalists [Watt does not explain why or how], are 
not committed to a literal interpretation of the Qur’an.” 
                                                           
39 ESPOSITO, John L. 1996. “Islamic Fundamentalism” in Encyclopaedia Britannica. Available at 
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40 AFTAB, Macksood. 1995. “What Does Fundamentalism Really Mean?” in The Islamic Herald 
(April). Available at http://www.themodernreligion.com/terror/deffundy.html, last accessed 
21/02/2012. 
 16 
 
Watt did not use the literal interpretation of the Qur’an as the basis to 
differentiate between Muslim fundamentalists and non-fundamentalist Muslims or 
between Islamic fundamentalism and non-fundamentalist Islam although the literal 
interpretation of the Bible was the basis for differentiating between Christian 
fundamentalists and non-fundamentalist Christians. Watt preferred to classify Muslim 
fundamentalists, conservatives and traditionalists in one category and Muslim liberals 
in another category. The two categories of Muslims were different because the 
fundamentalists, conservatives and traditionalists were “those Muslims who fully 
accept the traditional world-view and want to maintain it intact” while the liberals are 
those Muslims who see that the traditional world-view “needs to be corrected in some 
respects”.41 
“Islamism”, “political Islam”, “Islamic activism”, and “Islamic 
fundamentalism” are perhaps the more popular terms of reference; all of them are 
problematic, not least because all represent Western attempts to succinctly 
characterize a complex phenomenon for which there is no single agreed-upon term in 
the Arabic language. So, many decide to use “Islamism” due to its more generalized 
connotations and its current widespread usage in the public arena.42 
Relations between states and institutions, and religious communities, have 
been for more than a century a central concern in the study of what is called the 
Middle East and Islamic societies, with the notion that Islam does not possess an 
ecclesiastic institution and that it covers all fields, including Law and State, and that 
this and the religious are one and the same thing, and that the State and religious 
authority are embodied in the same person, a vision still common, even in the 
academic world.43 
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Ira M. Lapidus says that, contrary to what is thought, there is an important 
differentiation between State and religious institutions in Islamic societies and that the 
historical evidence also shows that there is not just one Islamic model for all States 
and religious institutions, but many, competing with one another. And in each model 
there are ambiguities in what refers to the distribution of authority, the functions of 
each institution and the relationships between them.44 
For Mohammed Arkoun, “in all contemporary societies, developed and 
underdeveloped, the most recurrent debate is the competition, or radical opposition, 
between the religious and the secular model in building the best polity and assuring 
the safest and the most beneficial governance for its citizens.”45 
According to John L. Esposito, “all the world’s religions in their origins and 
histories were fairly comprehensive ways of living. Although the relationship of 
religion to politics varies, religion is a path or a way of life with a strong emphasis on 
community as well as personal life. [...] The modern notion of religion has its origins 
in the post-Enlightenment West. Its restricted definition has become accepted as the 
norm or meaning of religion by many believers and unbelievers alike in the West. 
Bereft of a sense of history, few realize that the term ‘religion’ as known and 
understood today is a modern and Western interpretation of it. The West then set 
about naming other religious systems or isms. Christianity and Judaism were joined 
by the newly named Hinduism, Buddhism, and Mohammedanism. Thus the nature 
and function of other religious traditions were categorized, studied, and judged in 
terms of modern Western, post-Enlightenment secular criteria, with its separation of 
church and state”, a Western notion which is also recent.46 
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For Nikki R. Keddie47 the supposed near-identity of religion and politics in 
Islam is more a pious myth than reality for most of Islamic history. It is widely 
believed that Islam and politics are unusually closely intertwined in all spheres and 
periods, with the partial exception of the past century. This view understates the close 
church-state relations of the Eastern Orthodox churches and of religion and politics in 
the pre-modem West, with the difference between Islamic and Christian lands being 
partly when and how they reached modernity. In practice, despite the often-cited 
special role of Roman law and the existence of a clear relationship between church 
and state in the West, Christianity and Islam had rather similar levels of relations 
between religion and politics in pre-modern times. After the first four pious caliphs, 
i.e. between the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632 Christ Era (C.E.) and 661 
C.E., there were essentially a number of political caliphal dynasties that worked 
through political appointees and broke religious rules when they wished. The body of 
‘ulama partly helped through the creation of schools of law, creating a sphere 
independent of such essentially temporal rulers, but the ‘ulama’s rulings generally had 
less force than those of rulers. The independence of rulers from religious control grew 
as tribal and military converts took increasing power. Authors of advice to rulers often 
stressed the importance of backing religion, but this was pragmatic advice, not really 
advice to be good Muslims.48 Views similar to these on the essential separation of 
religion and politics can be found in other authors like the cited Ira Lapidus49, Sami 
Zubaida50, Nazih Ayubi51, Emmanuel Sivan52, and Aziz Ahmad, to whom it was 
arguable that Islam was religion and politics (State), al-Islam din wa dawla, and even 
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in the Middle Ages that question existed,53 with conflicting views by ibn Taymiyya 
(1263-1328) and al-Ghazali (1058-1111). In the 1950s, Hamilton Gibb had shown 
that Muslim political thinkers were aware of the separation between State and religion 
and acknowledged the emergence of an autonomous sphere of religious activity and 
organisation.54 
For Mohammed Arkoun, “secularism is implicitly and explicitly included in 
the Qur’anic discourse and the Medina historical experience. The Ummayyad-
Abbasid state is secularist in its sociological and anthropological basis, its military 
genesis and expansion, its administrative practice, its ideological discourse of 
legitimacy. The theological and jurisprudential endeavour developed by the ‘ulama 
contributed to concealing behind a religious vocabulary and sacralising 
conceptualisation, literay devices, the secularist, ideological basis of the so-called 
‘Islamic’ polity and governance. [...] All those scholars, Muslims and non-Muslims, 
who contend today that Islam confuses politics and religion, or Islam does not need to 
address the issue of secularism because - unlike Christianity - it never developed a 
clerical regime under the leadership of the Church, neglect the two major historical 
and sociological facts. These are the confiscation of spiritual autonomy by the top (the 
state) and by the bottom (lay believers mobilised by ‘saints’ in brotherhoods) that 
began in 661 and has lasted until today.[...] The large majority of the political regimes 
which emerged in Muslim contexts after the liberation from colonial domination are 
de facto secular in the sense that they have adopted legal codes, governmental 
procedures, administrative hierarchies and practices borrowed from liberal Western, 
or Socialist-Communist patterns of thought and institutional models.”55 
However, the older view remains strong, and it is still frequently heard that 
Islam is religion and world (al-Islam din wa dunya), implying that in the Islamic 
ideology the religious and social dimensions of behaviour are integrated. The well-
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known dictum about Islam being a religion and a state (al-Islam din wa dawla) owes 
its origins to the alarmed reaction in Muslim circles to the final abolition of the 
caliphate, in 1924, at a time when most Muslim communities were suffering from 
territorial division under the impact of European colonialism. In 1925, the Egyptian 
shaykh from al-Azhar University, ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888–1966) published his most 
controversial book, al-Islam wa usul al-hukm56 (Islam and the Foundations of 
Governance: Research on the Caliphate and Governance in Islam), in which he 
argued that Islam was a “message not a government, a religion not a state.” Although 
there had been earlier indications of this idea, such as in the writings of the Syrian 
‘Abd al-Hamid al-Zahrawi (1855-1916)57, the unambiguous, hard-hitting style of 
‘Abd al-Raziq’s book was unprecedented and provoked a vigorous reaction and an 
extremely heated debate which reverberates to this day. 
Thinkers like Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), Mawdudi or Sayyid Qutb, who 
were contemporaries of the abolition of the Caliphate, were the ones who 
reinvigorated and redefined the notion that Islam was religion and State at the same 
time, with the conviction that the State built by the Prophet and his companions in 
Medina was the only one truly Islamic, and reproducible in the contemporary world.58 
‘Abd al-Razzaq Ahmad al-Sanhuri (1895–1971), the distinguished jurist who 
later codified the Egyptian, Iraqi, and other Arab civil laws in a modernized form 
combining shari’a and European principles, could hardly ignore the controversy over 
the abolition. In his book Le Califat59 he called for a new caliphate to preside over a 
general assembly composed of delegations from all Muslim countries and 
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communities. Although al-Sanhuri was almost a secularist (or only a cultural 
Islamist), the contemporary writer Muhammad Sa’id al-‘Ashmawi credits him with 
having coined the phrase “al-Islam din wa dawla” in an article published in 1929.60 
As demonstrated above, researchers’ opinions on the relations between 
religion and politics, or State, in Islam, throughout history and nowadays, are very 
divergent: amid such a variety of views and opinions, is it really possible to offer a 
single answer on the question of what is the role of Islam in the political process? 
Thus, another objective of this research is to explore how different thinkers think, and 
thought, about that role, and under what conditions. 
 
Why study Islam in South Asia? 
In this research, the focus will be on how different thinkers conceived the 
State, the role of Islam, and of the Shari’a, in the formation and organization of a 
State, especially their interactions with the concept of the “Nation-State” which was 
promoted, during the nineteenth and the twentieth centuries, as an expression of 
political modernity. The Muslims of South Asia are circa four hundred and fifty 
million, more or less evenly distributed between Pakistan, India and Bangladesh, and 
there are more Muslims in South Asia than in any other region in the world. After the 
Great Mutiny, or Sepoy Revolt, of 1857-58, and although the great majority of the 
insurgents were Hindus, the last Mughal emperor, Bahadur Shah Zafar (1775-1862), 
was put on trial by the British and charged with being behind an international Muslim 
conspiracy stretching from Istanbul, Mecca and Iran to the walls of the Red Fort in 
Delhi. The Mutiny was crushed, the Emperor was sent into exile in Burma, where he 
passed away in 1862, and India became de jure under British rule.61 
                                                           
60 For further details see WIELANDT, Rotraud. 2003. “Is the unity of religion and state a sine qua non 
condition in Islam?” in MUNAVVAROV, Z. I. and SCHNEIDER-DETERS, W. (eds.). Islam and the 
Secular State. Tashkent: International Fund of Imam al-Bukhari and Friedrich Ebert Foundation, p. 
204, footnote 5. 
 
61 For a detailed account on the origins, causes and consequences of the Revolt see DALRYMPLE, 
William. 2007. The last mughal: the fall of a dynasty, Delhi, 1857. London: Bloomsbury. 
For a general overview on the Mughal India see ALAM, Muzaffar and SUBRAHMANYAM, Sanjay 
(eds.). 1998. The Mughal state, 1526-1750. Delhi: Oxford University Press; ALAM, Muzaffar. 2006. 
 22 
 
Between 1857 and 1947, the subcontinent went through great transformations, 
especially at a political level, and some of the most important outcomes of the Sepoy 
Mutiny of 1857 were the end of Islam’s political preponderance in the region, the end 
of the Mughal dinasty, which had established itself in India since 1526, and the 
replacement of Muslim political power with the British one. To consider the 
importance of this event one should have in mind the fact that even nowadays 
comparisons are being made to contemporary events and situations.62 Also, it should 
be remembered that what now is Eastern Afghanistan was on those days part of the 
Mughal Empire, and that in 1893 a British Commission, led by Sir Edward Durand, 
unilaterally determined the border between Afghanistan and British India, along the 
Khyber Pass. The two thousand and four hundred kilometre long border, known as the 
“Durand Line”, ran exactly along the line that marks the Afghan-Pakistan boundary 
today. Although the opposing zones of influence were by this time a political fact, the 
Durand line confirmed that existing political separation. It dissected many Pashtun 
tribes, seriously undermining their potential for unity and prospects for an 
independent territory of Pashtunistan (or “place of Pashtuns”), which could have 
possibly been consolidated between the Indus River and Hindu Kush. At the same 
time, it sowed the seeds of an enduring border dispute between Afghanistan and 
Pakistan which emerged upon the creation of the latter as a majority Muslim state out 
of the Hindu-dominated India in 1947.63. 
Although the prevalent approach in the study of Islam is to consider its “Arab” 
character as central, the Muslims in the pre-Partition India constituted the largest body 
of Muslims in the world, and the vast political and intellectual influence exerted by 
South Asian Muslims on the wider Muslim world is often neglected. Many of the 
most important political, intellectual and spiritual developments within Islam have 
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had their origins, or have flourished, in South Asia, and Muslims from the region have 
played important roles in the global history of Islam, including the role of Islam in the 
colonial period, resistance to colonial rule, and intellectual responses to, and dialogue 
with, Western thought. Pakistan was specifically created to provide a homeland for 
South Asia’s Muslim population and its trials and tribulations over the past sixty-five 
years have been carefully watched by Muslims and non-Muslims alike. Muslims 
constitute India’s largest minority, with an often uneasy relationship to the majority, 
and during the last hundred years there has been extensive English-language writing 
and research on Islam in South Asia, both by Muslim and non-Muslims scholars.64 
For the occasion of the sesquicentennial of India’s Great Rebellion of 1857-58 in 
2007-2008, scholarship on new aspects of the war as well as retrospectives on the 
conflict's often acrimonious historiography was spawned65, and many Muslims still 
consider that the British, in 1947, should have given back to Muslims the rule of 
India.66 
As Iqbal Singh Sevea shows67, the period between 1857, year of the Sepoy 
Revolt, and 1947, year of independence and Partition of India into two states, was 
very rich in Islamic reformist thinking, originating an intense debate which crossed 
the geographical borders of India and anticipated many contemporary issues: 
women’s condition, the role of religion in politics or the end of the Caliphate. At the 
same time, the world at large went through significant events, which influenced India 
and the Islamic world, almost entirely under imperial and colonial European rule. 
Throughout this period, on which we will focus in this research, Muslims in India 
witnessed the bourgeoning of a public sphere as members of its elite attempted to use 
newspapers, journals and tracts as a means to inform public opinion, discuss the 
contemporary condition of the Muslims, and usher in social and religious reforms. 
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According to John Obert Voll, “the Islamic world faced a major challenge 
during the nineteenth century. Expanding Western European states and economies 
played an increasing role in determining events, both on a global scale and within 
Islamic societies. By the end of the century, many Muslim territories were under 
direct European control, and much of the rest of the Muslim world was dominated by 
the West. [...] At times, the Islamic-Western interaction has resulted in fruitful 
cooperation, but the prevailing tone in the nineteenth century was one of conflict. 
Rather than partnerships emerging, the primary arrangement was domination-
subordination. The context for the Islamic experience was thus often one of struggle, 
and the new Western ideas and techniques were seen as being in competition with the 
Islamic ideals. From a strict Islamic standpoint, adaptation in this context gave the 
appearance of surrender. It was not until the end of the nineteenth century that 
significant efforts were made to create an Islamically oriented adaptationism. Part of 
the problem for Muslims was a growing awareness of Western power and the feeling 
that the strength of the modern ideas and institutions was in fact qualitatively different 
from the Islamic sources of power. For a community whose historical experience 
tended to reinforce the idea that ‘God is on the side of those who fear Him and do 
good’, the visible strength of the modernising West pose grave problems, and at 
times, it created a sense of unease. [...] In the diversity of the Islamic experiences 
during the nineteenth century, some general trends can be discerned. There was a 
continuing momentum of the eighteenth-century developments that gave inspiration 
to Islamic activist movements in many areas. There were also substantial efforts to 
introduce Western techniques in the creation of more effective state structures. The 
success of both of those efforts was limited in the nineteenth century in the face of 
growing European dominance, and as that fact became clear, efforts were made to 
redefine Islam in order to meet the challenges. Along with that redefinition, other 
activities developed, sometimes in conjunction with and sometimes in competition 
with Islamic sentiments. These activities involved more clearly secularist attitudes, 
ideas of radical reform, and nationalism.”68 
On the same line of thinking, John L. Esposito says that “although modern 
Islamic reform is often simply presented as a response to the challenge of the West, in 
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fact its roots are both Islamic (its revivalist tradition) and Western (a response to 
European colonialism). Islam possesses a rich, long tradition of Islamic revival 
(tajdid) and reform (islah). Down through the ages, individuals and organizations 
undertook the renewal of the community in times of weakness and decline, 
responding to the apparent gap between the Islamic ideal and the realities of Muslim 
life. As with all things, a return to Islam – that is, to the fundamentals: the Qur’an, the 
life of the Prophet, and the early Islamic community – offered the model for Islamic 
reform.”69 
Since the middle of the eighteenth century, many individuals and movements 
tried to reform and renew Islam, each according to the environment where they 
worked. Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, different movements and 
individuals were active in the Islamic world, like the Mahdi in the Sudan, the Sanusi 
in Libya, the Wahhabi in Arabia, the Fulani in Nigeria, the Padri in Indonesia, and 
Shah Wali Allah in India. Most of these movements were internally and externally 
motivated: to respond to the decline, whose root cause was considered to be within 
the Islamic world, and the European expansionism, which would invade, conquer and 
colonise most of it in late nineteenth, early twentieth century.70 
Within the Muslim world, and according to Nikki R. Keddie, revolts with a 
religious aspect or ideology had had a long history, but these revolts, common in the 
early centuries of Islam, became less frequent thereafter, resurfacing with a revivalist 
tone after circa 1700. These revolts can be characterised into three phases, tied to 
interaction with the West, in different ways, although this was far from being their 
only cause: 1) the pre-colonial phase; 2) early resistance to colonialism; and 3) the 
recent Islamic revival.71 
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In India, the need for reform was put forward by Shah Wali Allah (1702/3-
1762), who lived in a period of political decadence of the Mughal dinasty. His works 
and theories were of great influence and many of the later thinkers and movements in 
Muslim India would consider themselves as spiritual heirs to his thought, although 
many of them had great differences between them, sometimes with completely 
different agendas. Of particular importance was his notion of ijtihad (independent 
reasoning) which would have a deep impact on many movements which sprang up, 
proposing a reform of Islam, with the aim to bring again an idealized Golden Age, 
i.e., the epoch of the Prophet and the Companions, but the proposals and the 
discourses varied according to each individual and each movement, something that we 
can still discern nowadays in many Islamist movements or movements that use Islam 
as a source of identity.72 
One of the individuals to propose a reform of Islam was Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
(1817-1898), founding figure of the Aligarh movement. After the events of 1857-
1858, Ahmad Khan came to the conclusion that the Muslims of India had to 
accommodate the British, and use modern education to advance themselves. This line 
of thought influenced, among others, Chiragh ‘Ali, who defended that, in Islam, the 
“State” was separated from the “Church”, and Muhammad Iqbal, who would, in turn, 
influence Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi and ‘Ali Shari’ati (1903-1977). Mawdudi was fiercily 
anti-British and a staunch supporter of an Islamic State, and his work was 
fundamental in shaping the views of Sayyid Qutb, an important ideologue of the 
Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. ‘Ali Shari’ati, drawing on Iqbal’s critique of Marxism 
and his construction of Islam as the solution to contemporary social, economic and 
political problems, was very influential for the Revolution in Iran in 1978-79.73 
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Studying the State in an Islamic context 
According to Nazih N. Ayubi, Nader Hashemi and Emran Qureshi, to define 
the proper relation between Islam and the state remains a central and unresolved 
question. Among the chief questions are whether or not revealed sacred text, in this 
case the Qur’an, should be the exclusive or principal source of political legitimacy, 
and whether or not government should enforce a particular religious doctrine. Islamist 
movements have been strengthened globally (as recent elections in different countries 
of the Arab world have shown), and though their ideological positions vary greatly 
and are contingent upon local circumstances, they all insist on the primacy of the 
Shari’a, even though they may interpret it in vastly different ways. Support for the 
ideal of an Islamic state today needs to be situated against the broad failure of the 
secular post-colonial Muslim-majority state. Although there are a few countries that 
may qualify as exceptions, such as Turkey and Indonesia, most states in the Muslim 
world today have been characterized by corruption, cronyism, authoritarianism, and 
varying degrees of political repression. It is in this context that the “Islamic state” 
option appears most attractive. At times, Muslim political identity today is formed in 
opposition to and rejection of “the West.” Thus Western support for secularism and 
liberal democracy, while it pursues foreign polices that are viewed as inimical to 
Muslim interests, engenders a reactive oppositional Muslim political identity. The 
consequences of this identity construction lend support to the abstract idea of an 
“Islamic state” as an alternative to Western models.74 
In Quentin Skinner’s assessment of Thomas Hobbes’s use of the term state to 
denote the highest source of authority in matters of civil government, that use was a 
declaration that could be viewed as marking the end of one phase in the history of 
political theory and the beginning of another, and a more familiar one, announcing the 
end of an era in which the concept of public power had been analysed in more 
personal and charismatic terms, and pointing to a simpler and more abstract vision of 
sovereignty as the property of an impersonal agency, a vision that has remained ever 
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since and has come to be embodied in the use of such terms as état, stato, Staat and 
state.75 
For Barbara Goodwin76, the term “state” is a relative newcomer to political 
debate. Until the nineteenth century political thinkers preferred terms such as 
“commonwealth”, “political society”, “sovereign power” and “government” to denote 
what would today be called the “state”. “Nation-state” is a nineteenth-century term, 
which embraces the whole of a society as well as its political apparatus. The subject 
here, however, is the state as the major locus of power and authority in every modern 
society. The state consists of the legislative, executive and judicial branches of 
government, along with all the institutions to which they delegate powers. Goodwin 
presents four alternative views regarding the nature of the State, embedded in 
different ideological or theoretical frameworks, and briefly summarized: 
1) The contractual view. The state derives from voluntary agreement of men, via the 
social contract, and its task is to promote the interests of the people as individuals 
(Locke) or as a collectivity (Rosseau). The state’s (or sovereign’s) power is unlimited 
(Hobbes), or limited by men’s natural rights (Locke), or is constrained to realize the 
General Will (Rousseau). The hypothesis of the contract thus leads to no general 
conclusions about the nature and powers of the state, as these are deduced from the 
different original premises of the various theories. However, it does, in Locke’s 
version, lead to a marked distinction between the institutions of the state and civil 
society, the “public” and the “private”, and entails a natural demarcation between 
these spheres; 
2) The state as arbiter and nightwatchman. This view derives from the minimal role 
assigned to the state by classical economists and liberals. The state is minimal because 
state intervention impedes individuals’ pursuit of their own interests. The utilitarians 
in particular emphasized the neutrality of the state. All individuals were considered 
equal, qua individuals, so the state could and should take nobody’s part, but should 
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harmonize everyone’s interests. The state’s origin is unimportant, for its justification 
lies in the satisfactory performance of its role of negotiator, arbiter and minimizer of 
conflict. The state is obliged to care equally for all its members, as utilitarianism 
enjoins, and to ensure this, the state is best subjected to a constitution which enforces 
its impartiality. From this perspective, the state is merely the sum of its individual 
parts, and is seen only as one element, albeit important, in the wider civil society; 
3) The state as organism. Conservative romantics like Coleridge, but also the anti-
romantic Hegel, conceived of the state as an integrated organism, set above 
individuals, a whole greater than its component parts. Hegel was anxious to oust the 
contract view and the liberalism based on it. The organic ideal denies the possibility 
of conflicting interests: it offers a “natural” foundation for the state. Hegel 
characterized the state as “abstract mind” which acknowledged no other absolute 
principles, such as morality, and was an absolute in itself, hence the omnipotence of 
the state in his theory. From this organic account there could be no balance of powers 
and no neutrality in the state, for the state had its own holistic interest, far above the 
interests of individuals. According to this analysis the state represented and embodied 
the whole society or nation; and, finally, 4) The state as oppressor, as considered by 
the Marxist analysis, to which most anarchists would also adhere in principle if not in 
detail, and which viewed the state as the instrument of the ruling class, and explicitly 
contradicted the other three views. 
In the Islamic world, the term “state” is also a newcomer but, like any other 
human society, different Muslim communities had to organise themselves politically.  
Although the original Islamic sources (the Qur’an and the hadiths) have very little to 
say on matters of government and the state, the first issue to confront the Muslim 
community immediately after the death of its formative leader, the Prophet 
Muhammad, in 632 C.E., was in fact the problem of government and how to select a 
successor, khalifah (caliph), to the Prophet. From the start, therefore, Muslims had to 
innovate and to improvise with regard to the form and nature of government. The first 
disagreements that emerged within the Muslim community, which led to the eventual 
division of Islam into Sunnis, Khawarij, Shi’is, and other sects, were undeniably 
concerned with politics. But theorizing about politics was very much delayed, and 
 30 
 
most works of Islamic political literature seem to have emerged when the political 
realities that they addressed were already in the past. 
For Ayubi, Hashemi and Qureshi77, Islam is a religion of collective morals, 
containing little that is specifically political: the original Islamic sources rarely 
convey much on how to form states, run governments, and manage organizations. If 
the rulers of the historical Islamic states were also spiritual leaders of their 
communities, this was not because Islam required the imam (religious leader) to be 
also a political ruler, but because Islam had spread in regions where the modes of 
production tended to be control-based and where the state had always played a crucial 
economic and social role. 
The “monopoly” of a certain religion had always been one of the state’s usual 
instruments for ensuring ideological hegemony (the Roman, Byzantine and Persian 
Empires are examples), and the historical Islamic state was heir to this tradition. The 
main piece of political literature inherited from the Muhammadan period is al-sahifah, 
the document often known as the constitution of Medina, the text of which is 
attributed mostly to the hijrah (migration) episode of 622 to 624 C.E. This 
constitution speaks of the believers as forming one umma (community), which also 
includes the Jews of Medina. Although composed of tribes, each of which is 
responsible for the conduct of its members, the umma as a whole is to act collectively 
in enforcing social order and security and in confronting enemies in times of war and 
peace. Given the limited nature of political stipulations in the Qur’an and the hadiths, 
Muslims have had to borrow and to improvise in developing their political systems. 
These systems, however, have been inspired by 1) Shari’a (which literally means, in 
Arabic, path, way, and is usually translated as Islamic law), as represented in the 
Qur’an and the Sunna; 2) by Arabian tribal traditions; and 3) by the political heritage 
of the lands Muslims conquered, especially the Persian and Byzantine traditions. 
The influence of the first source was more noticeable during the era of the first 
four rashidun (rightly guided) caliphs (632-661 C.E.), the second during the 
Umayyad dynasty (661-750 C.E.), and the third during the ‘Abbasid (749-1258 C.E.) 
and Ottoman (1281-1922 C.E.) dynasties. Muslims had indeed been state builders, in 
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the practical sense, in such fields as military expansion, government arrangements, 
and administrative techniques - in this respect they probably preceded Europeans. But 
these were not really states in the modern sense of the term: they were externally 
imperial systems, and internally dynastic systems, akin to many other ancient and 
medieval systems that are normally distinguished from the modern state. Since the 
state is a Western concept, representing a European phenomenon that developed 
between the sixteenth and twentieth centuries in relation to various factors, including 
the Renaissance and the growth of capitalism and individualism, it is not surprising 
not to find such a concept in Islamic thought prior to the modern era. However, 
Islamic political thought did have much to say about the body politic and, of course, 
about rulers and governments: these, when examined and reconstructed, can give us 
an understanding of what is the closest thing to the concept of the state in traditional 
Islamic thinking. If the concept of the state in Europe cannot be understood in 
isolation from the concepts of individualism, liberty, and law, the Islamic concept of 
the body politic cannot be understood in isolation from the concepts of jama’a or 
umma (the group or the community), ‘adl or ‘adala (justice or fairness), and qiyada or 
imama (leadership). Basically, the category of politics in traditional Islamic thought is 
a classification of types of statesmanship, not types of state; it pertains to the problem 
of government and especially to the conduct of the ruler, not to the polity as a social 
reality or to the state as a generic category or legal abstraction. 
Islamic political theory took shape subsequent to the historical development 
that it addressed, and indeed most major political concepts did not develop except 
during periods when the political institutions about which they were theorizing were 
in decline. Thus, for example, the caliphate theory goes back to the period of the 
deterioration of the caliphate as an institution during the ‘Abbasid dynasty, the 
appearance of more than one caliph in several Muslim cities (i.e., the division of the 
Islamic umma), and the growth of opposition movements of Shi’is, Khawarij, 
Muʿtazilis, Ikhwan al-Safa, and others, against the Sunni ruler in Baghdad. Indeed, 
the caliphate theory was mainly a Sunni refutation of the arguments put forward by 
the escalating opposition movements (including the Shi’i), and it represented a quest 
for the ideal, not a positive description of what was actually there. It was only with the 
process of tadwin (inscription and registration), in the middle of the ninth century, 
that writings on the caliphate emerged, first among the Shi’is, then by way of reaction 
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among the Sunnis, but most particularly after Muhammad ibn Idris al-Shafi’i (d. 820 
C.E.), a founder of one of the four legal schools, had specified the methodological 
rules of Sunni thought and had enumerated the sanctioned sources of Shari’a: the 
Qur’an, the Sunna, ijmaʿ (consensus of the learned), and qiyas (reasoning by 
analogy). 
Until the beginning of the nineteenth century Muslims thought of politics in 
terms of the umma (a term originally connoting any ethnic or religious community but 
eventually becoming nearly synonymous with the universal Islamic community) and 
of a caliphate or a sultanate (i.e., government or rule of a more religious or a more 
political character, respectively). A concept of the state that might link the community 
and the government was not to develop until later on. The term dawla (used today to 
connote “state” in the European sense) existed in the Qur’an and was indeed used by 
medieval Muslim authors. However, in its verbal form, the word originally meant “to 
turn, rotate, or alternate.” In the ‘Abbasid and subsequent periods, it was often used to 
describe fortunes, vicissitudes, or ups and downs (e.g., “dalat dawlatuhu” – “his days 
have passed”). Gradually the word came to mean “dynasty”, and then, very recently, 
“state.” 
The Egyptian Rifa’a al-Tahtawi (1801-1873) paved the way for a territorial, 
rather than a purely communal, concept of the polity when he emphasized the idea of 
watan (or fatherland, as expressed in the French, German, and Russian words patrie, 
Vaterland, and rodina). Nonetheless he could not break away completely from the 
(religious) umma concept, nor did he call for a national state in the secular European 
sense. The first time that the term dawla (in Turkish, devlet) appears in its modern 
meaning of “state,” as distinct from “dynasty” and “government,” is in a Turkish 
memorandum of about 1837. Islamic thinkers, however, were in no hurry to espouse 
this new concept of the state. This was because the modern Middle East state system 
did not emerge until after World War I. Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839–1897) and 
Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849–1905), therefore, still spoke in terms of the Islamic umma 
and its “firmest bond” (al-ʿurwat al-wuthqa, the name of a publication which both 
animated in late nineteenth century) and of the Islamic ruler and his good conduct. 
‘Abd al-Rahman al-Kawakibi (1854–1902) went a step further by talking about the 
Islamic league (al-jami’a al-Islamiya) as a religious bond, using the term umma not in 
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an exclusively religious but sometimes in an ethnic sense and the term watan when he 
spoke of what united Muslim with non-Muslim Arabs. He also distinguished between 
politics and administration of religion (al-din) and politics and administration of the 
“kingdom” (al-mulk), saying that in the history of Islam the two had only been united 
during the rashidun era (632-661 C.E.) and that of Caliph ‘Umar ibn ‘Abd al-‘Aziz (r. 
717–720 C.E.). 
The modern concept of the Islamic state emerged as a reaction and response to 
the demise of the last caliphate in Turkey in 1924. Muhammad Rashid Rida (1865-
1935) started the move in that direction when, as a protest against the Turkish 
decision after World War I to turn the caliphate into a purely spiritual authority, he 
published, in 1923, his book Al-Khilafa aw al-Imama al-‘Uzma (The Caliphate or 
the Grand Imamate), in which he argued that the caliphate had always been, and 
should continue to be, a combination of spiritual and temporal authority. He called for 
an Arab khilafat durura (caliphate of necessity or urgency) and maintained that this 
would give both Muslim and non-Muslim Arabs a state of their own.78 
The intellectual evolution of the concept of “al-Islam din wa dawla” took 
another step forward about a decade later. The political context was marked by British 
colonialism and the Indian-Pakistani writer Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi (1903-1979) was its 
major proponent. Indian Muslims had indeed reacted most vociferously to the demise 
of the Ottoman caliphate by, among other things, forming the Khilafat movement. 
Most of his political ideas were developed in India in the turbulent period between 
1937 and 1941. But whereas many saw the emergence of Pakistan as grounds for 
optimism, what Mawdudi wanted was not a Muslim state, i.e., a state for the Indian 
Muslims, but an Islamic state, i.e., an ideological state run only by true believers on 
the basis of the Qur’an and Sunna. Consequently, Mawdudi directed much of his 
writing against nationalism and against democracy, because he believed that either or 
both would result in a non-Muslim government. A particular idea that would be 
widely echoed was his Khawarij-inspired concept that al-hakimiya (total absolute 
sovereignty) should be for God alone, not for law and not for the people. Also 
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influential was his emphasis on the Khawarij-Ibn Taymiyya concept that what makes 
a Muslim is not simply acceptance of the credo, al-shahadatayn (there is no god but 
God, Muhammad is God’s Messenger), but rather active involvement in enforcing the 
Islamic moral order on the legislative, political, and economic affairs of the society. 
Mawdudi would influence, among others, the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb (1906-1966), 
member of the Muslim Brotherhood and a most influential figure for contemporary 
political Islamists. 
Hasan al-Banna (1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt in 
1928, appeared to arrive at similar if less-sweeping conclusions about a decade after 
the movement’s formation. From a moralistic and social emphasis, al-Banna began to 
move in a political direction and to speak in his writings of “an Islamic nationalism 
that is far superior to any local nationalism”, and he denied that the Muslim 
Brotherhood was a political party, but admitted that “politics on the foundation of 
Islam is at the heart of our idea.” To him Islam was everything: “a belief and a form 
of worship, a fatherland and a nationality, a religion and a state, spirituality and 
action, a book and a sword.” Such a formulation becomes even more extreme with his 
fellow Muslim Brother ‘Abd al-Qadir ‘Awda (d. 1954), according to whom Islam was 
also “a religion and a state.” To this author, the two are so blended that they cannot be 
distinguished: “the state in Islam has become the religion, and religion in Islam has 
become the state.” And “just as religion is [the first] part of Islam, so is government 
the second part, indeed it is the more important part.” 
Is it really possible to deduce directly and unambiguously from the Qur’an 
and the hadiths the form of the state and the nature of government? The fact is that the 
few contemporary polities that call themselves, or are taken to be, Islamic states are 
very different from each other in their most important political aspects. Such countries 
might be similar in terms of applying so-called Islamic penalties (hudud) or of trying 
to avoid the receiving or giving of banking interest taken to be forbidden (usury, or 
riba), yet they are very different from each other with regard to their political forms 
and constitutional arrangements. Nor do they usually have mutual recognition of each 
other as being Islamic states. 
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Saudi Arabia is taken to be the earliest contemporary Islamic state, dating at 
least to the early 1930s. It is a monarchy (a form considered un-Islamic or even anti-
Islamic by many), although the king has recently dropped the title of “his royal 
majesty” and replaced it with the more Islamic one of Khadim al-Haramayn (“servant 
of the two sanctuaries”, Mecca and Medina). Saudi Arabia owes its origins to tribal 
conquests and alliances, and it continues to rely on tribal solidarity to maintain the 
cohesion of the regime. It does not have a constitution (the Qur’an being its 
fundamental law), nor does it have a parliament or political parties, although it has a 
modern-looking cabinet and bureaucracy. Socially, it is extraordinarily conservative, 
although in terms of employment and services it functions in many ways as a welfare 
state. What gives the state its Islamic character is mainly the role of its ‘ulama who, 
following a strict Hanbali/Wahhabi tradition, exercise an unmistakable influence by 
issuing fatawa (plural of fatwa, a formal legal opinion, a counsel) on social and 
political matters, controlling Shari’a courts, and directing the morals police. 
Islamic Iran, by contrast, is a republic with a constitution, a president, a 
parliament, a cabinet, bureaucracy, a court system along with regular elections (for 
regime loyalists). The current state owes its existence to a multi-class popular 
revolution within which the religious wing, led by a politicized segment of the Shi’i 
‘ulama, was able to assume the upper hand.79 Islam played a mobilizing role and 
Khomeini’s discourse made it possible to combine social conservatism with populism 
and political radicalism, and to construct a basically étatist economy in post-
revolutionary Iran. The distinct features of such a regime have been the role of an 
Islamic jurist as the “Leader of the Islamic Republic”, the high representation of 
‘ulama in the parliament (majlis) and the court system; the ‘ulama also perform key 
parts in the Guardian Council and the Assembly of Experts. It should be also 
remembered the important role played by the Islamic Revolutionary Guards and the 
Basij paramilitary corps. 
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Sudan is another country where the establishment of an Islamic state was 
attempted by a military regime; in this case the process was resumed later by another 
military regime. Ja’far Nimeiri ’s regime (1969–1985) started with distinct socialist 
and Arabist leanings but was tempted, with the escalation in its economic and political 
problems, to adopt an increasingly Islamist orientation, in alliance with the Sudanese 
Muslim Brotherhood led by Hassan al-Turabi.80 In 1983–1984 the application of 
Shari’a laws was announced, combined with sweeping powers for Nimeiri himself, 
stipulated in the emergency law of 1984. Courts were hurriedly formed, summarily 
handing down severe punishments, including limb amputations. The escalating 
socioeconomic crisis and the growing resistance in the non-Muslim South, combined 
with Nimeiri’s eccentric arbitrariness, resulted in a popular uprising that ousted him in 
1985. But the Islamic movement had used its period in government with Nimeiri to 
consolidate its organization and to spread its influence within the country’s 
institutions, including the army. This enabled the movement to win in various 
syndicate and political elections, and when Lieutenant-General ‘Umar al-Bashir 
installed another military regime, in 1989, it was markedly influenced by the National 
Islamic Front. 
Pakistan, which was created in 1947 for the Indian Muslims and was supposed 
to be a secular country, had been claiming to construct an Islamic state, especially 
since the military coup d ’état of Zia ul-Haq (r. 1977–1988). The military regime 
attempted to derive political legitimacy from its program of “Islamization.” Initiating 
the process in 1980, an Islamic legal code, to be applied through Shari’a courts, was 
issued by decree, but this was strongly resisted by the Shi’is and scorned by the 
women’s movement. Tightly controlled elections were held without functioning 
political parties and interest-free banking was introduced, but faced serious 
difficulties. Commissions were formed for the Islamization of the economy and of 
education, and such moves were halted by Zia’s death in a plane crash in 1988, but 
the Islamization programme has continued, with ups and downs, and has resulted in a 
strengthening of exclusionary sectarian Sunni and Shi’i identities. 
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It should be clear from these cases that although so-called Islamic states may 
adopt similar practices with regard to moral and social issues (pertaining to family, 
gender, dress, alcohol, and so forth) there is little similarity in the political features of 
such states or even in their socioeconomic orientations. 
 
Methodology and sources 
This research, which is at the intersection of four fields of knowledge 
(Political Science, History, Islamic Studies, and South Asian Studies), will investigate 
what Chiragh ‘Ali, Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi offered in terms of political 
models, what were their conceptions of State, and what was the role of Islam in it, the 
similarities and the differences, and in what ways their thinking was framed by what 
surrounded them: the influences of western political thought, the interaction between 
the Islamic world and the West, and the British influence on India. 
The sources used are mainly primary ones, and the strategy employed is the 
one advanced by Mohammed Arkoun81 (1928-2010) and Quentin Skinner.82 
Combining a critical review of modern studies devoted to early and contemporary 
periods of what is generally called “Islam” with the systematic deconstruction of the 
original texts used in these studies as sources of genuine information, primary and 
secondary texts will not be read in order to discuss the facts themselves, but to 
problematize the epistemis and epistemological framework underlying the articulation 
of each discourse. One of the main concerns here will be with ideas put forward by 
Muslim thinkers and not with ideas which are “Islamic” or considered as such, since 
this would detract us from a study of the debates amongst various Muslim thinkers 
and the attempts by them to reinterpret and, in the process, shape Islam. While the 
study of theology and texts is important, far more significant are the political 
dynamics and historical context in which a given theology ascends, gains acceptance, 
or loses salience. 
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From Mohammed Arkoun’s perspective, historical epistemology had a priority 
over the purely descriptive, narrative presentation of what “Islam” teaches, or what 
Muslims say, do or achieve as social and historical protagonists. To what extent are 
these protagonists aware of the ideological dimensions of their discourse and 
historical actions? Which cognitive structures do they use for the purpose of 
interpreting their religion, applying it to their actual life or reshaping it on the basis of 
historical pressures? To what extent do they develop a critical relationship with their 
past and their present in order to have better control over their future, and how 
relevant, effective and creative would such a relationship be? 
For a time, during the late 1970s, Mohammed Arkoun called this approach 
“applied Islamology” following the example set by a group of anthropologists who 
had started the practice of “applied anthropology”, and, during the following decades, 
political scientists focused on political Islam, and in particular, fundamentalist 
movements, to such an extent that they succeeded in marginalizing classical 
islamology, ignoring the methodological breakthrough offered by Applied Islamology. 
This situation applied both to classical Islamicists, long confined to the philological, 
historicist application of the most “representative” classical texts, and to the new 
wave of Islamicists who had had no philological training in the main Islamic 
languages (Arabic, Persian, Turkish and Urdu) and who had confined their research to 
socio-political issues considered from a short-term perspective. Applied Islamology 
insists on the need to practise a progressive-regressive method, combining the long-
term historical perspective with the short-term perspective, because all of the 
contemporary discourse emerging in Islamic contexts, inevitably refers to the 
emerging period of Islam, and the “Golden Age” of its civilization used as 
mythological reference to reactivate “values” - ethical and legal paradigms - which 
need to be reassessed. 
As Quentin Skinner says, concepts not only alter over time, but are incapable 
of providing us with anything more than a series of changing perspectives on the 
world in which we live and have our being. Our concepts form part of what we bring 
to the world in our efforts to make sense of it. The shifting conceptualizations to 
which this process gives rise constitute the very stuff of ideological debate, so that it 
makes no more sense to regret than to deny that such conceptual changes continually 
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take place. With this research, it is also hoped that an explanation is made of why 
some concepts came to prominence at a particular historical period. Concepts, or what 
we express through them, have a history. They rise and fall, and in some cases they 
finally disappear from sight, reflecting deeper transformations in social life.83 
Not only do political scientists occupy key positions in academic institutions, 
they also have a strong relationship with the political decision-makers as well as tacit 
solidarity with the most powerful media. As far as Islamic studies are concerned, the 
move from classical Islamology, dominated by the classical Orientalist episteme and 
epistemology, to the pragmatic, factual, too often ideological practice of the social 
sciences by the political scientist, has had little material effect in improving the 
intellectual shortcomings of scholarship applied in the Islamic sphere of influence in 
research and teaching. 
The International Journal of Middle East Studies Transliteration Guide was 
used.84 All Urdu (and Hindi), Arabic, Turkish, and Persian names have been cited 
using a simplified transliteration system that eliminates diacritical marks other than 
the ‘ayn and hamzah, except in the titles of books or articles. Vowels are rendered by 
i, u, and a; on occasion, e or o is substituted to convey a spelling more in line with the 
local pronunciation of the name or source cited. The use of u instead of w, and ia as 
opposed to iyya, reflects the closest approximation to the local pronunciation of the 
name or source in question. Terms such as jihad, Shari’a, and ‘ulama appear in their 
anglicized form, except when the source is in Turkish (Ictihad instead of Ijtihad and 
so on). The meanings of non-European words are explained throughout the text 
instead of providing a list at the end of this thesis, in a glossary. Personal names are 
rendered in accordance with the transliteration rules cited above even when spelled 
differently by the persons in question. The only exceptions are names whose 
particular spelling has become established in Western literature. In transliterating 
personal names, the collapse of vowels and the particular pronunciation of Arabic or 
Persian words typical of Urdu have been retained (hence, for example, Hashmi rather 
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than Hashimi). Whenever the transliteration of a directly quoted source differs from 
the one employed here, the variations have been respected. 
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CHAPTER I: 
ISLAMIC REFORM MOVEMEATS IA THE 19TH AAD 20TH CEATURIES 
AAD THEIR IMPACTS IA IADIA 
 
Throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, in a trend that had begun at the 18th, 
many thinkers in the Muslim world felt that Islam was going through a period of 
social decline, political weakness and economic disintegration, expressing itself in 
different regions where reform movements and schools, while taking into account 
spiritual and environmental differences of each region, showed an essentially similar 
character. This pushed those thinkers to propose projects of deep reform in beliefs, 
ideas and practices based on them. These reformers were convinced that their 
opinions, policies and programmes were fundamentally similar to those of early 
Islam, and among the reformist phenomena there were clear differences as to the main 
theme: some insisted more on purification than others, some were more proactive; and 
their forms also varied according to local differences and different religious historical 
experiences. However, the general view presented a clearly defined character: an 
invitation to return to primitive Islam, the end of moral and social abuses, the general 
deterioration which the umma had undergone over the centuries, since the fall of 
Baghdad in 1258 at the hands of the Mongols, and, as a proposed solution to these 
problems, the adoption of an attitude of moral and religious positivism.85 
The second half of the 19th century was a period of great richness in the history 
of the modern Islamic movement, when a group of Muslim intellectuals, in different 
parts of the world, rigorously examined the fundamentals of Islamic jurisprudence. 
The central theological problems at the core of these examinations focused on the 
validity of the knowledge derived from sources external to the Qur’an and the 
methodology of traditional sources of jurisprudence: the Qur’an, the hadith 
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(traditions of the Prophet Muhammad), ijma (consensus of the Muslim community), 
and qiyas (analogical reasoning). The epistemological step adopted was to reinterpret 
the first two, the Qur’an and the hadith, and to transform the last two, ijma and qiyas, 
in the light of scientific rationalism. Among those who had a strong impact were al-
Afghani (1838-1897), Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898), Muhammad ‘Abduh (1849-
1905) and Amir ‘Ali (1849-1928), who presented Islam in a way that was consistent 
with modern ideas and rational sciences. They were fascinated with what the West 
had achieved in technological and scientific progress: the Newtonian conception of 
the Universe, Spencer’s sociology, Darwinian ideas and even Western style of life. 
All of them argued that, since Islam was a world religion, it was capable of adapting 
to the changing environment of each age, particularly since the use of law and reason 
was characteristic of the perfect Muslim community.86 
Although the felt need for reformist thinking was endogenous, with 
movements which proposed a fresh rereading against the inherited traditions87, the 
shock of European expansionism beginning in the later part of the 18th century, early 
19th, the expansive social and intellectual power of Europe, seen not only as an 
adversary but also as a challenge, in some cases an attractive one, brought a new 
element which reinforced that feeling. The power and greatness of Europe, science 
and modern technologies, political institutions of European states, and social morality 
of modern societies were all favourite issues, forcing the formulation of a 
fundamental problem: how could the Arabs and other Muslims, and the Ottoman 
Muslim state, acquire the strength to confront Europe and become part of the modern 
world? 
According to Albert Hourani, the first clear attempts to answer this question 
came to light in the writings of the officials connected with the reforms in the middle 
of 19th century in Istanbul, Cairo and Tunis. Some were written in Turkish, others in 
Arabic. Particularly important was the work of Khayr al-Din Pasha al-Tunisi (c. 1822-
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1890), leader of the last attempt to reform the Tunisian government before the French 
occupation. In the introduction to his book, which would have a strong impact on the 
thought of Al-Afghani and Sayyid Ahmad Khan88, he explained his aim: 
“First, to urge those who are zealous and resolute among statesmen and men 
of religion to adopt, as far as they can, whatever is conducive to the welfare of the 
Islamic community and the development of its civilization, such as the expansion of 
the bounds of science and learning and the preparation of the paths which lead to 
wealth... and the basis of all this is good government. Secondly, to warn those who are 
heedless among the generality of Muslims against persistence in closing their eyes to 
what is praiseworthy and what conforms with our own religious law in the practice of 
adherents of other religions, simply because they have the idea fixed in their minds 
that all the acts and institutions of those who are not Muslims should be avoided.”89 
In the view of such authors, the Ottoman Empire should acquire the strength 
of a modern state by changes in its laws, methods of administration and military 
organization; the relationship of sultan and subject should be changed into that of 
modern government and citizen, and loyalty to a ruling family should be transmuted 
into the sense of membership of a nation, the Ottoman nation, which would include 
Muslims and non-Muslims, Turks and non-Turks. All this could be done without 
disloyalty to Islam or the traditions of the empire, if only they were understood 
correctly. 
As the century went on, and with the rise of the new educated class in the 
1860s and 1870s, a split appeared among those who supported the reforms, a division 
of opinion which was about the bases of authority: whether it should lie with officials 
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responsible to their own sense of justice and the interests of the empire, or with a 
representative government produced by elections. The split between generations of 
Muslim thinkers went deeper than this, however. The second generation, in all three 
countries, Ottoman Turkey, Egypt and Tunisia, was aware of a problem implicit in the 
changes which were taking place. Reform of institutions would be dangerous unless 
rooted in some kind of moral solidarity: what should this be, and how far could it be 
derived from the teachings of Islam? Such a question became more pressing as the 
new schools began to produce a generation not grounded in the traditional Islamic 
learning, and exposed to winds of doctrine blowing from the West. 
This problem, the compatibility of the reforms with Islam, did not arise for the 
Arabic-speaking Christians of Lebanon and Syria, who played a large part in the 
intellectual life of this period. For Muslims, however, the problem was inescapable. 
Islam was what was deepest in them. If living in the modern world demanded changes 
in their ways of organizing society, they must try to make them, while remaining true 
to themselves; and this would be possible only if Islam was interpreted to make it 
compatible with survival, strength and progress in the world. This was the starting-
point of those who might be called “Islamic modernists”. Islam, they believed, was 
not only compatible with reason, progress and social solidarity, the bases of modern 
civilization; if properly interpreted, it positively enjoined them. Such ideas were put 
forward by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1839-97), developed by Muhammad ‘Abduh 
(1849-1905) and, later, by Rashid Rida (1865-1935). 
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani was worried about Western penetration in Muslim 
lands and was afraid that this would provoke the extinction of the umma, leading him 
to ask why the West was strong and Islamic states weak.90 He found the answer in the 
West’s technological superiority and in Muslims’ religious decadence, visible in their 
lack of solidarity. The solution was for Muslims to adopt Western technology and to 
reform their religion, returning to the “real” Islam of the Golden Age, the age of the 
Prophet, the first four caliphs and the pious ancestors (salafiyya). Those measures 
would make Muslims rise from the levels of decadence to which they had fallen. 
Since al-Afghani believed that true Islam was a religion based in reason, activism and 
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mutual help, Muslims should find the way to their rebirth using force if necessary.91 
Al-Afghani travelled to India, Afghanistan, the Ottoman Empire and Egypt, 
where he gathered a certain number of disciples, especially a young ‘alim, 
Muhammad ‘Abduh. In Egypt he participated in the political activities that led to the 
crisis of late 1870’s and, in 1879, he was expelled. After a brief stay in India, al-
Afghani lived in Europe, in France, from 1883, where he was joined by Muhammad 
‘Abduh, exiled from Egypt due to his role in the ‘Urabi revolution that led to the 
British occupation of Egypt in 1882. Jointly, they published a political newspaper, 
The firmest bond (al-‘Urwat al-Wuthqa), where they challenged the notion that there 
were nationalities in Islam, because ‘asabiyya (tribalism, clan consciousness) was 
against the principles of religion. What united Muslims was the religious bond. For al-
Afghani and ‘Abduh, Muslims’ decadence was due to a lack of solidarity with the 
rivalry between Muslim powers as one of the causes for that decadence, and only a 
total application of Islamic law would permit the return to the power of ancient times 
and resistance to foreigners in the countries of Islam. 
In a way, al-Afghani and ‘Abduh saw primitive Islamic society as a counter-
model against those who saw in the importation of western ideologies of liberalism 
and nationalism the only solution for Muslims’ backwardness. Their insistence on 
religion’s earthly objectives and on the necessity of an Islamic solidarity led them to 
an identitarian affirmation, more than a religious one. For them the gates of ijtihad 
(independent reasoning) were not closed and taqlid, the blind imitation, led to 
stagnation and it was treason to real Islam. The return to the original texts of religion 
should be done not in blind imitation of what ancestors had done but with the attitude 
of rediscovering the spirit that inspired them, allowing to minimise the importance of 
the differences between Sunnis and Shi’is, favouring the solidarity of all Muslims, a 
kind of Pan-Islamism that started to worry European colonial powers. 
Al-Afghani was mainly an activist and the responsibility for developing the 
grand issues of reformism was left to Muhammad ‘Abduh. After his stay in Paris, the 
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‘alim went to Syria and, having been authorised to return to Egypt in 1888, was 
nominated judge in an Islamic court, becoming Egypt’s grand mufti in 1899. In 
Muhammad Abduh’s work, a distinction emerges between the essential doctrines of 
Islam and its social teachings and laws. The doctrines had been transmitted by a 
central line of thinkers, the “pious ancestors” (al-salaf al-salih, hence the name often 
given to this kind of thought, salafiyya), which were simple: belief in God, in 
revelation through a line of prophets ending in Muhammad, in moral responsibility 
and judgement. They could be articulated and defended by reason, on one hand, and, 
on the other, Law and social morality were applications to particular circumstances of 
certain general principles contained in the Qur’an and accessible to human reason. 
When circumstances change they too should change; in the modern world, it was the 
task of Muslim thinkers to relate changing laws and customs to unchanging 
principles, and by doing so they would give them limits and a direction. Muhammad 
‘Abduh tried, in vain, to reform both the syllabus of Al-Azhar University as well as its 
internal organization, supporting himself on British authorities, and passed away in 
1905.92 
Such a view of Islam was to become part of the furnishing of the minds of 
many educated Muslims, Arabs and non-Arabs alike, and it developed in more than 
one line.93 The Islam of those educated in the new fashion was no longer that of the 
Azhar or the Zaytuna, but that of the reformists of the school of ‘Abduh. Among his 
disciples some were more vocal, such as the future Egyptian nationalist leaders like 
Qasim Amin (1863-1908), who struggled for women’s emancipation; Ahmad Lutfi al-
Sayyid (1872-1963), who defended civic virtues and a liberal and constitutional 
political life and who also founded the modern school of Arabic prose; Sa’d Zaglul 
(1859-1927), who led the Egyptians in the 1919 revolution, in the struggle for 
independence; and, finally, the Syrian Rashid Rida. 
Those who interpreted Abduh’s thought in the direction of a separation de 
facto between the spheres of religion and social life found a new topic of discussion in 
the 1920s: the abolition of the Ottoman caliphate by the new Turkish Republic gave 
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rise to the thought about the nature of political authority, and one of ‘Abduh’s 
followers, the Egyptian ‘Ali ‘Abd al-Raziq (1888-1966), wrote a famous book, al-
Islam wa usul al-hukm94 (Islam and the Foundations of Governance: Research on 
the Caliphate and Governance in Islam), in which he argued that the caliphate was 
not of divine origin, and that the Prophet had not been sent to found a state and had 
not, in fact, done so. His ideas were badly received by religious conservatives, but 
their implication, that the caliphate should not be restored, was generally accepted. 
The other line of thought, also derived from ‘Abduh, laid emphasis on the 
need to go back to the bases of the faith and derive from them, by responsible 
reasoning, a social morality which would be acceptable in modern times. This kind of 
reformism began to have a large influence in the Maghrib, and one which in the end 
would take a political form. In Algeria, an Association of Algerian ‘Ulama was 
founded in 1931 by Abdel Hamid ben Badis (1889-1940), with the aim of restoring 
the moral supremacy of Islam, and with it of the Arabic language, among a people 
whom a century of French rule had torn from their roots. This was sought by putting 
forward an interpretation of Islam based on the Qur’an and Hadith, tending to break 
down the barriers between different sects and schools of law, by creating non-
governmental schools teaching in Arabic, and by working for the release of Islamic 
institutions from state control. His work drew upon him the hostility of Sufi leaders 
and the suspicion of the French government, and by 1939 the Association had become 
more fully involved in political life, and identified with the nationalist demand that 
Muslims should have equal rights within the French system, without having to give 
up their distinctive laws and social morality. 
In Morocco, reformist teachings also took root in the 1920s, with similar 
results. To try to purge Moroccan Islam from the corruptions of later times was, by 
implication, to attack the position which the leaders of Sufi orders had held in 
Moroccan society; and to call for a society and state based upon a reformed Shari’a 
was to oppose the rule of the foreign occupiers of the country. Such teachings pointed 
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the way towards political action, and when a nationalist movement emerged it was led 
by a disciple of the reformers, ‘Allal al-Fasi (1910-74).95 
In Indonesia, schools, beneficial organizations and progressive parties came to 
light from the modernist blossoming of Islamic universe. The most important of the 
modernist movements, Muhammadiyah, was founded in 1912 by a friend of 
Muhammad ‘Abduh, Kiaji Hadji Ahmad Dahlan (1869-1923). Islam was preached 
and propagated in common language using, among others, youth groups, female 
organizations, clinics and asylums, as well as through the modern educational system, 
following the model of Christian missionaries. Hadji Agus Salim (1884-1954), from 
Minangkabau, founded in 1925 the Jong Islamieten Bond (Young Muslims 
Federation) and Muhammadiyah became, after 1923, a political factor, particularly 
outside Java, where nationalist organizations had no reach but where Western 
education had popularised progress and rationalism, something also claimed by the 
Muhammadiyah, who also defended the material aspects of life, saying that that was 
one of the aspects of primitive Islam, and rejecting the Sufis’ exclusive preoccupation 
with mysticism. While for traditional Muslims religion was an existential experience, 
for the modernist it was a means of obtaining earthly objectives, and religious praxis 
was justified by the pragmatic usefulness.96 
Another important Islamic reform movement, but of a different kind, appeared 
in the 1930s in Egypt, and would have a wide influence: the Muslim Brotherhood, 
founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906-49). The Muslim Brotherhood started as a 
movement for individual, moral and social reform, based on an analysis of what was 
wrong with Muslim societies, and was inspired by idealised primitive Islam. Similarly 
to the views of the Salafiyya movement, the Muslim Brotherhood believed that Islam 
was in decay because of taqlid and the excesses of Sufism, to which was added 
Western influence, which, despite its social virtues, had brought foreign values, 
immorality, missionary activity and imperial domination. The solution was to return 
to “the real Islam” and the Qur’an, interpreted by true ijtihad, and following its 
teachings in all spheres of life; Egypt should become an Islamic state based on a 
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reformed Shari’a and all spheres of life - gender relations, education, economics and, 
of course, politics - should be based on the Qur’an. At the beginning, the Muslim 
Brothers were not directly interested in governing the state but they would only 
recognise as legitimate rulers those who followed the Shari’a and who fought foreign 
rule that threatened it and the community of the faithful. They were mainly 
preoccupied with Egypt, but their influence would cross the borders of the Muslim 
world, and their first political involvement was with the Palestinian uprising of the 
late thirties of the 20th century. 
 
I.1. Early movements: Wahhabism 
In the 18th century there were reform movements in Arabia, one of which 
would be known as the Wahhabi movement, and also an intellectual reaffirmation in 
Yemen, under two different forms, represented by Yemeni sages: Muhammad al-
Murtada (d. 1790) and Muhammad ibn ‘Ali al-Shawkani (1758-1834).97 Al-Murtada 
represented the moderate ressurection of orthodoxy when he tried to reaffirm and 
reivindicate al-Ghazali’s (1058-1111) line of thought, something also found in most 
of the Indian reform movements. Al-Shawkani, a Zaydi sage from Sana’a, who 
considered himself a great chief of the Ahl al-Sunna and was celebrated as such, 
rejected the idea of taqlid (blind obedience) and was violently attacked by his 
contemporaries, including the Zaydis Shi’is. Ibn Taymiyya (1263-1328) had a deep 
influence on al-Shawkani and on Wahhabism, something which can be seen by the 
fact that al-Shawkani’s work, +ayl al-Awtar, is a commentary on a work devoted to 
law by Ibn Taymiya’s grandfather, Majd al-Din ibn Taymiyya (d. 1254). 
This work by al-Shawkani was written at a time when he was still relatively 
young and he clearly says in the preface that the sages used immensely Ibn 
Taymiyya’s work. This shows that the resurgence of orthodoxy was developing over a 
certain period of time. However, it came to light in Hanbali form in central Arabia, in 
the middle of the 18th century, inspired by the teachings of Ibn Taymiyya and the 
leader of a puritanical movement, Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab (1703-1792), who 
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had been a sufi when young, and was later influenced by the works of Ibn Taymiyya, 
and who would have a deep and lasting influence on him, particularly the criticisms 
on Sufism and its superstitions and intellectual doctrines. 
Muhammad ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab travelled to Iraq and to Iran when he was 
twenty one years old, studied Philosophy and Sufism, and even gave classes on this. 
However, after returning to his homeland, when he was about forty, he started to 
preach his own doctrines, something which caused some in his family to oppose him. 
After emigrating to Dair’iya (Najd, central Arabia), where he made an alliance with 
the chief of the local clan, Sa’ud, who accepted his religious opinions, Wahhabism 
expanded militarily from there to the Najd and Hijaz, dominating the holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina. During the beginnings of the 19th century, however, the Wahhabis 
were militarly defeated by Muhammad ‘Ali (1769-1849), Egypt’s governor, under the 
orders of the Ottoman government, in 1818. But they quickly resurrected locally in 
the Najd, with its capital in Ryadh and, after being expelled from there and forced to 
search for refuge in Kuwait, Abd al-‘Aziz ibn Sa’ud (1876-1953) returned to the 
beginnings of the 20th century, not only to recover his ancestors’ power, but also to 
establish their dominion through all the territory known as Sa’udi Arabia.98 
In a short treatise called The Book of Unity (Kitab al-Tawhid), Ibn ‘Abd al-
Wahhab attacked the common beliefs in the power of saints and of holy men and the 
consequential practices: the worship in and of saints’ tombs, faith in the intercession 
of the Prophet and of saints, i.e., every form of popular religion. In his attacks against 
generalized moral lapse, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab, besides attacking Sufism, also attacked 
the blind acceptation of authority, i.e., of the ‘ulama, in religious affairs, for whom the 
medieval systems of Islam had become the definitive word and no revision was 
accepted. So, Ibn al-Wahhab, following Ibn Taymiyya, considered it essential to go 
beyond the medieval authorities, to the “Sunna of the first generations”. In defending 
so, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab ended up opposing medieval schools’ authority, 
acknowledging only three authorities: 1) the Qur’an; 2) the Prophet’s Sunna; and 3) 
the authority of the Companions. However, since the Hadith had actually been 
compiled as authority in the 9th century, Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab’s followers had to 
change their position and accepted Ijma’ of the first three centuries as a source. 
                                                           
98 BENZINE, 2005: pp. 35-36; and RAHMAN, 1970: pp. 270-271. 
 51 
 
The consequences of this position had a deep, long lasting impact on Islam’s 
spiritual and intellectual character. Its insistence in the right to ijtihad (independent 
reasoning) and its condemnation of taqlid acted as a powerful force of liberation and, 
even with the strong opposition it received in the first phases, in the political and 
religious fields, affecting the subsequent evolution of Islamic character maybe more 
than any other single factor. “Wahhabism” became, in fact, a generic expression, used 
not only for that particular movement started by Ibn ‘Abd al-Wahhab but also for all 
kind of similar phenomena, throughout the Muslim world, which defended the 
“purification of the faith” from degrading additions, and insisted on more or less 
independent, even original, reasoning in religious matters.99 It also prepared the field 
for Muslim modernists to surpass the literalism of the Wahhabis and to enable the 
qur’anic text to be treated and interpreted according to more liberal patterns. 
“Wahhabism” did not restrict itself to the Wahhabi movement as history knows it but 
also to other movements, as a kind of abobadal expression, the “Wahhabi idea”, 
covering more analogous than identical phenomena movements of the Muslim world. 
It could be summarised as an affirmation of monotheism and equality of men 
combined with different degrees of reinterpretation of the positive heritage and of the 
actual Islamic tradition for the reconstruction of Muslim society. 
 
I.2. Early movements: Shah Wali Allah of Delhi 
Qutb al-Din Ahmad ibn ‘Abd al-Rahim (1702/03-1762), known as Shah Wali 
Allah, lived in a period of historic transition for India, as in his time the Mughal 
empire started to collapse, with small semi-independent states emerging and the Sikh 
and Hindu communities challenging Muslim power. He left a vast written work, 
covering different fields such as the Qur’an, the Hadith, Jurisprudence, Sufism, 
Prophecy, Shari’a, Economics, Society, Philosophy and also Poetry. In consonance 
with the scope of this research, a detailed attention will be given to Politics.100 
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During the 18th century, the Mughal Empire, as an effective system of political 
control in India, started to collapse. The last years of Aurangzeb’s (1618-1707) rule 
(1658-1707) were characterized by revolts and, after his death, in 1707, wars of 
succession and the ascension of local and provincial powers brought to an end the 
political and military unity that had been created by Mughal rule.101 Hindu and Sikh 
princes competed with local Muslim commanders, and with Afghan and Persian 
invaders, for supremacy inside the sub-continent, but no local power was able to 
impose a position of lasting strength. In time, Great Britain would take over the 
control of most parts of India but, in the 18th century, the British were just one 
more amongst innumerable competitors. 
In the opinion of Shah Wali Allah, society’s decadence had its causes in the 
lack of a strong faith, disunity between Muslims and a deep moral degeneration. As a 
solution he proposed a rational interpretation of Islam. Jointly with rational 
arguments, he presented traditional dialectics and tried to resolve the question of 
disunity proposing a reconciliation between the different juridical and theological 
schools, defending Sufism at the same time, into which he had been initiated by his 
father, Shah ‘Abd al-Rahim (d. 1719). 
Shah Wali Allah adopted measures for the reconstruction of Muslims’ culture, 
politics and ideological orientation, and his proposals covered fields such as beliefs, 
social structure, politics, economics, legal and juridical concepts, philosophical and 
metaphysical ideas, in an attempt to address the needs of this world and the hereafter. 
In his works, the interaction between the issues of 18th century Islamic history and the 
special conditions of India is clear. On one hand, he was the culminating point of 
Islam’s evolution that had been put in movement by the ascension of the Mughals and 
the beginnings of Naqshbandiyyah revivalism, and, on the other, his work furnished 
the foundation for virtually all important future Muslim movements in India. 
Like other Islamic revivalists from 18th century, Wali Allah was not concerned 
about the modernising challenge of the West, and his reformism came from the 
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interaction between local conditions, that were changing, and the Islamic dimension. 
The starting point for Islamic thought in modern India was inspired more by 
endogenous factors than exogenous, a fact that gives a special characteristic to 
Islamic revivalism in the context of modern History. Two big issues framed his 
work: the decline of Muslim community as a whole in India and the disunity and 
conflict inside the community. Shah Wali Allah did not organize a formal movement 
nor did he create a special association. The structures he developed were schools, 
through which he expected to provide the foundations for a revitalisation of Islamic 
thought and so restore the Islamic position in India. Although his attitude of 
coexistence with other religions was tolerant, he tried to eradicate from the Muslim 
Indian social mores the practices and the rituals inherited or taken from Hinduism, 
something that Aurangzeb had tried before with the court ceremonials. 
The stress on the study of the hadith was also present in his work. Wali Allah’s 
studies of hadith, like his interpretation of Sufism, shows his double concern about 
reconciling the divisions inside the Muslim community and bringing Islamic practice 
into accordance to the Islamic ideal. One of the dividing lines was the separation of 
Sunni Muslims into different juridical schools (madhab). In his work, Wali Allah 
subordinated the study of the Law to the study of the hadith. Like Muhammad ibn Abd 
al-Wahhab, Wali Allah rejected the practice of taqlid if it meant a blind obedience to 
the teachers of the juridical school’s traditions. Instead, he believed that ijtihad was 
necessary and that the two unquestionnable sources for Islamic Law were the Qur’an 
and the Sunna and, so, the study of traditions had precedence to the imitation of 
former jurists.102 
Shah Wali Allah was conscious that the ethical and religious decadence of 
Islam in 18th century was something general and, addressing a very wide field of 
readers in India and abroad, he wrote in Arabic and Persian, continuing the work 
begun by Sheikh Ahmad Sarhindi (1564-1624) in the 17th century, consisting in the 
channelling of the tides of mystical origin in traditional Islam. His effort was based, in 
part, on a synthesis that stressed a formula of commitment on what the different legal 
schools of Islam shared between them. He explained the juridical concept of ijtihad as 
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an effort to understand the principles of canonical Law, and, although he was a 
rigorist, he opened the way to future modernists of Indian Islam, like Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan in the 19th century and Iqbal and Mawdudi in the 20th.103 For example, for 
Muhammad Iqbal, Shah Wali Allah was “perhaps the first Muslim who felt the urge 
of a new spirit in him.”104 
In the political sphere, Shah Wali Allah defended the idea of a universal 
caliphate, but considered the monarchy a necessary institution for the maintenance of 
peace and order in the Muslim state, which explains the several letters that he wrote to 
Rohilla Najib al-Dawla, to the Afghan Ahmad Shah Abdali (1723-1773) and to the 
rulers of princely states of Rohilkand and Deccan asking them to rise up against the 
Marathas and to re-establish Muslim power and hegemony in India.105 
The principles of qur’anic exegesis, contained in his work Al-Fauz al-kabir fi 
usul al-tafsir106, introduced a new dimension in the field of tafsir (the interpretation 
of the Qur’an). Before Shah Wali Allah, and because there was the idea that the text 
could not be translated, qur’anic commentary was an exclusive field for specialists. 
So, Wali Allah emphasised a direct approach to the Qur’an and took the initiative of 
translating it into Persian107, lingua franca of cultivated Muslims in the sub-
continent108, allowing the common people to access it directly, to understand and to 
explain the teachings of the Qur’an without recurring to a third party. 
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Shah Wali Allah’s approach to the Science of Hadith was characterised by his 
view that the Sunna was, more than something independent, essentially a commentary 
to the Qur’an, leading him to consider that there was an organic relation between 
both. In the field of Philosophy and Scholastics his work Hujjat Allah al-Balighah, 
his magnum opus, made a significant exposition of his vision of an Islamic 
worldview.109 Very important in the fields of History and Biography were the works 
Izalat al-Khafa’ ‘an Khilafat al-Khulafa’, which dwells on the original caliphal 
model, i.e., of the first four caliphs, especially the deeds of the first two caliphs and 
their place in Islam, and Surar al-Mahzun, a short biography of the Prophet 
Muhammad. 
According to his political thought, built on his theory of irtifaqat (stages of 
social development that become more and more complex), the most outstanding and 
distinctive characteristic of human society is justice (‘adala), which is both an 
individual and collective quality. When expressed in dress, manners and mores, it is 
adab (etiquette). When it is maintained in matters relating to income and expenditure, 
it is “economy”. Its observance in the affairs of the state is called “politics”. At the 
pinnacle of the social evolution of man he envisaged something in the nature of a 
cosmopolitan socio-political organisation, or a commonwealth of different countries, 
bound together by the spirit of a universal Islamic fraternity.110 
Many currents of educational, intellectual and spiritual thought, that sprung up 
in India after Shah Wali Allah, reclaimed themselves from his reformist ideas, like the 
Modernists from Aligarh, Ahl-i Sunnat wa al-Jama’at, Ahl-i Hadith, Jama’at-i Islami 
or the educational centres of Deoband, Farangi Mahal and :adwat al-‘Ulama.111 
Wali Allah’s theological seminary in Delhi produced a group of theologians 
between the late 18th century and the early 19th, including his son, Shah ‘Abd al-
‘Aziz, who declared that India, under the British East India Company, was dar al-
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harb (abode of war, in opposition to the abode of Islam, dar al-Islam)112, and one of 
his disciples, Sayyid Ahmad of Rae Bareilly (Brelwi) (1786-1831), transformed this 
reformist school into a jihad movement113, being generally considered as the 
introducer of Wahhabism on a large scale to India, and thought to have been 
influenced by that doctrine when he visited Mecca, in pilgrimage, in 1822-3. Men 
were recruited and funds were collected for the jihad in a vast area in the North and 
East of India. Sayyid Ahmad and his companion Shah Muhammad Isma’il (1781-
1831), known as Shahid (martyr) and grandson of Shah Wali Allah, died in 1831 in 
Balakot, in a battle against the Sikh, although killed by local Pathans, who were 
Muslims.114 Their followers, although weak and lacking on funds and men, continued 
the jihad against the British, from Sithana to the Western frontier. In 1870-71, some 
pro-British ‘ulama issued fatawa (plural of fatwa) dissociating themselves from the 
movement, but the jihad activity went on until 1890.115 
Meanwhile, Hajji Shari’at Allah (c.1764-1840) had founded in Bengal another 
movement of reform in the beginnings of the 19th century, known as the Fara’idi 
movement, characterized by three factors: 1) an anti-British trend, visible in the 
declaration that India had stopped being Dar al-Islam and had become Dar al-Harb; 
2) an economic and social reform against the rich landowners, and in favour of the 
peasants and workers; 3) purification of Islam from Hindu ideas and Sufi excesses. 
This movement was later continued by Shari’at Allah’s son Dudhu Miyan, who died 
in 1864.116 
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I.3. Sayyid Ahmad Khan: Short biography and the Aligarh movement 
Ideological debates and religious disputes in 19th century resulted in the rise of 
several important issues in the wider Islamic world such as: 1) The empirical versus 
the Islamic sciences; 2) The rational basis of law versus the Shari’a; 3) Western 
civilization versus the abode of Islam; 4) Gender equality versus male supremacy; and 
5) Constitutionalism versus the Islamic conception of sovereignty. In their re-
examination of Islamic worldviews, Islamic modernists pointed to the methodological 
and conceptual inadequacy of Islamic orthodoxy. In India and Egypt, the active 
presence of the followers of the Enlightenment, the Westernizers, and the 
Evangelicals, resulted in the rise of a pluralistic discursive field, where modernist 
Muslim scholars faced a multiplicity of issues.117 
In 1832 the Reverend Midgeley John Jennings (d. 1857) arrived at India. He 
would become, in 1852, chaplain of the Christian population of Delhi, and hoped to 
convert the local population to Anglican Christianity, thus ending with the local “false 
religions”, a sentiment shared by many Evangelical British in India, who were 
expecting not only to rule and manage the country but also to “save” her, using their 
influence through the British East India Company to convert the country. The British 
Empire was the proof that God was on their side: to propagate the faith would 
augment even more that empire. Some Evangelical figures, such as the Reverends 
Henry Martyn (1781-1812), Joseph Wolff (1795-1862) and, especially, Carl Pfander 
(1805-1865), were important missionaries with an agressive posture of “frontal 
attack” against Islam, exemplified by the publication of books such as Mizan al-Haqq 
(Balance of Truth), first published in 1829118, or Remarks on the nature of 
Muhammadanism.119 
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The impacts on the Indian Muslim community were felt and, at an intellectual 
level, Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan (1817-1898) became preoccupied mostly with 
theological issues, Chiragh ‘Ali (1844-1895) with legal reforms, Mumtaz ‘Ali with 
Islamic feminism, and Shibli Nu’mani (1857-1914) and Sayyid Amir ‘Ali (1849-
1928) with historical Islam and hagiographical studies.120 Shibli Nu’mani was an 
associate of Ahmad Khan and taught Persian and Arabic at Aligarh, but became 
critical of the college after leaving it in 1898 in an attempt to penetrate and, indeed, 
lead the :adwat ul-‘Ulama in Lucknow.121 
After the Sepoy Mutiny of 1857-58, the leading figures of the Muslim 
community in India posed a series of questions about their future. The answers were 
many and three types can be distinguished: 1) Traditionalists, established in 
Deoband122 and Bhopal; 2) Shibli Nu’mani’s, who helped to establish the :adwat ul-
‘Ulama in Lucknow, which attempted to be a middle way between the former and; 3) 
the Modernists, starting with Sayyid Karamat ‘Ali (1796-1876) and his disciple 
Sayyid Amir ‘Ali, both from Bengal123, culminating with Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, 
from the United Provinces (nowadays Uttar Pradesh). The Modernists, who were 
deeply influenced by Western modern liberal thought, tried to interpret Islam in a 
rational way, inspired also by the idealised vision on the Mu’tazilite school, and 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan eventually came to the conclusion that the Muslims of India had 
to accommodate themselves with the British.124 
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Sayyid Ahmad Khan was born on 17th October 1817 into an important family 
from Delhi, which belonged to the Mughal aristocracy.125 His ancestors claimed to be 
direct descendents from the Prophet Muhammad through his daughter Fatima and his 
cousin and son-in-law ‘Ali. Ahmad Khan’s family had migrated to India through Iran 
and Afghanistan, and, after his father’s death in 1838, he started to work as a civil 
servant in a Civil Court under the British East India Company in Delhi, dedicating 
himself to the writing of various subjects like History, Sciences, Theology and Civil 
Law. At the same time, he re-read the Muslim medieval classical works and produced 
his first historiographical work, which dwells on the ancient buildings and 
monuments of Delhi and surroundings.126 
The events of 1857 caught him in Bijnaur as a civil judge, and his journal 
between May 1857 and April 1858 became a monography with the title Tarikh-i 
Sarkashi-i Bijnaur, which is a history of the Mutiny in Bijnaur.127 In 1859, Ahmad 
Khan published a book in Urdu, Risalah-i-Asbab-e Baghawat-e Hind (Causes of the 
Indian Mutiny), later translated into English, in which he criticised the mutiny of the 
previous years, arguing that there had been only one cause for it, all the others being a 
consequence: the fact that the natives of India blamed the government for the 
diminishing of their position and dignity and for maintaining them in a lower position. 
In addition, the natives blamed the British for daily suffering and for being afraid of 
abuse at the hands of the officials.128 
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What happened to the Muslims after the Mutiny shocked Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
greatly and he pursued the task of rapprochement between the British and Indians, and 
between the former and the Muslims. It was on this period that his book on the causes 
of the revolt was written129, exposing the errors of the administration of the East India 
Company as well as what the native population thought were the actual objectives of 
the Company: proselytism of Christian missionaries and subsequent conversion of 
India; in the economic field, the fiscal and financial monopolies of the Company, the 
smashing of local industries with the objective of creating a market for British 
exports; the huge fiscal burden in northern India, causing misery; destruction of 
political and military organization; and the deep discrimination and despise that the 
Company had for the native population. 
In 1860-61, Ahmad Khan published his Risâlah Khair Khawahân 
Musalmanân: An Account of the Loyal Mohamadans of India, in which he 
defended that the Indian Muslims were the most loyal subjects of the British Raj 
(Rule) because of their disposition and because of the principles of their religion, 
being convinced that the British had come to stay and that their supremacy, with that 
of the West, could not be doubted in the near future. So, Muslims should rethink their 
way of living, being at the risk of falling further. For him, the existing resentment was 
due to mutual prejudices and ignorance. His effort to mediate between Christianity 
and Islam took shape in his work Ahkam-i Ta’am-i Ahl-i Kitab, dealing with the 
social contact between Muslims, Christians and Jews, and in a commentary to the 
Bible, where he tried to establish that both religions derived from the same source and 
that their similitude would be quickly recognized by whoever studied and compared 
them. In that commentary to the Bible, Tabîyyan alkalâm fî’l-tafsîr al-tawrâ wa’l-
injîl calâ millat al-islam (The Mahomedan Commentary on the Bible), he included, 
as an appendix, a fatwa issued by Jamal ibn al-‘Abd Allah ‘Umar al-Hanfi, the Mufti 
of Mecca, who said that as long as some of the rites of Islam were maintained in 
India, this was Dar al-Islam (Abode of Islam). The aim was to contain the fatwa 
issued by some Indian ‘ulama saying that India had become Dar al-Harb (Abode of 
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War). At the same time, Ahmad Khan tried to make Muslims see that modern western 
education, with its emphasis on science and rational thought, would only be beneficial 
to the community, and also tried to synthesize it with Islamic religious thought, 
defending that in this there was nothing that opposed to the study of science and that 
there was nothing to be afraid of from its impact. 
Arguing that the Qur’an should be interpreted according to each time and its 
conditions, Sayyid Ahmad Khan defended that the Hadith did not furnish an adequate 
basis for the understanding of Islam, and that religion had suffered many changes 
through time, especially with the additions and mixings of the specialists’ opinions. 
So, it was necessary to extract all the “exotic” ideas and put them in their respective 
perspectives. Ahmad Khan conceived a new educational system, in which the 
responsibility to educate future generations would be on the Muslim community itself 
and in which the intellectuals would receive education in Islam and in Western 
sciences, becoming Aligarh’s main educational basis, with future impacts in Indian 
Muslim society in the modernist trend. 
Ahmad Khan created two schools in the cities of Muradabad and Ghazipur, 
having established in the first one, in 1864, the Scientific Society, which was moved 
in 1867 to Aligarh. The objectives of the Society were to translate works on Arts and 
Sciences from English or other European languages so they could be understood by 
the natives; to find and publish rare and valuable oriental works which did not have a 
religious character; to publish a periodical, the weekly Aligarh Institute Gazette; to 
offer lectures on scientific subjects or others that were considered useful. The main 
objective for Aligarh was to become the source of a new leadership for Indian 
Muslims, responding to the new conditions in the world and based on new kinds of 
knowledge, claiming this new knowledge for Islam, and protecting the faith and 
identity of their English-educated sons in the face of competing sorts of belief and 
allegiance.130 
Many translations of English works in the fields of History, Political 
Economy, Agriculture, Mathematics and others were published, and the institution of 
modern education and Western scientific knowledge as a way of reform and renewal 
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of the Muslim community and/or Muslim countries was also common in other places 
like Egypt, the Ottoman Empire or Tunisia.131 
In 1866 the Aligarh British Indian Association was created, with more 
political aims in the sense of influencing the government’s decisions in what was 
related to Indian Muslims, but with little impact. Ahmad Khan, who had been elected 
honorary Fellow of the Royal Asiatic Society of London in 1864, visited England in 
1869-70, staying in the British capital for seventeen months with his two sons, Sayyid 
Hamid and Sayyid Mahmud, a friend, Mirza Khuda Dad Beg, and an employee. 
Besides giving him the opportunity for contact with the local reality, the stay also 
gave him the chance of meeting the State Secretary for India and Queen Victoria 
herself, who gave him the title of Companion of the Star of India. His visit convinced 
him of the British superiority and allowed him to read William Muir’s biography of 
the Prophet Muhammad, which disturbed him deeply, for religious reasons and 
personal ones, because the Prophet was his ancestor (hence his title Sayyid). 
The Life of Mahomet132, written by Sir William Muir in response to a veteran 
missionary’s request, amplified the thesis that Islam was a backward religion, and was 
based on information drawn from the study of some Muslim sources, being acclaimed 
as a great help in the missionary enterprise. In that work, Sir William Muir talked 
about divorce, poligamy and slavery, and Sayyid Ahmad Khan wrote a refutation with 
the title Essays on the Life of Mohammed and Subjects Subsidiary Thereto133, 
containing twelve essays, an endeavour which forced him to search for materials in 
the British Museum and in the India Office Library.134 Ahmad Khan was also able to 
visit Oxford and Cambridge Universities and some colleges, like Eton and Harrow, 
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which would serve him as models for his Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College.135 
Back to India in October 1870 and with a new orientation for his ideas and efforts, 
Ahmad Khan dedicated himself to the social and intellectual regeneration of Indian 
Muslims. 
In 1871 William Hunter published his The Indian Musalmans136, with the 
aim of creating a better understanding between rulers and ruled, as a way to safeguard 
British power in India. Using as a basis the various trials after the Mutiny, he came to 
the conclusion that there was a causal relation between the Wahhabi activities and the 
permanent instability in the North-Western Frontier. For him, the movement was well 
organized and its leaders claimed all the functions of sovereignty over their 
constituents. The bonds that connected the members of that “secret order” were 
extraordinarily strong and permanent. The headquarters, in Patna, and the controlling 
machinery throughout rural areas for the “spreading of insatisfaction, sent a multitude 
of zealots carefully indoctrinated with treason and equipped with vast literature about 
the duty to wage war against the British. An uninterrupted flow of money and fiery 
recruits determined to extirpate the infidel crossed the border.” 
This picture described by Hunter caused a protest from the part of Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan, who characterized the book as misleading and historically inaccurate. 
In a recension to that book, The Indian Musalmans137, he pointed out many 
incorrections in the afirmations of Hunter about the Wahhabi precepts, and made a 
critical history of that movement from 1823 until the publication of that book. For 
Sayyid Ahmad, the permanent transborder hostility against British rule had nothing to 
do with Wahhabi fomentations but with the continuing presence in the border of a 
large, non-loyal and terrified population, Hindu and Muslim alike, who had run away 
from British territory, after the Mutiny, to escape the wrath of the conqueror. The 
population sought shelter in the tribes and started a new life in an unknown 
environment, and there was nothing strange in the fact that those migrants received 
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visitors and money from their families and others in India. Finally, the tribal enmity 
against authority in the country near the Indus River was something recurrent in 
Indian history, as illustrated by the expeditions sent in the past by the emperors Akbar 
(1542-1605), Shah Jahan (1592-1666), and Aurangzeb (1618-1707), all Muslim, and 
which had failed in their goal of subjugating the insurgents. 
For Sayyid Ahmad Khan, Islam’s demonization and the distortion of its 
history in the West were directly responsible for the political adversity to Indian 
Muslims. For him, a more objective approach to the past would make the West end its 
strong aversion to Islam and its followers, and would also ensure that even the 
Muslims rediscovered their own identity and their own ideals. History would be an 
instrument in the Muslim renaissance and this attitude influenced many like Shibli 
Nu’mani, Zaka’ Allah (1832-1911) and Maulawi Mehdi ‘Ali, known as Muhsin al-
Mulk (1837-1907), among others. 
Ahmad Khan was in the judicial service until his retirement, in 1876, moment 
from which he established himself at Aligarh and where the Muhammadan Anglo-
Oriental College was created in 1875, and which would become, in 1920, the Aligarh 
Muslim University. In 1886 he established “The Muhammadan Educational 
Conference”, which was held annually in many Indian cities, and the magazine 
Tahdhîb al-Akhlâq (Refinement of Morals - Mohammedan Social Reformer), was 
published with the aim of educating and civilising Indian Muslims, with Ahmad Khan 
being its principal contributor until the end of the periodical in 1893. The essays 
written by him examined the foundations of Muslim society as well as its institutions, 
in the light of Reason and religious sanction. The Tahdhîb attracted an audience 
which shared with Sayyid Ahmad the objectives of reform. While on one hand he 
tried to contain the forces of scepticism and irreligion liberated by Western 
influences, on the other, he strongly fought the opposition to Western education. 
Although he had no expertise in Western sciences or Islamic ones, especially 
in the study of the Qur’an or the Hadith (something which earned him some criticism 
from some ‘ulama), Ahmad Khan tried to demythologize the Qur’an and its 
teachings. His interpretation of some fundamental aspects of Islamic teachings which 
could not be demonstrated by modern scientific methods found a strong resistance in 
 65 
 
some more traditionalist sectors but, in spite of that, he earned a widening popularity 
in the elite and, in the early 1880s, he became a very important figure in the Muslim 
community. Ahmad Khan wanted to reinterpret Islam, defending a modern ‘ilm al-
Kalam with the aim of showing that “the Work of God (Nature and its laws) was 
according to the Word of God (the Qur’an)”, something that earned him the epitet of 
:aturi. For that reinterpretation, Ahmad Khan ellaborated a tafsir (the interpretation 
of the Qur’an), which was published at the same time as it was being written. The 
work started in 1879 and it was completed with the author’s death in 1898. This tafsir 
found strong resistance not only from the ‘ulama but also from some his friends and 
admirers, like Nawab Muhsin al-Mulk, who were uncomfortable with the radical 
interpretations of some of the Qur’an’s verses. In response, Ahmad Khan wrote a 
little treatise with the aim of explaining the principles of his tafsir which was 
published in 1892 with the title Tahrîr fi’l-asûl al-tafsîr, where he declared that 
Nature was the “Work of God” and that the Qur’an was the “Word of God” and no 
contradiction could exist between them.138 
 
I.4. Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the Caliphate: 
Political allegiance to the British 
Until the end of his life, Sayyid Ahmad Khan dedicated himself more and 
more to the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, which produced a unique 
community of pupils and which, with time, would become the political and 
educational capital of Muslim India. The sister organization, All-India Mohammadan 
Educational Conference, founded by Sayyid Ahmad Khan in 1886, became a forum 
for the discussion of social and educational issues and an important factor in the 
promotion of Muslim solidarity throughout the sub-continent. Sayyid Ahmad Khan 
tried to stay away from “political” issues, giving more attention to Education, and his 
work was mainly educational and reformative. He never considered himself a 
politician and always tried to forge a political accommodation with the British. At the 
same time, and due to the fact that Muslims had become a “minority” in the context of 
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the larger India, some Indian Muslims forged an emotional link with the Ottoman 
Empire, which also followed the Hanafi School of jurisprudence, and was considered 
the last symbol of Muslim pride. For Shibli Nu’mani, on an inter-Islamic level, there 
was a sense of the community of Islam, the universality of the millat, which made him 
take interest in the vicissitudes of the Ottoman Empire. 
In a communication addressed to one of his English friends, Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan said that the religion of Islam, in which he had full and abiding faith, preached 
radical principles and was opposed to all forms of monarchy, whether hereditary or 
limited. It approved of the rule of a popularly elected president; it denounced the 
concentration of capital and insisted upon the division of properties and possessions 
among legal heirs on the demise of their owners. But the religion which taught him 
those principles also inculcated certain others: if God willed the subjection of 
Muslims to another race, which granted them religious freedom, governed them 
justly, preserved peace, protected their life and belongings, as the British did in India, 
the Muslims should wish them well and owe allegiance.139 
In 1878 the Ottoman sultan, Abdul Hamid II (1842-1918), placed a new 
emphasis on his claims as Caliph to counter, on one hand, the Tsar’s invocation of 
“Orthodoxy and Slavdom” and, on the other, the constant interferences by Britain and 
France in internal Ottoman affairs, using as an excuse the protection of the Christian 
population in the Ottoman Empire. This new emphasis raised suspicions on the 
Muslim subjects who were living under European and Christian colonial and imperial 
rule, such as in Russia, in France and in Great Britain.140 Sayyid Ahmad Khan had a 
special concern with the Indian Muslims and always tried to maintain a loyalty to the 
British.141 
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Despite the fact that, since the 1857 Uprising, India had come under the direct 
rule of the British Government, there was a considerable section of Indian Muslims 
who had recognized for some time the Ottoman claim to the universal Islamic 
caliphate, a recognition which, though religious in nature, was not devoid of political 
implications. All was well as long as Britain itself pursued a pro-Ottoman policy and 
even encouraged this attitude among Indian Muslims. But with the manifest shift in 
British policy, tension began to develop between the two loyalties. For instance, while 
Ahmad Khan had a political-concrete loyalty to the British, Shibli Nu’mani had a 
religious-spectral loyalty to the Turkish.142 
The allegiance of Ahmad Khan to the British is well documented in his views 
on the Caliphate. For him, the Prophet Muhammad was endowed with three attributes: 
1) Prophecy, i.e., the commandments of God were revealed to him, which ended at his 
death, and no one ever was, or is, or can be, his caliph or deputy, in this sense; 2) 
Communication, i.e., he communicated or announced to the people what was revealed 
to him. In this attribute, all the Muslim143 lawyers, learned men, and men of tradition 
who inculcated the articles of Muslim faith could be regarded as caliphs or deputies of 
the Prophet (it was for this reason that some commentators of the Qur’an included in 
the words  “those who are in authority among you”, which occur in the verse “O true 
believers, obey God, and obey the Apostle and those who are in authority among you” 
(Qur’an IV, 59), the twelve Imams and the Muslim lawyers); 3) Government of the 
country, i.e., he ruled the country, enforced the revealed commandments and looked 
after their proper observance, protected the people of the country and repulsed the 
enemy by force. 
With regard to this last attribute, Ahmad Khan considered that those who 
possessed and governed a country and had the power to enforce and keep the rules of 
faith alive and could, through their strength and resources, defend the country against 
its invaders, could be regarded as Caliphs or deputies of the Prophet, provided that 
they were gifted with the virtues and manners of the Prophet and followed the dictates 
of the religion and possessed external and internal holiness. Some commentators had 
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also included in the words “those who are in authority among you” Muslim generals 
under whom were large multitudes of people. 
It was possible, from this point of view, that Muslim sovereigns of a country 
may regard themselves as Caliphs, but they were Caliphs or Sultans of that country 
alone which they ruled and of those Muslims only who were their subjects. They were 
not Caliphs or Sultans of that country or of those Muslims who were neither their 
subjects nor were governed by them because it was necessary for a Caliph to be the 
ruler of the country, able to give orders of punishment and retaliation and to enforce 
them. He should be the defender of the faith and should protect the country and its 
people from their enemies and maintain peace and order within. So, if a Muslim 
sovereign did not possess such power and could not exercise such authority in a 
particular country he could not and should not be called the Caliph over that country 
or its Muslim inhabitants. 
For Ahmad Khan, a Caliph was only the Caliph in that country which he 
governed, in which he could inflict punishments of death or retaliation and maintain 
the laws of religion, and only for those Muslims who owed him allegiance. He was 
not Caliph in that country over which he did not hold the supreme authority and 
control, in which he could neither give orders for death or retaliation, nor could 
maintain the faith, nor could protect its Muslim inhabitants. Not fulfilling the 
conditions necessary for the Caliph, he could not be the Caliph over that country or its 
Muslim inhabitants. So, for Ahmad Khan, the Muslims of India were the subjects of 
the British Government, under whose protection they lived, being irrelevant if the 
Sultan of Turkey was the Caliph or not, due to the fact that he was not a Qureish 
(from the tribe of the Prophet Muhammad).144 
The British Government had given to the Indian Muslims peace and allowed 
them all freedom in religious matters. Although the English rulers professed the faith 
of Christ, the Government presented no difficulties to a Christian who became a 
Muslim, as it did not prevent Muslims of becoming Christians. The Christian 
Missionaries had nothing to do with the Government, as they were wandering about 
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preaching their religion, much as were hundreds of Muslims delivering public 
sermons on Islam. If a Muslim became a Christian, there was, on the other hand, 
always some Christian who converted to Islam. The Muslims who lived as subjects 
under the protection of the British Government had been given enough liberties in 
matters of faith, and their lives and property were safe and they enjoyed all the rights 
concerning matrimony, divorce, inheritance and wills, gifts and endowments which 
Muslim law allowed them, even when Christian judges had to decide upon them, 
because Christian judges were obliged to decide according to the law of Islam. So, it 
was a religious duty for the Indian Muslims to remain faithful to and well-wishers of 
the British Government and not to do or say anything practically or theoretically 
inconsistent with their loyalty and goodwill towards that Government. For Ahmad 
Khan, the Indian Muslims were not the subjects of the Ottoman Sultan Abdul Hamid 
Khan nor did he possess any authority over them or over their country. No doubt, the 
Sultan was a Muslim sovereign and consequently they sympathised with him as 
Muslims, but he was not their Caliph either according to Muslim law or Muslim 
religion. If he had the rights of a Caliph he had them only in the country and over the 
people that he was master of. 
History had also proved that whenever a Muslim sovereign assumed the title 
of Caliph his Caliphate extended only to the extent of his dominions and his subjects. 
A country beyond the range of his government had nothing to do with his Caliphate, 
Imamate or Sultanate. And there were times when more than one caliph existed. The 
fact that the Caliph was the guardian of the sacred places of the Holy Ka’aba, Medina 
and also Jerusalem had nothing to do with his being a Caliph. In short, for Ahmad 
Khan, no Muslim sovereign was Caliph for those Muslims who did not live in his 
dominions.145 
Although Islamic modernists like Jamal al-Din al-Afghani and Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan shared a modern reformist agenda, they had divergent political orientations and 
objectives. While Ahmad Khan held a position of political loyalty to the British146, al-
                                                           
145 KHAN, Sayyid Ahmad. Late 19th century. “The views of Sir Syed on the Caliphate” in 
MOHAMMAD, Shan (ed.). 1972. Writings and Speeches of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan. Bombay: 
Nachiketa Publications, pp. 255-260. 
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Afghani was deeply anti-colonial, anti-British and pan-Islamist, violently criticising 
Ahmad Khan, considering him subservient to the British.147 
Ahmad Khan was knighted as Knight Commander of the Star of India in 1888 
and died in Aligarh in 1898. His work and thought influenced many who would play 
an important role in the intellectual and political affairs of Muslim India. The 
implications of the positions taken by Sayyid Ahmad Khan led to a variety of 
developments, either in opposition or developing his positions further. The work of an 
associate of Sayyid Ahmad’s, Chiragh ‘Ali, illustrates the radical potential of the new 
modernism, as it will be seen, in a more comprehensive way, in the next chapter. 
Chiragh ‘Ali rejected the whole structure of medieval society as outmoded. He 
engaged in a vigorous defence of Islam against the criticism of Christian missionaries 
and other Europeans, but he did it on the basis of an analysis and interpretation of the 
Qur’an rather than by defending existing Muslim practices. In that defence, he 
presented arguments through the vehicle of a rational historical analysis. A modernist 
adaptation was combined with a rejection of all classical sources of Islamic law and 
thought except the Qur’an itself. Positions were supported by a rigorous, if 
speculative, analysis of the Qur’an, and everything else in the Islamic traditions was 
viewed in its historical context. It was possible for Chiragh ‘Ali, and others like him, 
to argue that the Prophet Muhammad did not set up a formal legal system and did not 
require his followers to do so; thus, Muslims were free to develop legal systems that 
were in accord with the specific conditions of their own times and were not bound by 
systems developed by Muslims in other times or places, opening the way for a 
radically modernist form of Islam. 
The position of Sayyid Ahmad Khan was not accepted by all of the major 
Muslim teachers, and the richness of Indian Muslim thought at the end of the 
nineteenth century and the breadth of the foundations provided by Shah Wali Allah 
are clearly visible in the variety of the more conservative positions that had emerged 
by the end of the century. New educational institutions were a leading part of the 
more traditional revival. In 1867, an Islamic school was established at Deoband by 
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scholars in the tradition of Wali Allah and their goal was to revive a rigorous study of 
the traditional Islamic disciplines and to provide a link between the Muslim 
community and its traditional identity. The Deoband School was relatively 
conservative in accepting the validity of the law schools and rejected compromises 
with Hindu customs and the adaptationism of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, establishing an 
international reputation with ties to the ‘ulama of al-Azhar in Egypt.148 
The more conservative style was also manifested in other important schools. 
The oldest and most conservative of the major schools was the Farangi Mahal in 
Lucknow, which maintained a traditional curriculum and was relatively aloof from the 
arguments of the modernists and active traditionalists. A less conservative school was 
the :adwat al-Ulama, established in Lucknow in 1894. Its leaders attempted to find a 
middle path between the modernism of Sayyid Ahmad Khan and the conservativism 
of Deoband and hoped to provide the training necessary for the ‘ulama to be able to 
reassert their role as the moral leaders of the Muslim community in India. 
In the late 19th century a group known as the Ahl al-Hadith also emerged, 
which built on the tradition of hadith study that had been firmly established in India 
by Shah Wali Allah, emphasising the reliance on the Qur’an and the Sunna. Its 
members were unwilling to accept the teachings of the medieval scholars as binding 
unless they were directly based on the fundamental sources of the faith. The vigorous 
activity within the Indian Muslim community during the 19th century shows the 
dynamism of Islam in the early modern era. Movements were built on the Islamic 
foundations of the past but also reacted to the changing modern conditions, and the 
community was not isolated within the Islamic world. Sayyid Ahmad Khan was 
aware of the works of Khayr al-Din Pasha in Tunisia, and Chiragh ‘Ali read the works 
of al-Tahtawi in Egypt as well as the writings of Khayr al-Din. The Ahl al-Hadith was 
influenced by nineteenth-century Yemeni scholarship, and virtually all educated 
Muslims were aware of developments in Egypt and the Ottoman Empire. The second 
half of the nineteenth century was a time of real Islamic resurgence in India, in 
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intellectual and religious terms, despite the fact that it took place in the context of 
foreign politico-military control.149 
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CHAPTER II: 
CHIRAGH ‘ALI’S COACEPTIOA OF STATE 
II.1. Bio-bibliography of Chiragh ‘Ali 
Chiragh ‘Ali (1844-1895) was of Kashmiri background and he grew up in 
North India. After his father’s death, at a young age, Chiragh ‘Ali’s family 
responsibilities, along with the turbulent events of the 1857 uprising, prevented him 
from pursuing formal higher education. However, he was able to find work with the 
colonial regime in various revenue and judicial positions. In 1877, with the 
recommendation of Sir Sayyid Ahmad Khan, he entered the administration of the 
nizam (ruler) of Hyderabad, where he rose to the position of finance secretary.150 
Chiragh ‘Ali’s writings often refuted missionary and Orientalist criticisms of 
Islam as being hostile to reason and incapable of reform. He argued rather that the 
Islamic legal system and schools were human institutions capable of modification. His 
position was that while the Qur’an taught religious doctrine and rules for morality, it 
did not support a detailed code of immutable civil law or dictate a specific political 
system. Chiragh ‘Ali was a staunch supporter and associate of Sayyid Ahmad Khan, 
and the Aligarh movement’s most outspoken critic of traditional Islamic scholarship 
and legal stagnation. 
In his English-language writings, such as The proposed political, legal, and 
social reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammadan States, which will 
be analysed in detail below, and in his Urdu articles, many published in Sir Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan’s journal, Tahdhîb al-Akhlâq (Refinement of Morals: Mohammedan 
Social Reformer), Chiragh ‘Ali espoused a variety of modernist positions, including 
the importance of the education of girls. His arguments on the interpretation of hadith 
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(narratives of the Prophet) and the possibility of ijtihad (independent and rational 
interpretation) drew on the writings of Shah Wali Allah.151 
Following a similar approach to Sayyid Ahmad Khan’s, rationalizing religious 
dogma and examining the traditional sources of the Islamic law and methods to 
overcome the rigidity of the traditional theologians, Chiragh ‘Ali rejected all classical 
sources of jurisprudence except the Qur’an, constructing a new basis for the law. 
“There are”, said Chiragh ‘Ali, “certain points in which the Muhammadan Common 
Law is irreconcilable with the modern needs of Islam… and requires modifications. 
The several chapters of the Common Law, as those on political Institutes, Slavery, 
Concubinage, Marriage, Divorce, and the Disabilities of non-Moslem fellow-subjects 
are to be remodeled and re-written in accordance with the strict interpretations of the 
Quran.”152 
Chiragh ‘Ali’s modernist exposé was developed in response to critics of Islam, 
one of whom was the Reverend Malcolm MacColl (1831-1907), a British clergyman 
and publicist, and a persistent campaigner for the Christian nationalities under 
Ottoman rule, and a lifelong friend of Gladstone (1809-1898), with whom he 
developed a political alliance, in opposition with Benjamin Disraeli (1804-1881), who 
was pro-Ottoman (like Queen Victoria herself). 
MacColl began to publish articles in the early 1870s, writing with increasing 
proficiency. His earliest writings were almost entirely on ecclesiastical and 
theological matters. He also maintained contact with continental Roman Catholic 
dissidents such as the Croatian Bishop Josip Juraj Strossmayer (1815-1905), and Dr. 
Ignaz von Döllinger (1799-1890) in Munich, acting as a discreet intermediary 
between them and Gladstone, leader of the Liberal Party. Both Strossmayer and 
Döllinger were strongly interested in the “Eastern Question” and the ending of 
Turkish rule in the Balkans. This, as well as similar currents of opinion in the Liberal 
Party, may have been responsible for MacColl's own interest in combating Turkish 
political power during the last three decades of his life. From 1876 onwards, MacColl 
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was an active defender of the Christian inhabitants of the Ottoman Empire (which was 
equated with “Islam”), writing a series of violent attacks on Turkey and its friends in 
Britain in letters to newspapers, articles in reviews, and publishing several books. In 
his private letters to Gladstone, after the Bulgarian atrocities of 1876, MacColl urged 
the Liberal leader to denounce the Ottomans and is perhaps partly responsible for the 
powerful speeches Gladstone made on the issue in the last months of 1876 and early 
1877. MacColl published two major works on this issue himself: The Eastern 
Question: Its Facts and Fallacies153 appeared in the spring of 1877 and ran through 
five editions; and Three Years of the Eastern Question154 followed, in the early 
autumn of 1878, immediately after the Congress of Berlin had ended. 
In the first years of the twentieth century, MacColl was an active opponent of 
Muslim spokesmen such as Sayyid Amir ‘Ali and the Turkish writer Halil Halid, 
sometimes admonishing them on doctrinal points of their religion, arguing for 
instance that the Sultan of Turkey was not the Caliph of all Muslims, and arguing that 
reforms in Islam were not possible because Islamic states were branches of 
cosmopolitan theocracy bounded together by a common code of essentially and 
eternally unchangeable civil and religious rules. MacColl was on close terms with the 
King of Greece, George I (1845-1913), and leaders of the Armenian movement, and 
during the Turkish-Greek War of April 1897, he visited Athens to confer with the 
King, conveying the monarch’s private views both to Gladstone and also to the 
Conservative Prime Minister, Lord Salisbury (1830-1903).155 
Chiragh ‘Ali rejected MacColl’s argument by making a distinction between 
the Muhammadan Revealed Law of the Qur’an and the Muhammadan Common Law 
that was developed in the course of Muslim history. Islamic jurisprudence, he argued, 
was compiled at a very late period and, as such, could not be considered essentially 
and eternally unchangeable. This distinction between the revealed law and the 
common law of Islam not only enabled Chiragh ‘Ali to refute MacColl’s claim on the 
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rigidity of Islam, but also set the theological basis for his reinterpretation of the 
Qur’an in terms of the standards of modernity. 
For Chiragh ‘Ali, “the fact that Muhammad did not compile a law, civil or 
canonical, for the conduct of the believers, nor did he enjoin them to do so, shows that 
he left to the believers in general to frame any code, civil or canon law, and to found 
systems which would harmonize with the times, and suit the political and social 
changes going on around them”.156 For Chiragh ‘Ali, this new basis of Muslim law 
was rational, dynamic, progressive, and in tune with the standards of the modern 
civilised world. In terms of such standards Chiragh ‘Ali addressed the Orientalists’ 
and the missionaries’ criticisms of Islam on the issues of polygamy, jihad, religious 
intolerance, slavery, and concubinage. 
Popular jihad was a sore point in Muslim-Christian history and a source of 
often strident Western criticism of Islam. It was claimed that in his zeal to spread 
Islam, Prophet Muhammad, holding the Qur’an in one hand and the scimitar in the 
other, pursued wars of conquest against the Qureish, other Arab tribes, the Jews, and 
Christians. They further claimed that Islam was an intolerant religion, and 
Muhammad himself plotted the assassinations of his enemies and was cruel to his 
prisoners. Chiragh ‘Ali’s strategy to address these claims was to first analyse the 
historical context within which Muhammad’s alleged actions had taken place. Then, 
by recourse to international law, religious liberty, and the legitimacy of defending 
one’s freedom – that is, the dominant mores of modern diplomacy – Chiragh ‘Ali 
claimed that Muhammad’s conduct was justified, arguing that “neither of the wars of 
Muhammad were offensive, nor did he in any way use force or compulsion in the 
matter of belief”, for “Muhammad and his followers were severely oppressed at 
intervals and were under a general persecution in Mecca by the Qureish. Under the 
natural and international law, Muhammad and his followers had every reason to wage 
war against their persecutors to obtain their civil rights and religious freedom in their 
native city.”157 
                                                           
156 ALI, 1883: p. 11. 
 
157 ALI, Chiragh. 1885. A critical exposition of the popular “jihad,” showing that all the wars of 
Mohammad were defensive; and that aggressive war, or compulsory conversion, is not allowed in 
 77 
 
Chiragh ‘Ali dedicates his work The proposed political, legal, and social 
reforms in the Ottoman Empire and other Mohammadan States to the Ottoman 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Before analysing it with more detail, and to better understand 
the context in which that work was written, it is necessary to give attention to what 
was happening in the Ottoman Empire at this period, a period of profound 
transformations and reforms, which had begun in 1839 with the Tanzimat 
(Reorganization). It should also be stressed that the fate of the Ottoman Empire and of 
the Caliphate had a deep impact on the Indian Muslim community and on the thought 
of Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi, as will be seen in following chapters. 
 
II.2. Political and legal reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the first half of 
the 19
th
 century 
The Tanzimat era was the second phase of the Ottoman-Turkish 
modernization, after the “New Order” of Selim III (1761-1808) and Mahmud II 
(1785-1839). It began with the Royal Decree of Gulhane (Tanzimat Fermani; 
sometimes called the “Gulhane Charter”) on the 3rd November, 1839, inaugurated by 
Sultan Abdulmecid I (1823-1861). It included several modernizing reforms, 
especially in the legal system. A product essentially of the pressures of the European 
states and the modernist, “enlightened” intellectuals, the decree, which proclaimed the 
principles of the Tanzimat, granted and guaranteed certain rights called “the 
fundamentals” (Mevadd-i Esasiye) such as the guarantee of life, property and honour 
for all subjects of the Sultan, Muslims and non-Muslims. 
Although the decree was aimed at delimiting the realm of the Islamic Shari’a 
and separating the government’s temporal authority from the Caliph’s religious 
sovereignty, it was filled with Islamic terminology and references to the Qur’an and 
the Sunna. The very first sentence stated the need for a change in the state institutions, 
which had been a widespread assumption, and a discursive strategy, in all 
modernizing reforms since the late 18th century, and justified the reforms with 
reference to the “blessed Shari’a” which had not been obeyed properly, unlike the 
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earlier times when “the orders of the Holy Qur’an and the rules of the Shari’a were 
observed perfectly.” The decree then declared the Sultan’s order for issuing a number 
of “new laws” that would regulate the legal and financial system “relying on the help 
of the Almighty God and the spirit of the blessed prophet.”158 Also, a Consultative 
Council prepared a protocol which stated the conditions upon which the Tanzimat 
Decree was built upon, the necessity of a change which was explicitly mentioned in 
article (a): the old disordered system had to be replaced by new laws, which would be 
in accordance with the Shari’a, and would be based on the inviolability of life, 
property, and honour as legal fundamentals, applicable to all Muslims and to the 
peoples of the millets (non-Muslim communities). What was implicit, however, was 
the direction of this change: the change in the legislative system would be towards the 
“secular” West. The “new laws” mentioned in the text and article (a) of the protocol 
were the ones that would limit the authority and domain of the Islamic Shari’a, as 
well as that of the Sultan, which would be proven by later developments – e.g. the 
institution of the first-ever constitution and parliament in 1876. That is why the 
authors of the protocol needed to refer, in the next article, to the Shari’a as the source 
of legitimation, unlike former occasions when the necessity of a law being derived 
from Shari’a had been taken for granted and was not mentioned in the legislative 
process. This protocol paved the way for the positioning of the Shari’a as an object of 
the discourse of secularization, as a source of legitimacy in law making. However, its 
objectification would take a different form in later years, and its discursive status as 
the only source of legitimacy would shift to that of being in need of protection by the 
political-legal system as well. Thus, the significance of these texts lies in the fact that 
they involved many Islamic elements on the discursive level and yet signified an 
important departure from the sovereignty of Islamic law in the current legal system.159 
A parallel discursive technique, which assumed the backwardness of Islamic 
society, for which “tradition” was blamed, was also a common pattern among 
statesmen and intellectuals in the Second Constitutional Period, which started in 1908 
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after the Young Turks Revolution. However, actors also always insisted that the “true 
Islam” that could be found in “sources” (sacred texts and early Islamic history) was 
not to blame; on the contrary, the solution was deemed to be found in “returning to 
the sources”. It is explicitly mentioned both in the decree and in article (b) of the 
Tanzimat that all new laws should be “in accordance with the Shari’a”, 
acknowledging the superiority of Islamic law over the Sultan’s (or the government’s) 
will. Moreover, the basis of these proposed new laws as stated in article (c) again was 
Islamic law. The principles of the “inviolability of life, property, and honour,” 
together with those of “reason” and “generation”, constitute what is known as the 
“five goals of Shari’a.” According to Islamic fiqh (jurisprudence, or positive law), all 
rules and laws exist ultimately for the purpose of protecting these five elements of 
human life. 
The discourse used in the protocol had an important implication: it proposed to 
limit the authority of the Caliph-Sultan. The decree, too, which was itself signed by 
the Sultan, limited his sovereignty, making him an executive, bound to laws made by 
others: the councils of deliberation. Indeed, the sources of legislation would become 
these councils whose members would increasingly consist of high-ranking staff 
officers who had a Western-style education. Moreover, it is very significant that 
although the decree acknowledges the Shari’a, and although it obviously concerns it, 
the proclamation of the decree was unusually not accompanied by a fatwa (a formal 
legal opinion) by the Sheikh-ul-Islam (the Caliph’s chief religious deputy), indicating 
a decline in the Sheikh-ul-Islam’s power. In traditional practices of passing a law or 
issuing a decree, a fatwa had been considered a must in order to provide a practice 
with legitimacy. Thus, the lack of fatwa – as a discursive practice itself – signifies the 
first formal breach between “the temporal” and “the religious” in legislation. This is 
highly significant especially when we consider the fact that even as late as 1922, 
almost a century later, Mustafa Kemal and his allies needed a fatwa by the chief Mufti 
when they decided to abolish the Ottoman monarchy. 
A similar phenomenon can be observed in the Reform Edict (Islahat 
Fermani), which was proclaimed on the 18th February, 1856.160 Again, as a result of 
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the pressures by European countries to further extend the privileges of Christians 
living in the Ottoman Empire, important privileges were granted to the non-Muslim 
subjects of the Empire. This meant the creation of a whole new institution, the modern 
citizenship, and a further step towards the formation of a modern state. The edict 
included the reaffirmation of older rights and privileges as well as additional rights 
such as the guarantee of equal treatment of non-Muslims in matters of education, 
military service, administration of justice, taxation, and the appointments to 
governmental posts; the right of foreigners to own property; the reform of the judicial 
tribunals and penal and commercial codes; and the representation of religious 
communities in the Supreme Council. The edict described the non-Muslim subjects of 
the Empire as “the emanet (on hold) trusted by Almighty God,” and granted equality 
for all subjects “who are related to each other with the sincere bonds of citizenship.” 
There was, however, much less reference to the Islamic Shari’a in the edict compared 
to the Tanzimat Decree. Instead the edict extensively employed another discourse: 
that of “catching up with contemporary civilization”. The edict granted privileges to 
non-Muslims with reference to the principle of freedom of conscience. As a 
justification of the proposed regulations, it stated the necessity “to improve the 
conditions [of the citizens] in accordance with the glory of our Sublime State and the 
eminent place it holds among the civilized nations.” Therefore, the edict implied 
political, legal, moral, religious, educational, and economic reforms in which such 
notions as equality, freedom, material progress, and rationalism formed the 
“background.” 
It can be observable, in these two reform projects, an attempt to separate 
religious and temporal authority, and delimit both the sovereignty of the Sultan and 
the authority of the Shari’a, made possible by the use of a discourse of “renewing the 
old institutions”. This argument, based on the inadequacy of the old institutions, 
including laws, and on the need to replace them, with new ones, would be repeated 
time and again in the later reforms that would embody and reproduce the ideology of 
secularism. Supported by the two reforms, the political and economic developments 
which brought the Ottoman State closer to Europe in that era paved the way for the 
first-ever constitution in Turkish history. 
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II.3. Political and legal reforms in the Ottoman Empire in the second half 
of the 19
th
 century: the 1876 Constitution and Parliament 
Under the Sultan Abdul Hamid II, Khayr al-Din Pasha al-Tunisi (c. 1822-
1890)161 was made prime-minister. He was in favour of a constitutional system, 
according to the political thinking of the period, in which the ‘ulama and the notables 
would have a special place. The impact of these changes was felt in the political-
ideological field. The process of integration, which began originally as a drive 
towards administrative centralization, was broadened and became concerned with the 
basic question of political loyalty. The idea of equal citizenship, known usually as 
Ottomanism, was a mere legal device through which the government wanted to 
supersede the ethnic and religious loyalties of the various minority groups. These 
attempts towards integration failed in as far as most of the Christian subjects were 
concerned, for the idea lacked the emotional appeal held by their own brand of 
nationalism. But the Muslim-Turkish intellectuals, whose number began to increase 
rapidly after the middle of the nineteenth century, seized upon Ottomanism as a 
nationalist ideology of their own, and defined its content according to their own 
cultural-social background and interpretation of history. Nationality began to 
transform itself into nationalism. 
Among the Muslim interpreters of the new order, the Young Ottomans were 
an important movement and among them three intellectuals stood up: Ibrahim Sinasi 
(1826-71), Ziya Pasha (1825-80), and Namik Kemal (1840-88), who attempted to 
develop a broad theoretical justification and an ideology for the emerging centralized 
modern institutions in terms of Islamic political tradition and Ottoman principles of 
government. Their ideas centred essentially on the restructuring of state institutions, 
while Muslim reformists, such as Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani, and especially 
Muhammad Abduh, were concerned, on the philosophical level, primarily with the 
reform of Islam. Even the Pan-Islamism of Afghani, and Abduh’s limited political 
activity among Egyptian nationalists directed against the expansionist policy of the 
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West, differed from the endeavours of Namik Kemal and Ziya Pasha, who aimed at 
institutional adaptation and political socialization rather than religious reform.162 
Ibrahim Sinasi, Ziya Pasha, and Namik Kemal had been educated in 
government schools and occupied government positions most of their adult lives. 
They were essentially the agents of emerging centralized bureaucratic structure, 
despite their disputes with the sultan, arising primarily from the need to re-define the 
functions and powers of the throne. Their ideas may be divided into several categories 
and, regarding the political one, it can be identified the one concerned with the 
introduction of a constitutional order and of representative institutions designed 
largely to create a division of functions within the ruling institution. Representation 
was justified on the basis of the Islamic principles of meshveret and Shura 
(consultation and assembly), rather than on that of representation of groups and their 
interests. The intellectuals’ aim was to correct the errors of the Tanzimat reforms, and 
put an end to the cultural dichotomy which supposedly had resulted from a 
misunderstanding of the philosophical, ethical and social foundations of the empire, 
and from the use of state power to impose an alien cultural system upon society. 
The Young Ottomans were also considered “liberal” in the sense that they 
criticized the absolute powers acquired by the sultan and his bureaucracy through 
centralization, and its use to destroy the existing system of culture. Criticism of the 
sultan also resulted from the incompatibility of autocracy with a rational, creative life. 
Another category of ideas of the Young Ottomans constituted the political culture of 
the emerging “modern” Ottoman state or of the administrative unit in which changes 
occurred. The basic goal was the creation of a new identity for Ottoman subjects and 
loyalty to its government. The new concept of the Vatan (in Arabic watan, fatherland) 
aimed the creation of a new form of identity to supersede religious, ethnic, and local 
divisions. The recognition of Ottoman citizenship for all inhabitants regardless of 
religion, the abolition of the millets, and the introduction of the general military 
service (which had been, in practice, limited to Turks) prepared the ground for the 
successful dissemination of the new political culture. Yet, loyalty and identity were 
basically matters of inner commitment, which could not be achieved without an 
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emotional experience capable of linking one’s values to the new political entity, the 
modern state.163 
The ideology of Namik Kemal revolved almost exclusively around the 
emerging idea of fatherland, the territorial state to which many of the attachments felt 
towards the umma (community) were transferred. But this call to nationalism was 
devised in accordance with the Western approach, concept and usages of ideology, 
except that he substituted Islamic values for Christian ones. Ideology in the modern 
sense as a means of mass mobilization and identification found its way into the 
Muslim-Turkish political ethos. Namik Kemal’s ideology, thus rooted in Islam, could 
hardly appeal to the Christian groups which were striving to establish their own 
national fatherlands. Nor could the emerging political culture, centred on the 
bureaucracy-intelligentsia, fully satisfy the practical demands of the notables and 
propertied groups which demanded a controlled, responsible, and professionally 
competent administration, and continued to view with suspicion the élite’s power 
motives. 
Nevertheless, the Young Ottomans played a vital role in introducing some 
general notions of pre-modern political culture and in paving the way for the 
constitutional experiment of 1876-7. They could not, however, provide lasting 
solutions to the smouldering conflict between the rising propertied middle classes and 
their own statist, bureaucracy-intelligentsia. This conflict was born of economic and 
social differences that could not easily be superseded by a unity of culture. The 
propertied groups lacked the organization to articulate and express their own 
viewpoints, but the conflict was there, coming into the open during the first 
constitutional parliamentary experiment in 1876-8.164 
The young Sultan Abdul Hamid II came to power in 1876 by means of a deal 
made with the Young Ottomans, promising them a transition to the constitutional 
system. This would also be a proper response to the European powers, including 
Russia, that were pressuring Istanbul for further economic and political reforms, 
reforms that would open the Ottoman borders to European capitalists and further 
                                                           
163 KARPAT, 1972: pp. 262-264. 
 
164 KARPAT, 1972: pp. 264-266. 
 84 
 
expand the rights of non-Muslim Ottomans. The proclamation of the first constitution 
(Kanun-i Esasi)165 and the institution of the first General Assembly (Meclis-i 
Mebusan) in 1876, which marked the beginning of the First Constitutional 
(Meşrutiyet) era, were important cornerstones on the way to the secularization of the 
Ottoman State. They signified a radical, even though partial, change in the foundation 
of the State’s sovereignty by assigning “the people” part of the basis for its 
legitimation and thereby limiting the domain of the monarchy. In his royal decree, the 
Sultan defined the purposes of the new general assembly: to guarantee the complete 
enforcement of the laws; to make them in accordance with the Shari’a and the real 
and legitimate needs of the country and the people; to supervise the balance of 
revenues and expenditures of the state. 
From the late 17th century on, all social, political and legal changes had been 
justified with reference to the Shari’a. The theme of the congruence of the new laws 
with the Shari’a had already been maintained in the Tanzimat decree. Here, too, there 
is a clear reference as a complementary discursive technique to the “implementation 
of the rules of the Shari’a in a more efficient way” in the institution of the new 
Parliament, which constituted another step in the formation of a modern state. 
Moreover, Abdul Hamid II, the sultan who signed the decree, was not sympathetic to 
the “Westernizers” (Young Ottomans) and secular reforms; on the contrary, he 
pursued a Pan-Islamist policy during his sultanate. However, due to the delicate 
balance of power relations with the European states and the Young Ottomans, he had 
to cooperate with them in instituting the Assembly and proclaiming the Constitution 
in 1876, which he later suspended in 1878. The significance of this lies in the fact 
that, not only the reformers but also the anti-Westernists (conservatives), resorted to 
the same discourse of serving Islam when attempting to modernize the political 
system. 
After the Sultan’s decree, the issue was brought to the Council of Ministers 
and then to a larger convention with approximately two hundred persons, including 
ministers and the dignitaries of the civil, military, and ‘ulama ranks, discussed the 
institution of a parliament. Despite the opposition by the majority of the ‘ulama, and 
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the accusation that Midhat Pasha (1822-1884), the Grand Vizier and a leading figure 
among the Young Ottomans, known as the “Father of the Constitution,” behaved in an 
un-Islamic way by letting the “infidel” (non-Muslim) deputies into the Parliament, he 
succeeded in winning over the ‘ulama, with the help of some of its members, the 
Constitutionalist ones who justified the idea of a parliament with reference to the 
Qur’an. Among them, for example, Chief Justice Seyfeddin Efendi played an 
important role, explaining at length, “by akli [rational] and nakli [textual] evidences,” 
that meşveret [consultation, which he interpreted as “Parliament”] was “perfectly in 
accordance with Islam”, and an interpretation which was in accordance with the way 
the constitutionalists saw it. In fact, this is another example of a situation where 
modernists apply the strategy of deriving justification for a reform (here, for a 
constitutional government) from the Qur’an, by employing different discursive 
techniques including dissecting the sacred texts, abstracting verses, sentences, or even 
phrases from their context, and applying these to the solution of an emerging problem 
in terms of the lexicographical meaning of the selected phrases. Moreover, Islam (or 
the Qur’an) still preserves its “object position” as being the primary source of 
legitimation for a constitutional change. However, the verses cited by the speaker 
were transformed through a brand new and, given the centuries-long tradition of tafsir 
(the interpretation of the Qur’an) in Islam, unusual interpretation. The interpretation 
of the Qur’anic verses in unusual ways became a very common discursive technique, 
especially after 1908, in accordance with the pace of modernization in Turkey.166 
On the other hand, the fact that a member of the ‘ulama, albeit a supporter of 
the Constitutionalists, referred to the authority of the Qur’an and hadiths to prove the 
compatibility of a Western institution with Islam indicates again that important 
changes in the way of modernization were often realized in both discursive and 
political spheres by resorting to Islam itself. In other words, the recurrent theme of the 
congruence of a reform with Islam appears again, however with a different technique. 
Although he encountered great opposition, Seyfeddin successfully integrated the 
Islamic elements, which were supposed to belong to a different, even an opposite, 
field of statements, into a discourse that he deliberately employed to make his case in 
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the debates over the institution of the Parliament, lending a life-saving support to 
Midhat and the Constitutionalists. 
The Kanun-i Esasi [Basic Law], of 1876, the first-ever constitution in Turkish 
history, included one hundred and nineteen articles and was more developed than the 
next one (1921), which was prepared in the midst of war. The main discursive 
strategy employed in the former constitution was the inseparability of Islam and the 
Caliph-Sultan, and many of the articles contained in it expressed different techniques 
comprising this main strategy. For example, the Kanun-i Esasi maintained first and 
foremost that both the sultanate and the caliphate belonged to the Ottoman dynasty 
(Ar. 3), and that the Sultan was the protector of Islam and the ruler of the subjects of 
the Ottoman Empire (Ar. 4). The Constitution also glorified the Sultan maintaining 
that “the blessed Sultan himself is sacred and unaccountable” (Ar. 5). However, 
because Abdul Hamid II abolished the Constitution in 1878 and set himself as the 
absolute ruler until 1908, the Constitution would later be amended by the ruling 
Committee of the Union and Progress (C.U.P.) in 1909 by adding a new sentence to 
Ar. 3 requiring an oath by the Sultan to be loyal to the “blessed Shari’a and the rules 
of the Basic Law [the Constitution].”167 Also, the Sultan’s authority to abolish the 
Parliament (Ar. 73) was abrogated later in 1914. 
Thus, the absolute ruler’s authority was gradually limited through 
modifications in the articles of the Constitution. In accordance with the earlier pattern, 
this was done by applying the same discursive strategy, “by reference to the Shari’a”, 
as is evident in the requirement of the oath which would also be in the name of God. 
Taking an oath in the name of God, which was required of both the Sultan and 
deputies, also found in the following two constitutions (1921 and 1924) was a 
discursive practice that functioned as part of the larger strategy to derive justification 
for a modern institution (the Parliament) from Islam. Moreover, the original version 
of the Constitution itself limited the authority of the Sultan and the Shari’a. For 
instance, the principle of the separation of powers was adopted, and separate sections 
were devoted to the executive branch, instituting a modern government with a prime 
minister, ministries and a cabinet (Ar. 27-38); to the legislation (Ar. 42-80) restraining 
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the power of the Caliph-Sultan; and to the jurisdiction (Ar. 81-91), which involved a 
bifurcation in the legal system separating the religious courts (Mehakim-i Şer’iyye) 
from the administrative ones (Mehakim-i :izamiyye). The bifurcation was also 
maintained in the education system, which involved both religious (medreses) and 
“secular” ones (mektebs) in higher education. The adoption of the modern principle of 
the separation of powers was another important element of a modern state. 
The Constitution also maintained that the official language of the State was 
Turkish (Ar. 18), and the state religion was Islam, but that all other beliefs and 
religions could also be freely practiced (Ar. 11). Furthermore, it was stated that “all 
subjects of the State have personal freedom” (Ar. 9), which included, in accordance 
with the regulations in the earlier Reforms, the non-Muslims living in the Ottoman 
territory who were granted, together with Muslims, other rights such as equality 
before the law (Ar. 17) and equality in public employment (Ar. 19). All these 
regulations meant the “constitutionalization” of citizenship, as anticipated in the 
earlier Reform Decrees, making the inhabitants of the Empire both “subjects” of the 
Sultan and “citizens” of the state, another indication of the hybridism of the Ottoman 
(traditional and legal-rational) political system. 
Finally, the granting of freedom of the press (Ar. 12) also contributed to the 
modernization as both secular and religious ideas gained a ready soil for 
dissemination, and to the limitation of the Sultan’s sovereignty, especially considering 
the fact that the press was the main basis of the opposition and the basic tool that 
disseminated the revolutionary ideas towards 1908. That is why Abdul Hamid II, after 
abolishing the Parliament, censored the press and exiled the opposition leaders, who 
were also the publishers of various newspapers, particularly in France and Macedonia. 
That is also why, after the 1908 Young Turk revolution, the phrase “with no 
censorship” was added to the same article, though later (after 1913) the press would 
be censored by the new rulers.168 
The Constitution was intended, as far its timing and foreign policy goals were 
concerned, to upset the Russian efforts to intervene, with Western approval, in order 
to “liberalize” the Ottoman regime. From a functional viewpoint, however, it 
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appeared as a rational measure designed to achieve essentially the integrative political 
roles performed by parliaments in the West. The need and place for a parliament were 
determined not by culture but by the functional necessities stemming from a 
diversified social structure and a differentiated political system. The debates 
inevitably led to demands for subjecting the executive to the control of the elected 
representatives of the people and to legitimize power according to the peoples’ will, 
since the “state’s existence depended on the people’s acceptance”. This issue came 
into the open on the question of whether a law approved by the Parliament could be 
amended by the Council of Ministers. The House of Deputies eventually inserted in 
the reply to a sultan’s speech a critical remark censuring the poor administrative 
performance of the ministers who supposedly contributed to the Ottoman defeat in the 
war with Russia in 1877. The clash between the legislature and the executive 
culminated in a dramatic confrontation between the sultan and the superintendent of a 
guild, Ahmet Efendi, who told the sultan that he, the ruler, was the cause of the 
country’s misfortune, and that the deputies would never accept responsibility for a 
situation arising outside their knowledge. The sultan eventually dismissed the House 
of Deputies, thus ending the first ottoman parliamentary experiment in 1878. 
The constitution of 1876 endeavoured to institute a constitutional monarchy in 
order to limit the sultan’s powers and, thus, preserve and consolidate the division of 
labour among the three classical branches of government. The Constitution created 
the legislature and defined its functions according to Western models, though its 
relation to the executive was justified in terms of the shura (council) and meshveret 
(consultation), both of which came from Islam. At the same time the Constitution 
recognised the sultan as the head of the Executive and gave him extensive powers in 
the appointment and dismissal of ministers. But the deputies, as mentioned 
previously, soon began to demand control over the Executive, since they were the 
“people’s representatives”. The early Ottoman reformers, relatively free of direct 
foreign intervention, and not faced with complex problems, had followed the 
functionalist logic in making the Grand Vizier a Bashvekil (prime minister), who, in 
turn, developed his own administrative apparatus. This trend emerged clearly after the 
destruction of the Janissaries169 in 1826, that is, after the major threat to reforms had 
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been removed. The great prime ministers, known also as reformers, despite their 
different philosophies, such as Reshit, ‘Ali, Fuad and Midhat Pashas, emerged in 
1839-76. But from 1876 onwards, almost to the end of the Ottoman Empire, there 
were no prime ministers comparable in stature to them. Sultan Abdul Hamid II 
acquired effective control of the Executive and used the prime minister as a mere 
executive agent. 
The effort to consolidate the power of the throne began actually under Sultan 
Abdul Aziz (1830-1876) in 1870. It was Abdul Hamid II who increased the throne’s 
power and transformed the sultan from a supreme executive organ, as he was regarded 
throughout the Ottoman Empire, into an autocratic semi-deity as Caliph, and who 
sought to legitimise his powers through a reinterpretation and “perversion” of 
Ottoman Islamic political theory. Abdul Hamid II’s autocracy was different from 
Mahmud II’s strong rule. Indeed, Mahmud II followed the old Ottoman tradition of 
hokum (law) and örf (mores); that is, he relied upon the Executive absolute 
prerogative to use whatever authority was necessary in order to enforce government 
functions. Mahumd II did not attempt to legitimize his power by reinterpreting 
Islamic law, but relied on political practices. He referred to some old political 
traditions in an effort to show that he was acting in accordance with the traditional 
separation of powers that had been implemented by the Ottoman government. He 
claimed that this was in conformity with Islam. Abdul Hamid II broke away from an 
essentially secular political tradition by generalising the rule of Islam in government 
affairs. 
Much of Abdul Hamid’s policy stemmed from his own personality, the 
dictates of outside events, from the alienation of the intelligentsia, and changes in the 
demographic cultural composition of the empire. Aware that the fate of all sultans 
since Selim III (1761-1808) had been decided first by the Janissaries and the ‘ulama, 
and then by the court officials, he developed a morbid fear of plots. Eventually, he 
won the ‘ulama to his side and succeeded in controlling the bureaucracy. A series of 
internal and external developments also helped consolidate the throne’s position. The 
rapid change in native customs and way of life and the diversification and 
secularization of intellectual pursuits brought about a crisis of identity. Foreign 
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interference, coupled with the religious motives which stood behind the “reformist” 
urges of the British ambassador to the Ottoman Empire, Stratford Canning (1786-
1880), which were denounced by Ottoman intellectuals who attacked the era of 
“liberalism” under Abdulmecit (1823-1861) and Abdul Aziz (1830-1876), appeared 
as immediate threats to society’s cultural survival. The throne therefore appeared not 
only as the repository of all ancient values, but also as the agency most capable of 
defending and preserving them. Abdul Hamid’s pious nature, ascetic habits, frugal life 
and occasional resistance to outside demands seems to have enhanced his stature 
among the religious-minded, as well as the traditionalists. His efforts to reassert the 
identity of society, though more in religious rather than political secular terms, struck 
a nationalist cord, even among the most progressive thinkers.170 
Unlike the previous sultans, Abdul Hamid II had a rather simple but 
ideological interpretation of reforms, civilization, and East and West. First, he seemed 
to believe that human nature rather than reason dictated man’s attitudes, that the 
emotional life of Westerners was determined by national attachments, while the 
dominant force among Easterners was religious instinct, that much of the essence of 
contemporary civilization was rooted in the basic Islam, that this Islam was the 
product of Arab genius, which built a socio-political system around the religious 
instinct, and that materialism, naturalism and secularism (maddiyyun, tabiyyun, 
dahriyyun) were interrelated enemies of religion. Actually, as may be noted, this 
chain of thought was not a defence of Islam or of the basic tenets of religion. It was a 
reassertion of the Islamic identity and of piety as strongholds of resistance to the 
onslaught of change. This was also a response to the changing conditions in the 
Ottoman Empire and in the Islamic world in general. 
The war of 1877 with Russia, and the treaties of San Stefano and Berlin of 
1878-9, resulted in the loss of vital territories south and southeast of the Danube and 
the Caucasus, which were populated by large numbers of Muslim-Turkish people. In 
the following decades the empire lost additional European territories and witnessed 
the migration of additional thousands of Muslim-Turks into Thrace and Anatolia. 
Consequently, the empire’s Christian-Muslim balance disappeared, and the Muslim 
element acquired an overwhelming majority in the remaining areas. The idea of a 
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multinational state based on common citizenship lost its practical importance since 
the Ottoman state became predominantly inhabitated by Muslims, and, aside from 
Iran, it became the only remaining major independent Muslim state in the world. 
The future seemed to lay in capitalizing on the Muslim features of the empire 
in order to rally all the faithful, first, in order to assure the empire’s survival, and 
secondly, to start the movement of Muslim liberation from European rule as 
advocated by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani who, forced to leave the country in 1871, was 
invited back and greatly honoured in 1894-7. Hence Abdul Hamid’s efforts to 
revitalise the Caliphate and use it as the rallying symbol of Pan-Islamism. At this 
stage it seemed as though the empire could preserve its integrity only by consolidating 
the unity of its Muslim subjects. The strong emphasis on the Arab character of Islam 
and on the sultans’ position as caliph, therefore, had the practical aim of preserving 
the Arab’s loyalty and of neutralising further the relatively feeble nationalist, 
separatist endeavours of the Christian Arabs. Indeed, the Arab-Muslim Middle East 
loomed as the major area of strength capable of assuring the empire’s survival. On the 
other hand, the nationalist awakening among Muslims in India and their warm 
affection for the Caliphate gave additional impetus to the metamorphosis of the throne 
into a symbolic religious institution. Thus, in the hour of its greatest weakness, the 
Ottoman state was called to undertake the liberation of Muslims on behalf of the 
universal ideas of Islam, while the very Muslims demanding liberation were actually 
seeking to materialise the tenets of their particular brand of nationalism.171 
 
II.4. Analysis of The proposed political, legal, and social reforms in the 
Ottoman empire and other Mohammadan states 
Originally published in 1883, seven years after the first Ottoman Constitution 
and five years after its suspension in 1878, this work by Chiragh ‘Ali is divided in 
three parts: “Introduction”; “Legal and Political Reforms”; and, finally, “Social 
Reforms”. In accordance with the scope of this research, only the “Introduction” and 
the “Legal and Political Reforms” will be analysed with more detail. The part on 
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“Social Reforms” deals with questions like “Position of Women” (pp. 112-127), 
“Polygamy” (pp. 128-129), “Divorce” (pp. 130-144), “Slavery” (145-174) and 
“Concubinage” (175-183). 
In the “Introduction” (pp. i-xl), the author starts by explaining that his book 
had been written to respond to the Reverend Malcolm MacColl and his article “Are 
reforms possible under mussulman rule?” published in the Contemporary Review of 
August 1881. It was also being published for the information of those European and 
Anglo-Indian writers who were suffering under the “delusion” that Islam was 
incapable of any political, legal or social reforms. 
Chiragh ‘Ali expresses his surprise towards the ill-information of English 
writers on a topic of vital interest to England, for “[t]he British Empire is the greatest 
Mohammadan Power in the world, i.e., the Queen of England, as Empress of India, 
rules over more Mohammadans than any sovereign, not excepting His Imperial 
Majesty the Sultan of Turkey”172, and argues that “the ideas that Islam is essentially 
rigid and inaccessible to change, that its laws, religious, political and social, are based 
on a set of specific precepts which can neither be added to, nor taken from, nor 
modified to suit to altered circumstances; that its political system is theocratic, and 
that in short the Islamitic code of law is unalterable and unchangeable, have taken a 
firm hold of the European mind, which is never at any trouble to be enlightened on 
the subject. The writers of Europe do not deeply search the foundations of Islam, in 
consequence of which their knowledge is not only superficial in the highest degree, 
but is often based on unreliable sources.”173 
Chiragh ‘Ali defends that Islam is capable of moral and social progress and he 
tries to show, with this book, that the “Mohammadanism” taught by the Prophet 
Muhammad possessed sufficient elasticity to enable it to adapt itself to the social and 
political revolutions going on around it, making a distinction between the 
“Mohammadan Common Law”, or Shari’a, and the Qur’an. While the first one was 
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by no means unchangeable or unalterable, only the Qur’an was the “Law of 
Mohammad”, or Islam. According to Chiragh ‘Ali, Muslim Law was Republican in 
character and the “Mohammadan States” were not theocratic in their system of 
government: being based on the principles of democracy, “Mohammadan Law” was 
on that account a great check on Muslim tyrants.174 
Using History, Chiragh ‘Ali considers that the first caliphs were republican in 
all their features (comparing them to the Dictators of the Ancient Republic of Rome), 
with each successor chosen among the people by common consent, and, contrary to 
what MacColl had written in the Contemporary Review, in an article published in 
November 1876, the government of Turkey did not and could not claim or profess to 
be theocratic. To support his assertion Chiragh ‘Ali quotes Sir Henry Elliot, the 
British Ambassador at Constantinople, who had written that there was a concern in 
proving that the government of the Ottoman Empire was “properly democratic”.175 
Chiragh ‘Ali, then, elaborates about the several schools of “Mohammadan 
jurisprudence” (madhabs), or “churches” as he also calls them176, which were 
developed in accordance with the social and political changes going on around the 
                                                           
174 Machiavelli, in his Discorsi, affirms that liberty is possible only under a repubblica. But he also 
affirms that Rome lived in libertà under her early kings. Since it is a commonplace to say that republic 
and monarchy are incompatible, historians have tended to reply that Machiavelli seemed to be 
confused. As Quentin Skinner writes, before endorsing such a conclusion, social scientists and 
historians ought first to consider the full range of contexts in which the term repubblica occurs. For 
Machiavelli the term could be used to denote any form of government under which the laws may be 
said to foster the common good. It follows that for Machiavelli the question of whether a monarchy 
could be a repubblica was not an empty paradox, as it would be for us, but a deep question of 
statecraft. The question was whether kings could ever be relied upon to pass only such laws as would 
serve the common good, giving us an alternative reading: Machiavelli is telling us that, under Romulus 
and his successors, the laws of Rome served the common good, so that the government, although 
monarchical in form, was an instance of a repubblica. Since this has the effect of resolving the 
contradiction, Skinner suggests that this is also the interpretation we ought to prefer, and which I am 
using for Chiragh ‘Ali’s conception of Republic. For further details, see SKINNER, Quentin. 2002. 
“Interpretation, rationality and truth” in Visions of Politics. Volume 1: Regarding Method. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 55-56. 
 
175 Italics in the original. ALI, 1883: p. iii. 
 
176 This example shows that Chiragh ‘Ali made an effort to use the language of European readers and 
European political concepts, so that he could be understood. With the equation State equals Politics and 
Church equals Religion, and with secularism and laïcité as main ideological features of late 19th 
century in Western Europe, with their separation of State and Church, Politics and Religion, Chiragh 
‘Ali tries to explain to his readers that, in Islam, Politics and Religion are separated. Although Islam 
does not have a Church, which is also a political institution, that equation would be maintained until 
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Muslim world, with a view of adapting the law still further to the progressive needs 
and altered circumstances of the Muslims. However, not one of those schools was 
final and “they were merely halting stages in the march of Mohammadan legislation.” 
As throughout History changing conditions required a change in the laws, the change 
in modern circumstances required a change in the law. For him, legislation was an 
experimental and inductive science, not logical and deductive. “The differences of 
climate, character, or history must be observed; the wants and wishes of men, their 
social and political circumstances must be taken into consideration, as it was done in 
the various stages of the first days of the growing Moslem Empire”, as had done the 
four founders of the madhabs (Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i, and Hanbali) and whose 
principles could not be binding either on the Muslims of India or Turkey, because 
they were local in their specific applications.177 
Then, Chiragh ‘Ali refutes the opinion of the Reverend Edward Sell, Fellow of 
the University of Madras, who had written in 1880, in his book The faith of Islam178, 
that the orthodox belief was that since the time of the four Imams there had been no 
Mujtahid (those who do Ijtihad) who could do as they did, and if circumstances 
should arise which absolutely required some decision to be arrived at, it must be given 
in full accordance with the madhab to which the person framing the decision 
belonged, situation which prevented all change, and, by excluding innovation, kept 
Islam stationary. For Chiragh ‘Ali, changes were not prevented and there was no legal 
or religious authority for such an orthodox belief, “or rather misbelieve”, nor could it 
be binding on Muslims in general: “In the first place the founders of the four schools 
of jurisprudence never claimed any authority for their system or legal decisions, as 
being final. [...] They were very far from imposing their analogical deductions or 
private judgments on their contemporaries, much less of making their system binding 
on the future generation of the wide-spreading Moslem Empire. In the second place 
none of the Mujtahids or Mohaddises would accord such a high position to any of the 
four Imams or doctors of jurisprudence.” So, the Mokallids, those who followed 
blindly any of the four doctors were wrong, and the characteristics of each of the four 
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orthodox schools showed that they were never intended to be either divine or finite.179 
Every system was progressive, incomplete, changeable and undergoing alterations 
and improvements and, consequently, the legislation of the “Mohammadan Common 
Law” was changeable and progressive.180 
 
II.4.1. Sources of Law 
For Chiragh ‘Ali, the sources for that Law, civil and canonical, were three: 1) 
the Qur’an; 2) the traditions from the Prophet and his Companions (Sunna and 
Hadith); and 3) the unanimous consent (ijma) of the learned Muslims on a point of the 
civil or canon law not to be found in the two preceding sources. He also adds a fourth 
one, Qiyas, analogy of the process of reasoning by which a rule of law was 
established from any of the three elements. 
Explaining with more detail each one of them, Chiragh ‘Ali starts by saying 
that the Qur’an, the “Mohammadan Revealed Law”, did not profess to teach a social 
and political law, nor to give particular and detailed instructions in the Civil Law or to 
lay down general principles of jurisprudence. The more important civil and political 
institutions of the “Mohammadan Common Law” based on the Qur’an were bare 
inferences and deductions from a single word or an isolated sentence. In short, the 
Qur’an was not a civil or political code nor did it interfere in political questions or lay 
down specific rules of conduct in the Civil Law. What it taught was a revelation of 
certain doctrines of religion and certain general rules of morality. The Muslims had 
applied its precepts to the institutions of their daily life as the Christians had done 
with the Bible, and as in Christendom Theology had been separated from Morals and 
Politics recently, late 17th century, middle of the 18th, the “enlightened 
Mohammadans” of Turkey and India were also trying to do the same in that century, 
i.e., the 19th, something which would not affect their religion.181 
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In what refers to the Sunna and Hadith, there were many traditions from the 
Prophet, his Companions and successors, on the various subjects of the social, 
political, civil, and criminal law incorporated in the Muslim law-books, and at a 
certain point “the vast flood of traditions soon formed a chaotic sea. Truth and error, 
fact and fable, mingled together in an undistinguishable confusion. Every religious, 
social, and political system was defended, when necessary, to please a Khalif [Caliph] 
or an Ameer [Amir, Prince] to serve his purpose, by an appeal to some oral traditions. 
[...] It was too late when the loose and fabricated traditions had been indiscriminately 
mixed up with genuine traditions, that the private and individual zeal began to sift the 
mass of cumbrous traditions. The six standard collections of traditions were compiled 
in the third century of the Mohammadan era, but the sifting was not based on any 
critical, historical, or rational principles. The mass of the existing traditions were 
made to pass a pseudo-critical ordeal. It was not the subject matter of the tradition, 
nor its internal and historical evidence which tested the genuineness of a tradition, but 
the unimpeachable character of its narrators and their unbroken links up to the time of 
the Prophet or his Companions, with two or three other minor observations and 
technicalities” and, contrary to what some Europeans writers defended, the Traditions 
were not generally binding on the conscience. The fact that the Prophet Muhammad 
never enjoined to collect traditions and the fact that they were not based on sure and 
positive grounds showed to Chiragh ‘Ali that they were not unchangeable and 
immobile.182 
Then, developing the concept of Ijma, “the unanimous consent of all the 
learned men of the whole Mohammadan world at a certain time on a certain religious 
precept or practice for which there is no provision” in the Qur’an or Sunna, Chiragh 
‘Ali shows how throughout History there were different and diverging opinions on it 
and how it was considered not authoritative.183 
Finally, Chiragh ‘Ali explores the concept of Qiyas, which was considered by 
Reverend Sell, in his book, as the fourth foundation of Islam. Refuting that, Chiragh 
‘Ali says that, technically, Qiyas means analogical reasoning based on the Qur’an, 
traditions, or Ijma, and its authority as a source of law had already been denounced by 
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many throughout history. Also, he is of the opinion that the several codes of Muslim 
jurisprudence were well suited to the then existing state of life in each stage of its 
development but that there were certain points in which the “Mohammadan Common 
Law” was irreconcilable with the modern needs of Islam, whether in Turkey or India, 
and required modifications. For Chiragh ‘Ali, the several aspects of that Law, like 
those on political Institutes, Slavery, Concubinage, Marriage, Divorce, and the 
Disabilities of non-Muslim fellow-subjects were to be remodelled and re-written 
according to the strict interpretations of the Qur’an, something that he attempts to 
show in the following pages of his book.184 
Chiragh ‘Ali was of the opinion that legal, political and social equality on a 
much more liberal scale had to be granted in Turkey, in theory as well as in practice. 
On the other hand, conformity, in certain points, with foreign laws must be allowed to 
Muslims, living under the Christian rule, either in Russia, India or Algiers. Political 
and social equality must be freely and practically granted to the natives of British 
India. Political inequality, race distinctions and social contempt evinced by 
Englishmen in India towards their fellow-subjects, the Natives, was very degrading 
and discouraging.185 
All the reforms could be made by the Sultan of Turkey, because besides being 
competent to bring about any reforms on the authority of the Qur’an, and being a 
successor of the successors of the Prophet and the Amir ul-Muminin [The Prince of 
the Believers], he was the only legal authority on matters of innovation. Contrary to 
what Coronel/Major Robert Durie Osborn defended, Chiragh ‘Ali disagreed with the 
idea that a religious revolution was needed before a political reform in “Muhammadan 
States” could take place, and contrary to what Stanley Lane Poole defended, the 
author did not consider imperative to cut the social system from religion because 
Islam, as a religion, was quite apart from inculcating a social system.186 
According to Chiragh ‘Ali, the political and social reforms which he explained 
in the first and second parts of the book were neither casuistical deductions, nor 
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fortuitous interpretations, nor analogical constructions of the Qur’an. On the contrary, 
they were the plain teachings, self-indicating evident meanings of it. For him, the 
Qur’an or the teachings of the Prophet were neither barriers to spiritual development 
or free-thinking on the part of Muslims, nor an obstacle to innovation in any sphere of 
life, whether political, social, intellectual, or moral, and all efforts at spiritual and 
social development were encouraged as meritorious and hinted at in several verses of 
the Qur’an.187 
For Chiragh ‘Ali, “Church and State” were not combined together, as it was 
shown by an episode in which the Prophet would have said that in matters of religion 
he should be obeyed, but on other matters he was only human. According to Chiragh 
‘Ali, the Arab Proverb “State and Religion are twins” was a mere saying of the 
common people, and not a Muslim religious maxim, being incorrect to suppose that 
the acts and sayings of the Prophet covered all law, whether political, civil, social, or 
moral, and, in fact, free-thinking was sanctioned by the Prophet.188 Chiragh ‘Ali 
concludes the “Introduction” to his book by stating that tradition secured the Muslims 
with enlightened progress and removed the fetters of the past, encouraging them to 
base all legislation on the living needs of the present, and not on the fossilized ideas 
of the past.189 
 
II.4.2. Legal and Political Reforms 
For Chiragh ‘Ali, legal and political reforms were possible in Islam, refuting 
the assertions of Malcolm MacColl, who had said that the Muslim states were only 
branches of a cosmopolitan theocracy, all bound by one common code of civil and 
religious rules and dogmas which were essentially and eternally unchangeable: what 
had been decreed by the Prophet twelve centuries earlier had to be applied forever in 
the Muslim world. 
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According to Chiragh ‘Ali, the Muslim States were not usually considered 
theocratic in their system of government and, in the earlier times of Islam, they were 
republican, only altered when the Ummayads changed that into monarchy and 
despotism. The fact that two Muslim kings professed the same religion did not 
prevent them of having political differences and even hostilities, as Indian history 
showed. In that republican period, or even with the first Ummayads, there was not any 
common code or law book for the guidance of the government, or even a canon or 
ecclesiastical law books, except the “Mohammadan Revealed Law” of the Qur’an. 
After the overthrow of the Ummayads, and the establishment of the Abbassid dynasty, 
a need was felt for a common code of law, partly required for the guidance of 
government, and the security of person and property, as well as to coincide with the 
“wishes of the despots”. However, there was not a common civil or canonical code, 
because different juridical schools sprang up, which recollected and interpreted the 
different traditions.190 
Chiragh ‘Ali then explores the confusion that some writers make who either 
confound the Qur’an, which he calls the “Mohammadan Revealed Law”, with the 
Fiqh or Shari’a, what he refers to as the “Mohammadan Common” or “Civil Law”, or 
think that the Qur’an contains the entire code of Islam, or that the “Mohammadan 
Law”, by which is invariably meant the “Mohammadan Common Law”, is infallible 
and unalterable. The “Mohammadan Law” books, the fundamental codes of Islam, 
according to Chiragh ‘Ali, took very little or nothing from the Qur’an, and all the 
“Mohammadan” jurists, casuists, muftis, and mujtahids, had by a tacit consent 
removed the law points from the text of the sacred book to the jurisdiction of the 
canon or civil law, relying Muslims principally on the later lego-religious books 
instead of the Qur’an. To illustrate his thesis, Chiragh ‘Ali quotes George Campbell, 
Edward Sell, W.W. Hunter and, especially, Cyrus Hamlin, an American missionary 
residing in Turkey. In the opinion of Chiragh ‘Ali, the latter was entitled to be more 
trustworthy because of his long stay and deep acquaintance of the “Mohammadan” 
world, and, for him, Cyrus Hamlin, “Tradition”, more than the Qur’an, had formed 
both the law and religion for Muslims. For Chiragh ‘Ali, Islam was capable of 
progress and possessed sufficient elasticity to enable it to adapt itself to the social and 
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political changes going on around it. The Islam, “the pure Islam” taught by the 
Prophet in the Qur’an, and not the Islam as taught by the “Mohammadan Common 
Law”, was itself a progress and a change for the better. It had the vital principles of 
rapid development, of progress, of rationalism, and of adaptability to new 
circumstances. What MacColl called the inviolable and absolutely unchangeable law 
of Islam was, for Chiragh ‘Ali, the “Mohammadan Common Law”, which could in no 
way be considered infallible, consisting of general or particular customs, and certain 
and peculiar or ecclesiastical laws. The only infallible law was the Qur’an.191 
The institutions of a Muslim state and of the “Mohammadan Common Law”, 
the Shari’a, and contrary to what MacColl had written, were not necessarily built 
upon the Qur’an. Very few points of the civil and canon law of the “Mohammadan 
Common Law” were founded upon the Qur’an, all other points of civil or 
ecclesiastical law being based on general and particular Arab customs. Some of them 
were reformed and improved, while others were simply put down as they were at the 
time, to be generally practised, and to be a necessary and inescapable part of the Arab 
institutions. For Chiragh ‘Ali, had the Prophet thought it incumbent on him to frame a 
civil and canon law, other than the Revealed one, he would have done so. The fact 
that Muhammad did not compile a law, civil or canonical, for the conduct of the 
believers, nor did he enjoin them to do so, showed that he had left for them to frame 
any code, civil or canon law, and to found systems which would harmonize with the 
times, and suit the political and social changes going on around them.192 
 
II.4.3. The rights of non-Muslims living under Muslim rulers, and 
International Relations 
Chiragh ‘Ali, quoting from the Qur’an, refutes the idea exposed by MacColl, 
who considered impossible any reform in the Sultan’s dominions with the aim of 
altering the conditions of the Christian population, because the dominions of the 
Sultan were merely a part of one vast theocratic power which claimed divine sanction 
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to reduce all mankind to the alternative of embracing Islam or submitting to servitude 
(in the case of Christians and Jews), or death to all other non-Muslims and Christians 
who took up arms in defence of their liberty. Chiragh ‘Ali writes that not even the 
“Mohammadan Common Law” claimed divine sanction to reduce all mankind to the 
alternative of embracing Islam or submitting to servitude or death, and not even the 
most fanatical of jurists claimed such a thing in books compiled by them. In what 
referred to the condition of the Christian population, and to the remark made by the 
Reverend MacColl that equality of rights was forbidden to the non-Muslim by the 
Sacred Law, Chiragh ‘Ali says that the condition of the non-Muslim subjects of a 
Muslim empire was in no way inferior to that of the dominant race, whose 
subordinates they were, and that certain legal disabilities of the non-Muslims, noted 
down in the “Mohammadan Common Law”, as referred by MacColl (quoting from a 
work on Muslim jurisprudence compiled in the earlier half of the sixteenth century), 
were merely imaginary and fantastical, because they were never in force and never 
were they intended to be so.193 
Using examples from the behaviour of the Prophet Muhammad, Chiragh ‘Ali 
says that they illustrate the perfect toleration and equality of rights granted to 
Christians and Jews. The disabilities quoted by MacColl were only dead letters in the 
books in which they were inscribed, like some penal ones in English-Statute books 
which had fallen into desuetude and oblivion. They were not put into requisition in 
legal practices, and never received the sanction of any Sultan. They had been 
repeatedly shelved up as useless enactments, and not a few times had they been 
repealed by the formal denunciations of the several Sultans in their Khatts, i.e., the 
Hatti Cherif of Gulhaneh of 1839, the Hatti Humayun of 1856, and in the Constitution 
of 1876, which granted to all Ottomans, independently of their religion, caste or 
creed, equality before the law.194 
According to MacColl, the Qur’an divided the world into Dar ul-Islam 
(Abode of Islam) and Dar ul-Harb (Abode of War), and it was the duty of the head of 
the Muslim faith to compel Dar ul-Harb to embrace Islam at the point of the sword. 
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For Chiragh ‘Ali, that was not only incorrect but also a groundless statement, because 
there was no such division of the world made in the Qur’an, nor was there any such 
assertion, as anyone could see by reading a copy of the Qur’an in an English, or any 
other European language, translation. That distinction, in the “Mohammadan 
Common Law”, was only a question of jurisdiction in the law-suits, for example in 
cases like extradition. Chiragh ‘Ali turns his attention to India and to the question 
posed by W.W. Hunter in his book Our Indian Musalmans. Asking himself if India 
was Dar ul-Islam or Dar ul-Harb, Chiragh ‘Ali contends that it is neither one or the 
other, and simply British India, and that the Muslims were subjects of the government 
living in Dar ul-Aman or Dar ul-Zimma (the House of Security or Protection).195 
MacColl had stated that Islam claimed to be a universal empire, based on the 
unchanging and unchangeable law of the Qur’an, and the Sunna, and that the right of 
citizenship in this world-wide polity was not based on birth, race, language, or 
country, but on a religious profession, for it did not recognize any country bur Dar ul-
Islam. For Chiragh ‘Ali that was not the case: the right of citizenship, of all the free 
inhabitants, in the “Mohammadan Common Law”, was based on nature, i.e., birth, 
and was not established on a religious profession. Non-Muslims were also believed to 
possess and enjoy the right of citizenship in their respective countries, and also in the 
countries of Muslims not hostile to the state. The non-Muslim population of Dar ul-
Harb, or of any hostile country, or of the country of an alien, enjoyed the same 
privileges, freedom, and security inseparable from the right of citizenship, as the 
Muslims possessed in their own, and that right was based on birth, i.e., on the grounds 
of humanity, because every person had the right of citizenship. Chiragh ‘Ali also says 
that those Muslim jurists who were intense fanatics and argued that the infidels, even 
in their own hostile country, were not free or citizens were perfectly unjust, and that 
the least fanatical of jurists did not recognize such a status of the inhabitants of the 
hostile country.196 
According to MacColl, the evidence of a non-Muslim, subject of a Muslim 
government, was never admissible against a Muslim. For Chiragh ‘Ali, that was 
neither found ordained in the Qur’an, which was the “Mohammadan Revealed Law”, 
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nor in the traditional sayings of the Prophet, which formed part of the “Mohammadan 
Common Law”, and it could not be admitted as a precept of the sacred and inviolable 
law. Moreover, it was “repugnant” to reason and public justice to refuse to admit the 
evidence of a non-Muslim against a Muslim. If a custom sanctioned such a thing, the 
“Mohammadan Common Law” should be reformed in that particular instance. 
Chiragh ‘Ali was glad to say that he did not find that law in the Turkish Civil Code 
(Majilla) published by the authority of the Sultan in 1880, from which it appeared that 
the legal disability of the non-Muslim subject had been altogether abolished in the 
Turkish Empire, a legal disability that had been set up by Muslim legislators on 
slender bases, from a non-credible interpretation of a verse of the Qur’an, the 140th. 
On the other hand, Chiragh ‘Ali quotes Sir George Campbell and stresses the fact that 
until recently British tribunals would also not accept the testimony of a non-
believer.197 
In MacColl’s opinion, the second legal disability under which non-Muslim 
subjects of a Muslim Government lie was the alleged intolerance of the “Islamitic” 
law, because religious liberty was forbidden by the unalterable law of Islam. Chiragh 
‘Ali responds to this by asking if the Qur’an inculcated religious intolerance and if 
Muhammad taught that to his followers. As far as he was able to judge, from the 
Qur’an and from the doctrines of the Prophet, the “Mohammadan Revealed Law” 
was the greatest advocate of a diametrically reverse principle, i.e., religious toleration. 
The fact that the Turks did not allow the use of church-bells or the erection of 
churches, or other grievances reported, did not mean that it was the outcome of the 
unalterable law of Islam, by which Chiragh ‘Ali meant the Revealed Law, the 
Qur’an. In the case of the denial of the use of church-bells where mixed creeds 
congregate, it was justified for administrative reasons, as a prevention of the breach of 
common peace. The fact that some of the “narrow-minded and illiberal Turkish 
fanatics” might practise all those things could not be a reason to blame the Qur’an 
and, so, those corruptions could be easily reformed.198 
Chiragh ‘Ali was also aware of the complicated situation in which the 
Ottoman Empire lived, particularly its external relations with Russia. He was of the 
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opinion that if such religious intolerance was carried on by some bigoted Turks, 
probably Russian intrigue might have been lurking at its bottom, as was seen in the 
situation in Serbia, when Christian brigades were introduced with orders to assume 
Muslim names and assail the Christians in order to create general disturbances. Using 
many examples from History, and quoting the Reverend Cyrus Hamlin and the Earl of 
Shaftesbury, Chiragh ‘Ali draws attention to the fact that Muslim governments in 
different parts of the world had always been remarkable for religious toleration, the 
Turks being the most celebrated.199 
Focusing his attention on the question of apostasy and the supposed death 
penalty for someone who renounced Islam, and using different verses from the 
Qur’an, Chiragh ‘Ali tries to show that that penalty did not exist in the 
“Mohammadan Revealed Law”, and that, on the contrary, the apostate was forgiven; 
and if there was any such intolerant or oppressive practices regarding apostates in the 
Ottoman State, Chiragh ‘Ali did not see any impediment for the Sultan to introduce a 
reform: the “Mohammadan Common Law” enjoined death in the case of an apostate 
who took up arms against his sovereign. That Law, compiled by some jurists, was 
based on an isolated sentence from the Qur’an, which was specifically directed to 
those Meccans who had broken the Treaty of Hudaibya, and on questionable 
Traditions, which, taken to the last consequences, meant that every conversion, 
including to Islam, was subject to the death penalty. In practical terms, religious 
freedom had been improving in Turkey, and the Sultan himself had annulled the law 
on apostasy, which had historical precedents in Judaism, Christianity, the Roman 
Empire, and in 13th century and 18th century England.200 
To the accusation of Malcom MacColl that Muslims could break treaties made 
with non-Muslims, Chiragh ‘Ali says that once again the Reverend’s sentence was 
false and ill-grounded, similarly to when the former said that it was unlawful for 
Christian subjects of a Muslim power to bear arms, being an unrepealable law 
declared as such by the ‘ulama of Constantinople in 1878, and that the Christians had 
to pay a yearly ransom for the right to live (a reference to the jyzia, or capitation-
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tax).201 Chiragh ‘Ali refutes this by saying that he did not find in the “Mohammadan 
Revealed Law”, or in the “Traditions”, any reference saying that it was unlawful for 
the Christian subject to bear arms. It might be a policy of the Government to prohibit 
the use of arms to a section of its subjects, especially to the insurgents, as a 
precautionary measure, but it was not a religious ordinance or an unrepealable law. 
The capitation tax was a tax imposed on male adults in lieu of assistance with person 
and property, as the non-Muslim subjects were not required by their sovereign to 
contribute towards any war-expense, nor personally go to war. The Christians of 
Turkey were exempt from military service, and, in return, the Christians were under 
protection and had the right to live in Muslim territory. If a non-Muslim did not pay, 
and if a year had elapsed, the tax of that year could not be levied.202 
According to MacColl, no Muslim power had ever granted, nor could grant, 
equal rights to Christians without being in apostasy, and the Hatt-i Houmayun of 
1856, granting equal rights to Christian subjects, had never received the due fatwa, 
nor could it, because the equality of rights to non-Muslims was forbidden by the 
Sacred Law. Chiragh ‘Ali considers this “absurd”, since many Muslim sovereigns, 
throughout History, had given equal rights to non-Muslims, without being considered 
apostates, and the political actions of the government did not need the sanction of the 
Shaikh ul-Islam, which was not a religious post and which was dependent on the 
Sultan. The Shaikh ul-Islam only gave opinions on legal and political matters, but 
without powers to enforce them or to annul or disallow any act of the Government.203 
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CHAPTER III: 
MUHAMMAD IQBAL’S COACEPTIOA OF STATE 
III.1. Bio-bibliography of Muhammad Iqbal 
Born in Sialkot, nowadays Pakistan, on the 9th November 1877, in the same 
year that the Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College, at Aligarh, was starting to work, 
Muhammad Iqbal’s thought developed in an environment in which a critical tradition 
to the loyalist policies of the All-India Muslim League was growing, and in a Muslim 
India which would witness the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, fragmentation 
seen as an Western threat to Islam. 
In late 19th century, Iqbal studied at the Scottish Mission School (nowadays 
Murray College), where he was influenced by Maulvi Mir Hassan, professor of 
Persian Literature. Then, to study English Literature, Arabic and Philosophy, he 
moved to the Government College in Lahore, where he received personal attention 
from Thomas Arnold (1864-1930), and was influenced by him, an important scholar 
of Islam at that time and to whom Iqbal would dedicate his Ph.D. thesis. Finishing his 
studies in 1897, Iqbal obtained a master’s degree in Arabic two years later, and in 
1903 he published ‘Ilm-ul-iqtisad (The Study of Economics), the first book on 
political economy to be published in Urdu. In 1905 he travelled to Europe to continue 
his studies in London, at Lincoln’s Inn, to qualify for the Bar and also enrolled 
himself at Trinity College (Cambridge), following the counsel of Thomas Arnold and 
studying Philosophy under J.M.E. McTaggart (1866-1925). At the same time, he 
submitted his thesis to the University of Munich204, where he obtained his Doctorate 
with The Development of Metaphysics in Persia.205 
In July 1908 he returned from Europe and became a professor of Philosophy 
and English Literature at the Government College in Lahore, also starting his career 
as a lawyer. It was also in this year that he gave the speech “The Political Ideal of 
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Islam”206, which will be analysed below with more detail jointly with a paper that 
Iqbal published after the completion of his doctoral thesis, entitled “Political Thought 
in Islam”.207 This paper can be treated as the manifesto which provided the basis for 
all subsequent work of Iqbal. First published in 1908 in the Sociological Review, 
London, and reproduced by The Hindustan Review, Allahabad, in its issues for 
December, 1910 and January, 1911, it was later translated into Urdu as “Khilafat-i-
Islamia” and published in the early 1920s. It has been included in various anthologies 
of Iqbal’s prose works, especially the Writings, Speeches and Statements of Iqbal 
edited by Latif Ahmed Sherwani208 and the Discourses of Iqbal edited by Shahid 
Husain Razzaqi.209 
In 1911, Iqbal gave up his teacher’s position to dedicate himself to an 
independent activity like Law, but still maintaining an interest on Education, 
associating himself to the Oriental College, the Government College and the Islamia 
College in Lahore, and also to the Jami’a Millia (National University) in Delhi. He 
was also interested in the works of the Muslim League, but was not an active 
participant in politics. In 1923 he was knighted, and the following year Iqbal became 
a member of the National Liberal League of Lahore. In 1926 he was elected member 
of the Punjab Legislative Assembly and on the 29th December 1930, when he was 
fifty three years old, Iqbal was elected president of the All-India Muslim League, in 
its 25th session which was held in Allahabad. On this occasion, Iqbal gave a historical 
speech, where he devised for the first time the creation of a state for the Indian 
Muslims.210 Many of the issues raised then were again focused on in the Presidential 
Address delivered at the annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at 
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Lahore, on the 21st March 1932211, and developed further in his most famous book, 
The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.212 
Muhammad Iqbal was a prolific writer, authoring many works covering 
various fields and genres, including Poetry, Philosophy, Mysticism, which should be 
viewed as an unity. His ideas were expressed through many forms and even Anne 
Marie Schimmel, one of the most important western specialists on Iqbal, 
acknowledged the difficulty in constructing a system based on Iqbal’s work.213 
Having in mind the scope of this research, only those works which have a clearly 
political dimension or had impact on his political thought will be analysed. 214 
According to Masood A. Raja215, Iqbal took upon himself the task of 
deconstructing the benevolent vision of the West, stressing the darkest aspects of 
European colonialism and brutality, exposed during the First World War. It is this 
challenge to the West’s civilisational and moral superiority that arises in his 
trustlessness of the West. However, Iqbal’s vision on Europe and the West was not 
binary. For him, the question was not to choose between the East and the West but to 
find a middle path where Muslims would not have to abandon their Islamic identity to 
take part of the modern world. Still, his version of an Islamic system was an 
alternative not only to Muslims but also to the colonial powers, trying to form a 
civilization where both, East and West, could contribute, since, for Iqbal, unless a 
civilisation possessed both sets of values, it would not be viable. This philosophical 
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position enabled him to defend a reciprocal sharing between East and West in order to 
build a better world, creating a space which offered an alternative world-view. Iqbal 
did not want a Muslim response to the British in a particularist field and so he 
proposed to articulate both and create the terrain where the importance of Islam and 
the Umma as a political system would be recognised. This focusing in the Umma also 
had its material reasons which, according to Francis Robinson216, were the impact of 
colonial rule, the awareness that the encroachment of the West was an experience 
shared by almost all Muslims, the growing easiness with which Muslims were able to 
travel to be with other Muslims in other places, the need to find a sentiment of 
identity while, at the same time, discussing the meaning of a modern state under 
colonial form. For Iqbal, the Muslim future was not only dependent in gaining 
western knowledge but also in balancing that knowledge with its own tradition, and 
his works show this engagement with the West, always mediated through his 
knowledge of both civilisational systems. 
Iqbal’s vision of the West was very different from the vision of men like Sir 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan. A product of the colonial system, Iqbal not only was criticising 
the West from a native perspective but also from within western philosophies. In that 
critique he exposed the class hierarchies of western liberal democracy and wealth 
distribution. At the same time, Marxism was also criticised for focusing only in the 
material world. A modern system should offer the best of all other systems and, for 
Iqbal, Islam was that true system. So, he was not only fighting against the colonial 
system but also offering his own political and philosophical system as a solution for 
the problems of colonial masters. If it is true that Iqbal admired the West’s dynamic 
spirit, the intellectual tradition and technology, he also criticized its excesses: 
European imperialisms and colonialisms, capitalism’s economical exploitation, the 
atheism of Marxism and the moral bankruptcy of secularism. So, he looked to the 
Islamic past to rediscover principles and values which could be used to reconstruct an 
alternative Islamic model for modern Muslim society, resulting in the discovery of 
Islamic versions of democracy and parliamentary government. Iqbal believed that, 
through reinterpretation, Islamic “equivalents” of western institutions and concepts 
could be developed. 
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Aligning himself with Ahmad Sirhindi, Shah Wali Allah and Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab, Iqbal tried to answer to the questions posed by modernism: for him, 
Islam and the Muslim community were in danger, faced with decadence and decline, 
politically impotent, morally corrupt and culturally backward; all of these were in 
contrast with the inner nature of Islam, which was dynamic and creative. Influenced 
by his Islamic heritage and by western philosophy (Hegel, Bergson, Fichte, 
Nietzsche), Iqbal developed his own synthesis and interpretation of Islam, in response 
to the socio-historical conditions and events of his epoch. This synthesis of East and 
West is well demonstrated in his dynamic conception of the Ego. Rejecting Plato’s 
static Universe and some aspects of Sufism that denied the affirmation of the Ego in 
the world, Iqbal, using the Qur’an, developed a dynamic world-view in his theory of 
selfhood that encompassed all reality: individual Ego, society and God, whose 
relation with the Islamic society and Muslims’ relation with this meant permanence 
and change. Until the end of his life, Iqbal wrote innumerable articles in newspapers 
and magazines in Urdu and in English, and his last years were characterised by 
illness, passing away in 1938.217 
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III.2. Political conceptions until the First World War 
In the speech “The Political Ideal of Islam” 218, Muhammad Iqbal talked about 
the conditions of Muslim society in India, of Islam as a political ideal, and on the 
political aspects of the Islamic Ideal and war in Islam. 
According to Iqbal, quoting some verses from the Qur’an, defensive war was 
permitted but the doctrine of aggressive war against the unbelievers was not. For him, 
all the wars undertaken during the lifetime of the Prophet Muhammad were defensive 
and even in defensive wars wanton cruelty to the vanquished was forbidden. Quoting 
some more verses, Iqbal defended that in Islam all forms of political and social 
disturbances were condemned by the Qur’an and all forms of political and social 
disorders were severely denounced in it. The ideal of Islam was to secure social peace 
at any cost, and all methods of violent change in society were condemned in the most 
“unmistakable language”. Quoting Abu Bakr al-Turtushi (1059-1127), a lawyer from 
Muslim Spain, Iqbal considered that forty years of tyranny were preferable than one 
year of anarchy, since the unity of the community was of paramount importance. 
Turning his attention to the fact that the Muslims of India were living under a 
Christian government, Iqbal gave the example of those early Muslims who, when 
persecuted by their own countrymen, had to leave their homes to settle in the 
Christian State of Abyssinia. Their behaviour in that State must be the guiding 
principle in India, and the relations of Muslims with the Christians were determined 
for them by the Qur’an, which said, “And thou wilt find nearer in friendship of the 
believers those who call themselves Christians; this is because among them are 
learned men and hermits, and because they are never vain” (Qur’an 5:82), meaning 
that nothing was wrong in being under a non-Muslim government. 
Then, Iqbal proceeds to consider the purely political aspect of the Islamic 
ideal, as entertained by a Corporate Individuality, by making three questions: 1) 
Given a settled society, what does Islam expect of its followers regarded as a 
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community? 2) What principles ought to guide them in the management of communal 
affairs? 3) What must be their ultimate object and how is it to be achieved? 
For Iqbal, “Islam is something more than a creed; it is also a community, a 
nation. The membership of Islam is not determined by birth, locality, or 
naturalisation; it consists in the identity of belief. The expression ‘Indian 
Muhammadans’, however convenient it may be, is a contradiction in terms, since 
Islam in its essence is above all conditions of Time and Space. Nationality with us is a 
pure idea; it has no geographical basis. But inasmuch as the average man demands a 
material centre of nationality, the Muslim looks for it in the holy town of Mecca, so 
that the basis of Muslim nationality combines the real and the ideal, [the] concrete and 
the abstract. When, therefore, it is said that [the] interests of Islam are superior to 
those of Muslims, it is meant that the interests of the individual as a unit are 
subordinate to the interests of the community as an external symbol of the Islamic 
principle. This is the only principle which limits the liberty of the individual, who is 
otherwise absolutely free.” 
Continuing with his speech, Iqbal considered that the best form of government 
for such a community would be democracy, “the ideal of which is to let a man 
develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as 
practicable. The Caliph of Islam is not an infallible being; like other Muslims, he is 
subject to the same law; he is elected by the people and is deposed by them if he goes 
contrary to the law.” 
For Iqbal, Democracy was the most important aspect of Islam as a political 
ideal. However, Muslims, “with their idea of individual freedom, could do nothing for 
the political improvement of Asia. Their democracy lasted only thirty years [i.e.  from 
632 to 661 C.E.], and disappeared with their political expansion. Though the principle 
of election was not quite original in Asia (since the ancient Parthian government was 
based on the same principle), yet somehow or other it was not suited to the nations of 
Asia in the early days of Islam. It was, however, reserved for a Western nation to 
vitalise the countries of Asia politically.”219 
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The natural conclusion for Iqbal was that “Democracy has been the great 
mission of England in modern times, and English statesmen have boldly carried this 
principle to countries which have been for centuries groaning under the most 
atrocious form of despotism. The British Empire is a vast political organism, the 
vitality of which consists in the gradual working out of this principle. The permanence 
of [the] British Empire as a civilising factor in the political evolution of mankind is 
one of our [Muslims’] greatest interests. This vast Empire has our fullest sympathy 
and respect, since it is one aspect of our own political ideal that is being slowly 
worked out in it. England, in fact, is doing one of our own great duties, which 
unfavourable circumstances did not permit us to perform. It is not the number of 
Muhammadans which it protects but the spirit of the British Empire that makes it the 
greatest Muhammadan Empire in the world.” 
Turning his attention to the political constitution of the Muslim society, for 
Iqbal there were two basic propositions underlying it. The first one was that the “Law 
of God was absolutely supreme. Authority, except as an interpreter of the law, has no 
place in the social structure of Islam, because Islam has a horror of personal authority. 
We regard it as inimical to the unfoldment of human individuality. The Shi’as, of 
course, differ from the Sunnis in this respect. They [the Shi’as] hold that the Caliph or 
Imam is appointed by God, and his interpretation of the law is final. He is infallible, 
and his authority, therefore, is supreme. There is certainly a grain of truth in this view, 
since the principle of absolute authority has functioned usefully in the course of [the] 
history of mankind. But it must be admitted that the idea works well [only] in the case 
of primitive societies, and reveals its deficiency when applied to higher stages of 
civilisation. People grow out of it, as recent events have revealed in Persia [a 
reference to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-06], which is a Shi’a country and 
yet demands a fundamental structural change in her government in the introduction of 
the principle of election.”220 
The second proposition was that there was no aristocracy in Islam. Quoting the 
Qur’an (49:13), “[t]he noblest amongst you are those who fear God most”, Iqbal 
considered that there was no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system in Islam, 
which was a unity in which there was no distinction; and that unity was secured by 
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making men believe in two simple propositions: 1) the Unity of God; and 2) the 
Mission of the Prophet. For Iqbal, the principle of equality of all believers made the 
early Muslims the greatest political power in the world, and Islam worked as a 
levelling force, elevating those who were socially low. The elevation of the down-
trodden was the chief secret of the Muslim political power in India, and, for him, the 
result of the British rule in that country had been exactly the same; and if England 
continued true to that principle, it would ever remain a source of strength to her, as it 
was to her predecessors. 
However, Iqbal questioned if the Indian Muslims were true to that principle in 
their social economy and if the organic unity of Islam was intact in that land. For him, 
religious “adventurers” had set up different sects and fraternities who were ever 
quarrelling with one another, and the solution was to reunite all the different parts of 
Islam: “Let all come forward and contribute their respective shares in the great toil of 
the nation. Let the idols of class distinctions and sectarianism be smashed forever. Let 
the Mussalmans [Muslims] of this country be once more united into a great vital 
whole. How can you, in the presence of violent internal dispute, expect to succeed in 
persuading others to your ways of thinking? The work of freeing humanity from 
superstitions - the ultimate ideal of Islam as a community, for the realisation of which 
you have done so little in this land of myth and superstition - will ever remain undone 
if the emancipators themselves are becoming enchained in the very fetters from which 
it is their mission to set others free.”221 
In his article written in late 1910, early 1911, entitled “Political Thought in 
Islam”222, Iqbal talks about the change that the Prophet Muhammad had brought to the 
Arab tribal system. Using History, the Qur’an, the Hadiths and the political thought 
of classical Islamic thinkers like ibn Khaldun (1332-1406) and al-Mawardy (972-
1058), Iqbal delineated what was, from his point of view, the conception of State and 
Government in Islam. 
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According to him, Pre-Islamic Arabia was divided into tribes, continually at 
war with one another. Each tribe had its own chief, its own god and its own poet, 
whose tribal patriotism manifested itself chiefly in the glorification of the virtues of 
his own tribe. Though these primitive social groups recognised, to a certain extent, 
their kinship with one another, yet it was mainly the authority of Muhammad and the 
“cosmopolitan character of his teaching which shattered the aristocratic ideals of 
individual tribes, and welded the dwellers of tents into one common ever-expanding 
nationality. Prophet Muhammad, true to custom, left no instruction with regard to the 
matter of succession.” 
When the Chief or Shaikh of an Arab tribe died all the elders of the tribe met 
together to discuss the matter of succession. Any member of the tribe could hold the 
chieftainship if he were unanimously elected by the elders and heads of great families, 
and if the tribe was equally divided between two leaders, the rival sections separated 
from each other until one of the candidates relinquished his claims; otherwise the 
sword was appealed to. The Chief thus elected could be disposed by the tribe if the 
conduct necessitated disposition. With the expansion of the Arab conquest, and the 
consequent enlargement of mental outlook, this primitive custom gradually developed 
into a Political Theory carefully constructed by the constitutional lawyers of Islam 
through reflective criticism on the revelations of the political experience. 
For Iqbal, it was early understood that the Political Sovereignty resided de 
facto in the people, and that the electorate, by their free act of unanimous choice, 
embodied it in a determinate personality in which the collective will was 
individualised, without investing this concrete seat of power with any privilege in the 
eye of the law except legal control over the individual wills of which it was an 
expression. To illustrate this, Iqbal uses the events occurred during the period of the 
first four caliphs, i.e., 632 to 661 C.E. The idea of universal agreement was, for Iqbal, 
in fact, the fundamental principle of Muslim constitutional theory, and, quoting a 
tradition attributed to the Prophet, he considered that “What the Muslim community 
considers good, God also considers good.” According to Iqbal, the Caliphate of 
Uthman, from 644 to 656, was the source of the three religio-political parties, each 
one with its respective political theories, which, finding itself in power, attempted to 
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realise in one or other of the provinces of the Arab Empire: Sunni, Shi’a, and 
Khawarij. 
Before proceeding to describe these theories, Iqbal wanted to draw attention to 
the fact that 1) the Muslim Commonwealth was based on the absolute equality of all 
Muslims in the eyes of the law and that there was no privileged class, no priesthood, 
no caste system, and 2) according to the law of Islam there was no distinction between 
the Church and the State. The State was not a combination of religious and secular 
authority, but a unity in which no such distinction existed. The Caliph was not 
necessarily the high-priest of Islam; he was not the representative of God on earth. He 
was fallible like other men and subject, like every Muslim, to the impersonal authority 
of the same law. For Iqbal, the Law of Islam did not recognize the apparently natural 
differences of race, nor the historical differences of nationality. The political ideal of 
Islam consisted in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and 
nationalities. Nationality with Islam was not the highest limit of political 
development, for the general principle of the law of Islam rested on human nature, 
and not on the peculiarities of a particular people. 
The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic 
unity, nor in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious 
and political ideal. The membership of this nation, consequently, would not be 
determined by birth, marriage, domicile, or naturalisation. It would be determined by 
a public declaration of “like-mindedness” and would terminate when the individual 
had ceased to be like-minded with others. The ideal territory for such a nation would 
be the whole earth: “The Arabs, like the Greek and the Romans, endeavoured to 
create such a nation or a world-state by conquest, but failed to actualise this ideal. The 
realisation of this ideal, however, is not impossible; for the ideal nation does already 
[exist] in germ. The life of modern political communities finds expression, to a great 
extent, in common institutions, Law and Government; and the various sociological 
circles, so to speak, are continually expanding to touch one another.” Also, this ideal 
was not incompatible with the sovereignty of individual States, since its structure 
would be determined not by physical force, but by the spiritual force of a common 
ideal. 
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According to Iqbal, the idea of personal authority was quite contrary to the 
spirit of Islam, and the Prophet Muhammad “succeeded in commanding the absolute 
submission of an entire people; yet no man has depreciated his own authority more 
than he. ‘I am,’ he says, ‘a man like you; like you my forgiveness also depends on the 
mercy of God.’” The whole system of Islamic ethics was based on the idea of 
individuality, and anything which tended to repress “the healthy development of 
individuality” was quite inconsistent with the spirit of Islamic law and ethics. A 
Muslim was free to do anything he liked, provided he did not violate the law. The 
general principles of this law were believed to have been revealed; the details, in 
order to cover the relatively secular cases, were left to the interpretation of the 
professional lawyers. It was, “therefore, true to say that the entire fabric of Islamic 
law, actually administered, is really judge-made law, so that the lawyer performs the 
legislative function in the Muslim constitution. If, however, an absolutely new case 
arises which is not provided for in the law of Islam, the will of the whole Muslim 
community becomes a further source of law. But I do not know whether a general 
council of the whole Muslim community was ever held for this purpose.”223 
Iqbal then gives a detailed analysis of the Sunni view of government, and a 
brief account of the Shi’a and the Khawarij ones. 
Considering the Khawarij as the Republicans of Islam, Iqbal divided them into 
three classes: 1) Those who held that there must be an elected caliph, but it was not 
necessary that he should belong to a particular family or tribe. A woman or even a 
slave could be elected as Caliph provided he or she was a good Muslim ruler. 
Whenever they found themselves in power, they purposely elected their Caliph from 
among the socially lowest members of their community; 2) Those who held that there 
was no need of a Caliph, the Muslim congregation could govern themselves; and 3) 
Those who did not believe in Government at all, “the anarchists of Islam.” 
According to Iqbal, the Shi’a view of the State was of divine origin and “the 
Caliph, or, as they call, Imam, governs by divine right. [...] The Imam, according to 
the Persians, is not elected but appointed by God (the Shi’as of Oman, however, 
adopted the elective principle and held that the Imam might be deposed). He is the 
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incarnation of universal reason, he is endowed with all perfections, his wisdom is 
superhuman and his decisions are absolute and final. [...] The first Imam, ‘Ali, was 
appointed by Muhammad; ‘Ali’s direct descendants are his divinely ordained 
successors. The world is never without a living Imam whether visible or invisible. 
The twelfth Imam, according to the Shi’as, suddenly disappeared near Kufa, but he 
will come again and fill the world with peace and prosperity. In the meantime he 
communicates his will from time to time through certain favoured individuals called 
Gates, who hold mysterious intercourse with him.” 
This doctrine of the absence of the Imam was, for Iqbal, a clever way of 
separating the Church and the State and, once again, it can be seen how different 
Muslim thinkers, as was the case with Chiragh ‘Ali224, were imbued with European 
political concepts. With the equation that State equals Politics and that Church equals 
Religion, Muhammad Iqbal tries to explain to his readers that, in the Shi’a view of the 
State, in this particular case Iran, Politics and Religion were separated: The absent 
Imam was the absolute authority in all matters; the present executive authorities were, 
therefore, only guardians of the estate which really belonged to the Imam who, as 
such, inherited the property of deceased intestates in case they left no heirs. It would 
be seen that the authority of the Shah of Persia was, therefore, limited by the authority 
of the Mullahs, the representatives of the absent Imam. As a mere guardian of the 
estate, the Shah was subject to the religious authority of the Mullah, though as the 
chief executive authority he was free to adopt any measure for the good of the estate. 
This led Iqbal to say that it was not surprising therefore that the Mullahs took no 
active part in the constitutional reforms in Persia. However, for some reason, Iqbal 
was mistaken, since during the events leading to the Constitutional Revolution of Iran 
in 1905-06, the mullahs took active part.225 
For the Sunni political views, Iqbal used the political theories of al-Mawardy 
(972-1058), al-Ghazali (1058-1111), al-Baidawi (died c. 1286), and ibn Khaldun 
(1332-1406). 
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Al-Mawardy divided the whole Muslim community into two classes: 1) the 
electors, and 2) the candidates for election. The qualifications absolutely necessary for 
a candidate were thus enumerated by him: i) Spotless character; ii) Freedom from 
physical and mental infirmity226; iii) Necessary legal and theological knowledge in 
order to be able to decide various cases227; iv) Insight necessary for a ruler; v) 
Relationship with the family of Quraysh. This qualification was not regarded as 
indispensable by modern Sunni lawyers on the ground that the Prophet never 
nominated any person as his successor; vi) Full Age; and vii) Male Sex.228 
If the candidate satisfied these conditions, the representatives of all influential 
families, doctors of law, high officials of the State, and commanders of the Army met 
together and nominated him to the Caliphate. The whole assembly then proceeded to 
the mosque where the nomination was duly confirmed by the people. After the 
election, the Caliph usually made a speech promising to rule according to the law of 
Islam. He could not secure the election of his successor during his own lifetime, and 
when people declared for another Caliph, the one previously elected must, on penalty 
of death, immediately renounce his right in public. If the Caliph did not rule according 
to the law of Islam, or suffered from physical or mental infirmity, the Caliphate was 
forfeited. 
As can be seen, for Iqbal the people always had the last word, because it were 
they who confirmed the election of the Caliph, who, on his turn, had to rule according 
to the law: it is not farfetched to say that the political views of Iqbal framed the way 
he saw or looked at History, something common on those days and even now. 
Iqbal also talks about the question whether two or more rival Caliphates could 
exist simultaneously. According to ibn Jama (d. 1333), only one Caliphate was 
possible, but for ibn Khaldun there was nothing illegal in the co-existence of two or 
more Caliphates, provided they were in different countries: “Ibn Khaldun’s view is 
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certainly contrary to the old Arabian idea, yet in so far as the Muslim Commonwealth 
is governed by an impersonal authority, i.e., law, his position seems to me to be quite 
a tenable one. Moreover, as a matter of fact, two rival Caliphates have existed in 
Islam for a long time and still exist.” 
 According to al-Mawardy, the qualifications of an elector should be: 1) Good 
reputation as an honest man; 2) Necessary knowledge of State affairs; 3) Necessary 
insight and judgment. For Iqbal, in theory, all Muslims, men and women, possessed 
the right of election. There was no property qualification. In practice, however, Iqbal 
adds, women and slaves did not exercise this right. The elector had the right to 
demand the deposition of the Caliph or the dismissal of his officials if he could show 
that their conduct was not in accordance with the law of Islam by addressing the 
Muslim congregation in the mosque after the prayer: “the mosque, it must be 
remembered, is the Muslim Forum, and the institution of daily prayer is closely 
connected with the political life of Muslim communities. Apart from its spiritual and 
social functions, the institution is meant to serve as a ready means of constant 
criticism of the State.” The elector could also issue a judicial inquiry concerning the 
conduct of any State official, or any other matter which affected the community as a 
whole: “such judicial inquiries are issued by the State as well, and when the lawyers 
give conflicting decisions, the majority prevails. Forced election is quite illegal. Ibn 
Jama, an Egyptian lawyer, however, holds that forced election is legal in times of 
political unrest. This opportunist view has no support in the law of Islam; though 
undoubtedly it is based on historical facts. Tartushi, a Spanish lawyer, would probably 
hold the same view, for he says: ‘Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of 
anarchy.’” 
The relation between the elected and the elector was defined by al-Mawardy 
as aqd (binding together, contract). The State, therefore, was a contractual organism 
and implied rights and duties. According to Iqbal, al-Mawardy did not mean, like 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to explain the origin of society by an original social contract 
but that the actual fact of election was a contract in consequence of which the Caliph 
had to perform certain duties, e.g., to defend the religion, to enforce the law of Islam, 
to levy customs and taxes according to the law of Islam, to pay annual salaries and 
properly to direct the State treasury. If he fulfilled these conditions, the people had 
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mainly two duties in relation to him: to obey him and to assist him in his work. So, 
the origin of the State, according to Iqbal’s interpretation of al-Mawardy, was not 
force but free consent of individuals who united to form a brotherhood, based upon 
legal equality, in order that each member of the brotherhood may work out the 
potentialities of his individuality under the law of Islam. 
For Muhammad Iqbal, Government was an artificial arrangement, and was 
divine only in the sense that the law of Islam, believed to have been revealed, 
demanded peace and security. In short, the fundamental principle laid down in the 
Qur’an was the principle of election, and the details or “rather the translation of this 
principle into a workable scheme of Government” was left to be determined by other 
considerations. However, “the idea of election did not develop on strictly democratic 
lines, and the Muslim conquerors consequently failed to do anything for the political 
improvement of Asia. The form of election was certainly maintained in Baghdad and 
Spain, but no regular political institutions could grow to visualize the people at large. 
[...] It seems to me that there were principally two reasons for this want of political 
activity in Muslim countries: 1) In the first place the idea of election was not at all 
suited to the genius of the Persians and the Mongols, the two principal races that 
accepted Islam as their religion; 2) The life of early Muslims was a life of conquest. 
Their whole energy was devoted to political expansion which tends to concentrate 
political power in fewer hands; and thus serves as an unconscious handmaid of 
despotism. Democracy did not seem to be quite willing to get on with Empire, a 
lesson which the modern English Imperialist might well take to heart. [...] In modern 
times, thanks to the influence of Western political ideas, Muslim countries have 
exhibited signs of political life. England has vitalized Egypt229; Persia has received a 
constitution from the Shah230 and the Young Turkish Party too have been struggling, 
scheming and plotting to achieve their object.231 [...] But it is absolutely necessary for 
these political reformers to make a thorough study of Islamic constitutional principles, 
                                                           
229 A reference to the British presence in Egypt, which would last until the end of First World War, as a 
consequence of the military intervention in 1882. 
 
230 A reference to the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-06 in Iran. 
 
231 A reference to the events in the Ottoman Empire at the beginning of the 20th century and which 
culminated in the Constitutional Revolution of 1908 and the deposition of the Sultan Abdul Hamid II in 
1909. 
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and not to shock that natural suspicious conservatism of their people by appearing as 
prophets of a new culture. They would certainly impress them more if they could 
show that their seemingly borrowed ideal of political freedom is really the ideal of 
Islam, and is, as such, the rightful demand of free Muslim conscience.”232 
As has been said earlier, the developments in other parts of the Muslim world, 
especially in the Ottoman Empire, had a deep impact on the Indian Muslim 
community. It will now be explained with more details the changing environment in 
Turkey at the beginning of the 20th century. 
 
III.3. Turkish Aationalism, Secularization in the Ottoman Empire, and 
the abolition of the Caliphate
233
 
The first quarter of the twentieth century was a period of great political 
upheavals in, and deep transformations of, the Ottoman State, which would have a 
profound influence in many Muslims around the world, particularly in India. The 
political and cultural debate between different thinkers of the Ottoman Empire 
regarding State and Religion, and the relationship between them, was very influential 
on Muhammad Iqbal. 
One of the leading figures in that debate was Mehmet Ziya Gökalp (1876-
1924), one of the most important intellectual figures during the process of the 
Ottoman-Turkish modernization, and whose ideas were a synthesis of Islamic fiqh 
(jurisprudence, positive law), Turkish nationalism, and Durkheimian sociology, as he 
believed that the Turkish nation simultaneously belonged to the Islamic umma and to 
the European civilization. Gökalp was highly influential on the political, as well as the 
intellectual, elite of the modernizing Turkey, both before and shortly after the 
foundation of the new Republic in 1923. Many of his ideas were materialized by the 
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233 Once more, I want to thank Nurullah Ardiç, this time for having shared with me the paper he 
presented at WOCMES 2010, ARDIÇ, Nurullah. 2010b. Secularization alla Turca: Islamic Fiqh and 
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policies adopted by the Committee of the Union and Progress (CUP) that mostly 
dominated the state from the 1908 revolution to the end of World War I, and by the 
Republican People’s Party (RPP) that founded the new Republic and ruled the country 
for the first twenty seven years of it. Although he never occupied a high political 
position, Gökalp influenced leading politicians (and the youth) as a public intellectual 
and ideologue, and his ideas formed the background of the CUP’s and the RPP’s 
programmes, and were incorporated into the 1924 Constitution as well.234 He is 
generally recognized as the leading ideologue and “father” of modern Turkish 
nationalism as outlined in his Turkification, Islamization, Modernization (1918)235 
and especially in The Principles of Turkism (1923).236 
Gökalp was also the founder of sociology in Turkey, following Durkheim not 
only in the content and orientation of his own ideas, but also in establishing sociology 
as a discipline, and translating Durkheim’s major works into Ottoman Turkish. His 
interest in the Durkheimian sociology and Comtean positivism coincided with the 
CUP government’s positivistic ideology that found sociology, particularly 
ethnographic studies, useful in terms of “saving” the state and modernizing the 
society. Gökalp thus emphasized Sociology’s significance within the context of the 
transformation of Ottoman society and considered it indispensable for his intellectual-
political project based on Turkish nationalism, which was also congruent with the 
CUP’s Turkist cultural policy, and, later, with Kemalist nationalism. 
Of Kurdish origin, Gökalp was born in Diyarbakir, a cosmopolitan urban 
centre with Arab, Persian and Turkish cultural influences felt during the 19th century, 
and raised in a rich intellectual environment where there was a lively debate among 
the late Ottoman intellectuals that centred on the problem of the conflict between 
Islam and the modern Western civilization. At that time there were three main 
currents of thought: 1) those who argued for the compatibility of modernity with the 
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235 GÖKALP, Ziya. 1918. Türkleşmek, islāmlaşmaḳ, mu’āṣirlaṣmaḳ. Istanbul: Yeñi Mecmū’a. 
 
236 GÖKALP, Ziya. 1923. Türkciligiñ esāslari. Ankara: Maṭbu’āt ve Đstihbārāt Maṭba’asi. 
Translated from the Turkish and annotated by Robert Devereux. GÖKALP, Ziya. 1968. The Principles 
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principles of Islam and for the preservation of the traditional values (the Islamists); 2) 
those who urged for a complete Westernization and rejection of the traditional order 
(secularists or the “Westernists”); and 3) those who longed for the romantic ideal of 
ethnic unity of Turks and preached a return to the pre-Islamic era (the “Turkists”). 
The problem of the harmonization of modernity with Islam was also Gökalp’s 
main concern. He joined none of the above currents at the beginning, but followed a 
middle path, being influenced by, and then influencing, all three of them. Later, 
however, he chose Turkism as the right path, and even became the intellectual leader 
of that ideology. Gökalp’s ultimate aim was to synthesize Islam with Turkish 
nationalism on the one hand, and with Western modernity, on the other, famously 
expressed in his motto, “Turkification, Islamization, and Modernization” (the title of 
his major work published in 1918), an idea borrowed from Huseyinzade ‘Ali (1864-
1942) and Yusuf Akçura (1876-1935), members of the CUP and two of the founders 
of Turkish nationalism. This evolutionist and assimilationist form of Turkism 
proposed that religion and the Ottoman past should be integrated into the modern 
Turkish identity. This idea of synthesis also constituted the background of his crucial 
distinction between “culture” (hars) and “civilization” (medeniyet), which he 
borrowed from German philosophy, particularly Herder (1744-1803). He argued that 
a viable solution for Turkey’s crisis could be found in integrating its culture, which 
would be a mixture of Islam and Turkish nationalism, into the (universal) civilization 
represented by modern Europe. Hence the major argument in his eclectic work: Islam, 
which constituted the basis of Turkish culture, could be adjusted to the exigencies of 
modern civilization. Here, his basic assumption was that Islam and (secular) 
modernity could be accommodated. Gökalp presented his views on Islamic law with a 
series of articles under the title “Social Methodology of Jurisprudence” (Đctimai Usul-
i Fıkıh) published in Đslam Mecmuası [The Journal of Islam], a bi-monthly journal 
that he founded in 1914 and issued until 1917. The journal was sponsored by the 
CUP, and was the main medium through which Gökalp’s ideas, as well as those of the 
Committee, were disseminated. Moreover, he published some unsigned articles 
possibly in cooperation with Halim Sabit, the editor of the journal. Sabit, besides 
writing several articles expounding and developing Gökalp’s ideas on religion, would 
influence Muhammad Iqbal, as it will be seen below. 
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Gökalp’s discussion on Islamic law aimed to secularize it, distinguishing 
between the two bases of Islamic Shari’a: revelation and society. Religion determined 
the goodness or badness of actions using two criteria, nass [text] and örf [mores]. The 
nass was expressed in the Qur’an and in the Sunna of the Prophet, while örf was the 
conscience of the society expressed in the actual conduct and living of the 
community. For Gökalp, according to Islamic jurisprudence and under necessity, örf 
could take the place of nass. Therefore, on the one hand, fıqh [Islamic jurisprudence] 
was based on revelation, and, on the other hand, on society. In other words, Islamic 
Shari’a was both divine and social, and the social principles of fiqh, on the other 
hand, were subject to transformations taking place in the forms and structures of 
society, and hence subject to changes along with society. Gökalp also argued that the 
rules of the Shari’a regarding worldly matters should be derived from the existing 
socio-historical conditions and should merely be “a derivative of the örf.” This 
discursive strategy and technique involved identifying the sources of fiqh as 
“traditional (nakli) shari’a” and “social shari’a”, which implied the historicization of 
religion. By doing this, Gökalp maintained the significance of social change in terms 
of its impact on religious practices and understanding of the sacred texts. However, he 
justified this (secular) claim religiously, by arguing that social change and evolution 
were a manifestation of the “will of Allah”. 
The social context of the texts written by Gökalp was one of heated 
intellectual debates over the relationship between Islam and modernity, and of 
political struggles for the future of the Ottoman state. The relationship between 
religion and society was a hot topic constituting an important matter of debate among 
the Ottoman intellectuals after the 1908 revolution. Gökalp’s ideas regarding the fiqh 
and the relationship between the nass and the örf were extensively criticized and 
disputed by both modernist and traditionalist intellectuals, such as Ismail Hakki 
(1881-1916) and Sa’id Halim Pasha (1865-1921), especially from the point of view of 
the classical Islamic sciences. Gökalp’s ideas were part of a political as well as 
intellectual project that eventually won over his critics, with the help of the 
government and political actors of the time. The CUP’s policy of interfering with 
religion was justified, however, as an attempt to revitalize Islam, and a means of 
substituting superstition with true religion. Gökalp’s strategy involved a re-
construction of the Islamic jurisprudence as an object of knowledge in the texts, by 
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reclassifying the Shari’a, re-evaluating its components (the nass and the örf) and by 
attaching new meanings to them (for example, the “temporal affairs” were 
transformed into the “divine Sunna” [way of God]), and finally, the hierarchy between 
the two was first disturbed and then re-established in a new light, putting the örf over 
the nass. 
Gökalp also introduced a new concept, that of “Đctimai Usul-i Fıkıh” [Social 
Methodology of Jurisprudence] that helped him in secularizing the nature of the 
Islamic law, transforming its basis into a social one, and creating a new subject 
position in the texts for himself and for others (the ‘ulama) by claiming that only 
sociologists (or social scientists) should be concerned with those aspects of the 
Shari’a that applied to this world, and the authority of the traditional ‘ulama should 
be limited to the other-worldly matters. Finally, he defended that the “social 
fundamentals” of fiqh had to adapt in accordance with the necessities of life. His 
project of “Social Methodology of Jurisprudence” indicates a general political 
strategy: adaptation of Islam to modernity by reforming its various principles and 
institutions. The implicit presupposition in his proposal, which was based on his 
version of the Durkheimian social theory, was that religion should function to 
maintain social order, as simply one of the institutions constituting society rather than 
as the fundamental frame of reference. This concept was based on a functionalist view 
of religion in society, and an evolutionist view of history, where religion was 
supposed to evolve, together with other institutional “parts” of the society, and to 
adapt to new historical conditions, in order to contribute to social cohesion and the 
better functioning of the society, which was assumed to be a compact whole. 
Sociology entered the Ottoman Empire in the second half of the 19th century, 
and evolved as an alternative to the Islamic fiqh. It became part of the school 
curriculum in 1914 in the Istanbul Darulfünun (University) though it had been taught 
in some Western-style high schools before that. The first Institute of Sociology 
(Đctimaiyat Darul Mesaisi) was founded in 1915, and it started the publication of the 
first sociological journal, Đctimaiyat Mecmuası [Journal of Sociology], in 1917. Other, 
quasi-academic journals, such as Abdullah Cevdet’s (the first socialist thinker in 
Turkey, 1869-1932) Đctihad, also published social-science related articles in the 
Second Constitutional period, which began in 1908. Starting from this period, the 
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development of sociology during several decades was heavily influenced by 19th 
century French positivism, particularly by Le Bon, Comte and Durkheim, as in the 
case of Gökalp, whose discursive strategy would soon be put into action by the CUP 
leadership (of which he was a political adviser) that wanted to further secularize the 
state by removing the office of the Şeyhülislam (Meşihat) from the cabinet and 
completely trim its authority. The Şeyhülislam was created as a state institution in the 
15th century and mostly functioned as the religious office that justified (and, 
theoretically, checked) Sultans’ policies to make them compatible with the Shari’a. 
During the modern period (after the adoption of the cabinet system and the Tanzimat 
reforms in 1839), the Şeyhülislam was still part of the government, enjoying some 
degree of political and ideological power. After 1871, however, the Şeyhülislam lost 
his control over “non-religious” courts (Mehakim-i Şer’iyye) when they were attached 
to the Ministry of Justice, creating a bifurcation in the judiciary. Though the 
institution was tightly controlled by the powerful Sultan Abdul Hamid II, the 
Şeyhülislam continued to control the madrasa system during his reign (1876-1909). 
After the 1908 Revolution237, the Unionists lowered the status of the Meşihat 
by first making it a ministry in the cabinet in 1911 and then removing it from the 
cabinet and completely abrogating its authority over the judiciary and education in 
1917. This last move by the CUP was based on a report written by Gökalp (1917) 
who suggested that religious courts should be administered by the Ministry of Justice 
and higher education by the Ministry of Education instead of the Meşihat, which the 
CUP immediately materialized through a law passed on 12th March, 1917. In a report 
written two years before, based on the distinction between piety (diyanet) and 
jurisprudence (kaza) in Islamic legal literature, Gökalp claimed that the former 
contained the principles related to faith, worship and morality whereas the latter 
pertained to social, economic and political affairs. Thus, he concluded, as a religious 
institution par excellence, the Şeyhülislam’s office should be concerned with the 
former part of religion and thus have no authority over the latter, which would be 
taken care of by the Ministry of Justice. This “strategic intervention” into the Islamic 
fiqh by Gökalp as part of his “theological engineering” aimed to secularize the 
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Ottoman political system by instrumentally employing an Islamic discourse, which 
involved as its main “discursive technique” exploiting an already-existing distinction 
for secular(ist) purposes. 
Gökalp later clarified his view on the relationship between state and religion in 
two reports he wrote for the 1916 convention of the Party of the Union and Progress. 
In the first report, written in that same year, and which was entirely included into the 
Party programme, he argued that two opposite views on the modernization and 
Westernization had emerged in the CUP’s 1916 convention, “the zealots of 
Europeanism” and “the zealots of scholasticism”, i.e., those who believed that the 
principles of Islam should be dropped altogether versus those who argued that the 
Western civilization ought to be rejected completely, respectively. Both assumed that 
the principles of Islam and those of the modern civilization were incompatible. The 
Westernists and the Tanzimat reformers represented the first view, and the Islamists 
the second one. Based on the discourse of the compatibility of Islam with modernity, 
Gökalp criticized both views arguing instead that it was not possible in terms of the 
functioning of society neither to drop religion entirely nor to dispense with the 
necessities of contemporary civilization. He also added that Islam, based on reason 
and sociology, was not in conflict with modernity. 
In the second report, published in 1917, Gökalp made a comparison of 
Christianity and Islam, arguing again for the compatibility of Islam with the modern 
civilization: since Islam, unlike Christianity, included politics within religion, i.e.  
there was no separation between the religious and the secular authority (the sacred 
and the profane), he argued that no conflict emerged between these two in the 
“Islamic state,” and hence it was already a modern state. He argued that since “Islam 
had brought state, law, and court into the realm of the sacred” there was no duality of 
the sacred and the profane, and thus “there is only one government in Islam (…) the 
judicial government of the Caliphs”. Although he celebrated the separation of the 
Caliphate from the monarchy, in 1922, Gökalp still embraced the Caliphate, claiming 
that this (secular) move would both protect Islam and glorify the Caliph’s position. 
Furthermore, he explained the emergence of the modern state initially in the West, 
rather than in the Islamic world, with reference to the similarities between Islam and 
Protestantism, or rather, the putative integration of the Islamic principles into 
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Protestantism, and the imitation of the former by the latter rejecting “all institutions 
which had existed in [Catholic] Christianity as contrary to the principles of Islam.” 
Protestantism for him was merely an “Islamicized form of Christianity”.238 
In 1922, Abdul Majid (1868-1944) had been elected, by the Turkish Great 
National Assembly, to a Caliphate which was expressly divested of all the attributes 
of political sovereignty (the Assembly having arrogated these to itself) and was 
confined to “spiritual” powers. The year after, the Ottoman Sultanate, or Monarchy, 
was abolished, the Turkish Republic established and, in 1924, the Turkish National 
Assembly went farther and put an end to the Caliphate, an institution established after 
Prophet Muhammad’s death and which symbolised, although theoretically, the unity 
of all Muslims of the world, particularly the Sunni. However, the Caliphate was such 
a symbolical and powerful tool for many Muslims who were living under colonial 
rule, with many having an emotional attachment to it, and viewing it as a symbol of a 
future political unity of the Muslim world, that two proeminent Shi’a, Sayyid Amir 
‘Ali and the spiritual leader of the Isma’ili community, the Aga Khan III, Sultan 
Muhammad Shah (1877-1957), asked Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk, 1881-1938) not to do 
such a thing. The abolition of the Caliphate had seismic effects, particularly in India, 
by then a British dominion, and provoked a lot of debate, not only in the Arab world 
but also inside the Indian Muslim community, who was divided into many trends. 
In 1925, the Egyptian qadi ‘Ali ‘Abd-ul-Raziq (1888-1966), from the Azhar 
University in Cairo, one of the oldest and most important universities in the Muslim 
world, wrote a book, Al-Islam wa Usul al-Hukm (Islam and the Foundations of 
Government)239, in which he talked about the historical institution of the Caliphate, 
criticising it and defending the consensus of the community as the transformational 
power of juridical and political change. For him, the decision by Turkey to abolish the 
Caliphate was justified, since it was not needed, creating great controversy when he 
explicitly stated that there was no basis for the Caliphate in either the Qur’an or in the 
Hadith (Traditions of the Prophet). He also concluded that there was nothing un-
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Islamic about not having a Caliphate: Islam and Muslims could get along very well 
without any Caliphs to rule over them. 
In 1926, the Al-Azhar University hosted the “Congress of the Caliphate” in 
order to re-establish it. Largely attended by Egyptians and Palestinian Arabs, with 
minimal representation from elsewhere in the Muslim world, the Cairo Congress 
advanced King Fuad I (installed by the British in 1922 as king of Egypt, nominally 
independent under a British protectorate), as a candidate for Caliph. The Congress 
quickly broke down into largely procedural debates, yet managed to deny Fuad’s bid, 
with many considering him an “imperial stooge” and, at the Pan-Islamic Congress in 
Mecca, also in 1926, the delegates were not able to choose a Caliph, a title which has 
remained vacant since.240 
As shall be seen now, all these debates had a profound impact on Muhammad 
Iqbal’s writings and thought. 
 
III.4. Islam and Aationalism in Muhammad Iqbal 
For Muhammad Iqbal, the individual, the basic unit of Muslim society, was 
mandated by the Qur’an (2:30) as God’s vicegerent with the mission of carrying out 
God’s will on Earth. Muslims shared in this continuous process of creation, bringing 
order from chaos, in an effort to produce a model-society to be emulated by others: 
the individual was elevated through the community and this, the community, was 
organized by the individual. 
In the centre of Iqbal’s vision on Islam was the concept of Tawhid (Oneness), 
applied not only to God’s own nature but also in its relation with the world. Because 
God is an only creator, sustainer and judge of the Universe, God’s will or law also 
governs all aspects of its creation and should be realised in all areas of life. This belief 
was the base for Iqbal’s vision of the community as a religiopolitical state and for the 
supremacy of Islamic law in Muslim society. Basing himself on the prophetic 
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tradition which says that the “whole of the earth is a mosque”, and in the role of 
Muhammad as a leader of the state in Medina, Iqbal concluded that “all which is 
secular is for that reason sacred in the roots of its existence”, without separation of the 
spiritual and the temporal. Church and State were not the two sides of the same thing, 
because Islam was an unanalysable singular reality, patent in the law, and the Shari’a 
was, for Iqbal, a comprehensive guide for a society. 
During the nineteenth century, Islamic law, with the exception of family law, 
had been replaced in many Muslim countries with European codes. In the Indian sub-
continent the interaction between Islamic and British laws had produced the Anglo-
Muhammadan law, mainly based on British Common Law. Convinced that Islam’s 
survival, and that the role of the Muslim community as a political and moral force, as 
well as its unity and life, in India, were dependent on the centrality of Islamic law, 
Iqbal emphasized to Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah the future need for a state or states for 
the Muslims of India. However, Iqbal did not have in mind the simple restoration of 
law as it was framed in the doctrines of schools of law. For him, Islam’s way of life 
was dynamic and open to change, and a differentiation was made between the eternal 
and immutable principles of the Shari’a and those which were a product of human 
interpretation and, for that reason, subjected to change. 
Iqbal faced Islam’s condition as “dogmatic slumber” which had produced five 
centuries of immobility due to blind obedience to tradition. Believing that the 
restoration of Islamic vitality required the “reconstruction” of the sources of Islamic 
law, he acknowledged at the same time the role of the ‘Ulama in the past, blaming 
them for the conservatism of what had characterized Islam since the fall of Baghdad 
in 1258. With the perpetuation of what Iqbal called the fiction of closing the doors of 
Ijtihad, the ‘Ulama had stopped the dynamical process of reinterpretation and 
reapplication of Islamic principles to new situations, being satisfied with simply 
perpetuating established traditions. 
So, Iqbal rejected the centuries’ old trend of considering Islamic law as 
permanent and sacred and, like others, he believed that Muslims should, once more, 
reaffirm their right to Ijtihad, that is, of reinterpreting and reapplying Islam to 
changing social conditions, a right which belonged to each and every Muslim who 
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was qualified for that, and not only to the ‘Ulama. Iqbal also believed that the 
traditional criteria used to designate someone as an interpreter were both self-serving 
and short-sighted: the ‘Ulama’s incapacity in broadening their training had left them 
ill-prepared for resolving many new and modern questions. For those reasons, Iqbal 
expanded and redefined Ijtihad and Ijma, suggesting that the right of interpreting and 
applying Islam to the community should be transferred from the ‘Ulama to an 
assembly or national legislature. This collective or corporate Ijtihad would be the 
authorative consensus (Ijma) of the community. In this way, he also transformed the 
meaning of community’s consensus from its traditional form, the accord of religious 
leaders and specialists, to a modern one, that of the modern legislative assemblies, 
whose majority of members would have a better knowledge of contemporary issues. 
Iqbal also recommended that, having in mind the complex nature of many modern 
problems, the legislature should seek the counsel of specialists of traditional and 
modern disciplines.241 
For Iqbal, since equality and brotherhood of the faithful were central aspects 
of Islam, democracy was its more important political ideal, which led him to say that 
England embodied this “Muslim” quality: “Democracy has been the great mission of 
England in modern times…. It is one aspect of our own political ideal that is being 
worked out in it. It is… the spirit of the British Empire that makes it the greatest 
Muhammadan Empire in the world.”242 
The bases for an Islamic democracy, i.e., equality and brotherhood of all 
Muslims, were contrary to the notion of nationalism. Although an Indian nationalist 
when young, Iqbal dedicated himself in later times to Pan-Islamism. Besides 
considering territorial nationalism as antitethical against the universal brotherhood 
established by the Prophet Muhammad and embodied in the Caliphate, Iqbal viewed 
nationalism as an instrument used by colonialism to dismember the Muslim world. 
Islam’s political idea, according to Iqbal, was one of transnational community which 
transcended ethnical, racial and national bonds, based on an internal cohesion which 
stemmed from the community’s religious-political ideal unity. Iqbal rejected earth-
rootedness, the notion of native country and place, devaluing the Arabian context of 
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primitive Islam, and cutting the Umma from any concrete embodiment of ideal 
relation between millat (religious community) and qaum (nation), with the possible 
exception of the time of the first four Caliphs (632-661 C.E.), seeing it as the 
expression of a spiritual vision, in the centre of which was the Prophet. The argument 
that Muhammad’s community was a new creation was based partially in the belief 
that religion, contrary to art, politics and social institutions, was foundational for the 
society that he developed.243 The brutality of the First World War and the aggressive 
nationalisms in Europe, which would lead to the Second World War and to colonial 
and imperial exploitation in other parts of the world, was the main reason for Iqbal’s 
gradual transformation from Indian nationalist to Muslim nationalist, which can be 
assessed by reading some of his poems, especially the following excerpt from Rumuz-
I Bekhudi244: 
Our Essence is not bound to any Place; 
The vigour of our wine is not contained 
In any bowl, Chinese and Indian 
Alike the sherd that constitutes our jar, 
Turkish and Syrian alike the clay 
Forming our body, neither is our heart 
Of India, or Syria, or Rum,  
Nor any fatherland do we profess 
Except Islam 
………. 
Thou art a Muslim, do not bind thy heart 
To any clime, nor lose thyself within 
This world dimensionate. The Muslim true 
Is not contained in any land on earth; 
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Syria and Rum are lost within his heart 
Grasp thou the heart, and in its vast expanse 
Lose this mirage of water and of clay. 
Our Master, fleeing from his fatherland, 
Resolved the knot of Muslim nationhood. 
 
Like al-Afghani and others, Iqbal’s pan-Islamic compromise was moderated 
by political realism. He accepted the need for Muslims to gain national independence, 
but believed that, as a family of nations based upon a common spiritual heritage, 
common ideas and law - the Shari’a - they should form their own League of Nations. 
Applying this reasoning to the situation of Muslim Indians, in 1930, he concluded that 
internal communitary harmony between Hindus and Muslims was impossible. Iqbal 
was convinced that the threat of Hindu rule in an independent India needed the 
establishment of a separate region for Muslim Indians, so they could preserve their 
distinctive identity and way of life: “The nature of the Prophet's religious experience 
as disclosed in the Qur’an is wholly different from that of Christianity. It is an 
individual experience creative of a social order. Its immediate outcome is the 
fundamentals of a polity with implicit legal concepts whose civic significance cannot 
be belittled merely because their origin is revelational. The religious ideal of Islam is 
organically related to the social order which it has created. The rejection of the one 
will eventually involve the rejection of the other. Therefore the construction of a 
polity on [Indian] national lines, if it means a displacement of the Islamic principles 
of solidarity, is simply unthinkable to a Muslim.”245 
As John L. Esposito asserts, if Sayyid Ahmad Khan had been the traditionally 
educated Muslim who sought to make modern western liberal thought islamically 
acceptable, Muhammad Iqbal was a modern Muslim, with a western education, who 
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reinterpreted Islam in conjunction with western thought to show its relevancy as a 
viable alternative to Marxist and Christian European ideologies.246 
On the occasion of the 25th session of the All-India Muslim League, held in 
Allahabad and where he was elected as president, Muhammad Iqbal gave an historical 
speech, on the 29th December 1930, where he devised for the first time the creation of 
a separate state for the Indian Muslims.247 Echoing Johann Gottlieb Fichte’s 
Addresses to the German +ation248, Muhammad Iqbal talked about the question of 
Islam and Nationalism, saying that for the Muslims of India the main formative force 
through History had been Islam, which had given them the emotions and basic 
loyalties which gradually united scattered individuals and groups, transforming them 
into a well defined people. However, European political thought was rapidly changing 
the landscape for contemporary Muslims, inside and outside of India, with some 
Muslims wanting to replicate in their countries the phenomena of nation and the 
notion of country and territory, as well as the fact that religion was a private matter, 
independently of the facts that provoked their evolution in Europe, especially the 
phenomena of Christianity and its relation with politics. 
For Iqbal, Islam did not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable 
duality of spirit and matter, God and the Universe, Church and State, because each 
one of these parts was organically related with one another, and the individual was not 
a citizen of a temporal organization, since he was also spiritual. According to Iqbal, 
Prophet Muhammad’s experience had created a political and social order, based on 
revelation and, for this reason, Islam’s religious ideal was organically connected with 
the social order that he had created. The rejection of one would mean the rejection of 
the other. So, the construction of a polity based on national lines, if it meant the 
replacing of the Islamic principle of solidarity, was simply unthinkable for a Muslim: 
Indian History had already shown that the different unities of India were not inclined 
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to sink their respective individualities in a larger whole, with each group being 
intensely zealous of its collective existence. 
Addressing the question of the unity of the Indian nation, Iqbal raised the 
issues of the problem Indian Muslims would face as a minority, in their purposes of 
applying Islam as a moral, political and ethical ideal, if religion was to be considered 
a private matter, facing the risk of suffering the same fate as Christianity in Europe. 
For him, the unity of the Indian nation had to be searched not in the negation of some 
but in the reciprocal harmony and in the cooperation of many. Although the attempts 
to find that principle of internal harmony had failed so far, still each group had its 
own right to a free development according to its lines. 
Following this line of thought, Iqbal considered that India was composed by 
non-territorial unities, contrary to European countries, with human groups belonging 
to different races, speaking different languages and professing different religions. 
Their behaviour was not determined by a common racial conscience, and even the 
Hindus were not a homogenous group. The principle of European democracy could 
not be applied to India without acknowledging the fact of the existence of 
communitarian groups. The Muslim demand for the creation of a Muslim India inside 
India was, for Iqbal and for that reason, totally justified. That State would include the 
Punjab, North-West Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan, with self-government 
within, or without, the British Empire, and the formation of a consolidated North-
West Indian Muslim State appeared to him to be the final destiny of the Muslims, at 
least those of North-West India. That state would be the best defender against a 
foreign invasion of India, and Iqbal assured the Hindus that they had nothing to be 
afraid of the fact that the creation of Muslim autonomous states would meant the 
introduction of a religious government, since he, Iqbal, had already indicated the 
meaning of the word “religion” as applied to Islam. 
According to Iqbal, Islam was not a church. It was a state conceived as a 
contractual organism “way before Rousseau” had thought of something like that [as 
has been seen above when analysing his article of 1910-11], and animated by an 
ethical ideal that saw man not as a creature rooted in earth, defined by this or that 
portion of land, but as a spiritual being understood in terms of social mechanism, and 
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having rights and duties as a living factor in that mechanism. The Muslims of India, 
who were seventy million, were far more homogeneous, in Iqbal’s opinion, than any 
other people in India, indeed, they were the only Indian people who could fit the 
description of a nation, in the modern sense of the word: “The Hindus, though ahead 
of Muslims in almost all respects, had not yet been able to achieve the kind of 
homogeneity which was necessary for a nation, and which Islam had given to the 
Muslims as a free gift.” On the other hand, Iqbal was against nationalism based on 
territory, alerting Muslim leaders and politicians not to allow themselves to be carried 
away by the “subtle but fallacious argument that Turkey and Persia and other Muslim 
countries were progressing on national, i.e. territorial, lines, because the Muslims of 
India were differently situated”: the countries of Islam outside India were 
homogenous and the minorities there belonged, in the language of the Qur’an, to the 
“people of the Book”, i.e., they were protected. In India, with the caste system, there 
were social barriers between Hindus among themselves and between Hindus and 
Muslims.249 
These issues were again focused in the Presidential Address delivered at the 
annual session of the All-India Muslim Conference at Lahore, on the 21st March 
1932250, and more developed in his book, The Reconstruction of Religious Thought 
in Islam. 
 
III.5. Analysis of The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam 
Originally published as Six Lectures on the Reconstruction of Religious 
Thought in Islam, published in Lahore, in 1930, and then revised and added with the 
lecture “Is Religion Possible?” and an Index, this book was then published under the 
title The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, in London, in 1934.251 
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Muhammad Iqbal starts by saying, in the “Preface”, that the Qur’an is a book 
which emphasizes “deed” rather than “idea” and that the modern man and modern 
mind means a demand for a scientific form of religious knowledge and not the 
perpetuation of methods which were created for generations possessing a cultural 
outlook different from their own, i.e., of the 20th century. He, Muhammad Iqbal, tried, 
with the lectures, undertaken at the request of the Madras Muslim Association, and 
delivered at Madras, Hyderabad, and Aligarh, to meet, even though partially, that 
urgent demand by attempting to reconstruct Muslim religious philosophy with due 
regard to the philosophical traditions of Islam and the more recent developments in 
the various domains of human knowledge, at a moment quite favourable for such an 
undertaking, since Classical Physics had learned to criticize its own foundations. As a 
result of that criticism, the kind of materialism which it originally necessitated was 
rapidly disappearing; and the day was not far off when Religion and Science may 
discover hitherto unsuspected mutual harmonies. However, Iqbal was cautious, 
remembering that there was no such thing as finality in philosophical thinking. As 
knowledge advanced and fresh avenues of thought were opened, other views, and 
probably sounder views than those set forth in those lectures, were possible. His duty 
was to carefully watch the progress of human thought, and to maintain an independent 
critical attitude towards it.252 
Iqbal, then, argues that philosophical rationality and religious intuition were 
complementary ways of understanding the truth, and that belief allowed him to 
combine a variety of perspectives. So, it was no wonder for him that the younger 
generation of Islam in Asia and Africa demanded a fresh orientation of their faith. 
With the reawakening of Islam, therefore, it was necessary to examine, in an 
independent spirit, what Europe had thought and how far the conclusions reached by 
her could help the Muslims in the revision and, if necessary, reconstruction, of 
theological thought in Islam. For Iqbal, it was high time to look to the essentials of 
Islam and, with these lectures, he proposed to undertake a philosophical discussion of 
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some of the basic ideas of Islam, in the hope that this might, at least, be helpful 
towards a proper understanding of the meaning of Islam as a message to humanity.253 
In Iqbal’s assertion, during the last five hundred years, religious thought in 
Islam had been practically stationary. There had been a time when European thought 
received inspiration from the world of Islam, but the most remarkable phenomenon of 
modern history was the enormous rapidity with which the world of Islam was 
spiritually moving towards the West. There was nothing wrong in that movement, for 
European culture, on its intellectual side, was only a further development of some of 
the most important phases of the culture of Islam. Iqbal’s only fear was that the 
“dazzling” exterior of European culture might arrest Islam’s movement and Muslims 
might fail to reach the true inwardness of that culture. The task before the modern 
Muslim was, therefore, immense, since the whole system of Islam had to be rethought 
without completely breaking with the past. According to Iqbal, the first Muslim who 
felt the urge of a new spirit in him was Shah Wali Allah of Delhi, but the man who 
fully realized the importance and immensity of the task was Jamal ud-Din al-Afghani, 
whose deep insight into the inner meaning of the history of Muslim thought and life, 
combined with a broad vision engendered by his wide experience of men and 
manners, would have made him a living link between the past and the future. The 
only course open to Muslims was to approach modern knowledge with a respectful 
but independent attitude and to appreciate the teachings of Islam in the light of that 
knowledge, even though they might be led to differ from those who had gone before 
them.254 
In the sixth lecture, “The principle of movement in the structure of Islam”255, 
the most important in the scope of this research, Iqbal raises several issues, one of 
them ijtihad (independent reasoning), considered by Iqbal as very important as a 
means of bringing the necessary reconstruction of Islam in the modern world. He 
greatly admired the Turkish experience under Atatürk, but was very critical of 
Kemalism for assimilating from Europe the idea of separation between the Church 
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and the State, without understanding that it suggested a dualism that did not exist in 
Islam.256 
According to Iqbal, Islam, as a cultural movement, rejected the old static view 
of the universe, and reached a dynamic one. As an emotional system of unification it 
recognised the worth of the individual as such, and rejected blood relationship as a 
basis of human unity, because it was earth-rootedness. The search for a purely 
psychological foundation of human unity became possible only with the perception 
that all human life was spiritual in its origin. Such a perception was creative of fresh 
loyalties, without the need of any ceremonial to keep them alive, and made it possible 
for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity, which had originally 
appeared as a monastic order, was tried by Constantine as a system of unification. Its 
failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian to return to the old gods of 
Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. It was in a 
particular context that Islam came to existence. Islam, as a polity, was only a practical 
means of making the principle of rejection of blood relationship as a basis of human 
unity a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demanded 
loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God was the ultimate spiritual basis of all 
life, loyalty to God virtually amounted to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The 
ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, was eternal and revealed 
itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must 
reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal 
principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives a foothold in the world of 
perpetual change. But eternal principles, when they are understood to exclude all 
possibilities of change, which according to the Qur’an is one of the greatest “signs” 
of God, tend to immobilize what is essentially mobile in its nature.257 
For Iqbal, the failure of Europe in political and social sciences illustrated the 
former principle; the immobility of Islam during the last five hundred years illustrated 
the latter. What then was the principle of movement in the structure of Islam? It was 
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Ijtihad, which literally meant to exert. In the terminology of Islamic law it meant to 
exert with a view to form an independent judgement on a legal question. The idea, 
Iqbal believed, had its origin in a verse of the Qur’an: “And to those who exert We 
show Our path” (29:69), and in a tradition of the Prophet. Using some more examples 
from History, Iqbal asserted that, with the political expansion of Islam, systematic 
legal thought became an absolute necessity, and the early doctors of law, both of 
Arabian and non-Arabian descent, worked ceaselessly until all the accumulated 
wealth of legal thought found a final expression in the recognised schools of Law, 
which recognised three degrees of Ijtihad: 1) complete authority in legislation which 
was practically confined to the founders of the schools; 2) relative authority which 
was to be exercised within the limits of a particular school; 3) special authority which 
related to the determining of the law applicable to a particular case left undetermined 
by the founders. Iqbal was only concerned with the first degree of Ijtihad, i.e., 
complete authority in legislation, theoretically admitted by the Sunnis, but which in 
practice had always been denied ever since the establishment of the schools, inasmuch 
as the idea of complete Ijtihad was hedged round by conditions which were well-nigh 
impossible of realisation in a single individual. Nevertheless the fact that the Qur’an 
embodied an essentially dynamic outlook on life, such an intellectual attitude had 
reduced the Law of Islam practically to a state of immobility and, although some 
European writers thought that the stationary character of the Law of Islam was due to 
the influence of the Turks, Muhammad Iqbal contended that the legal schools of Islam 
had been finally established long before the Turkish influence began to work in the 
history of Islam. The real causes were, in his opinion, first, the controversy in the 
early days of the Abbasids between those who defended the eternity of the Qur’an 
and those denying it, the Mu’tazilites (the Rationalists, using Iqbal’s words, who 
defended the createdness of the Qur’an); second, the role of Sufism; and, finally, the 
destruction of Baghdad in 1258 by the Mongols. The consequences of all these factors 
were the crystallization of the Shari’a; the spirit of total other-worldliness in later 
Sufism obscured men’s vision of a very important aspect of Islam as a social polity; 
and a blind following of the traditional schools, i.e., taqlid.258 
                                                           
258 IQBAL, 1934: pp. 148-152. 
 142 
 
According to Iqbal, their main purpose was to secure social order, and there 
was no doubt that they were partly right, since organization did to a certain extent 
counteract the forces of decay. But they did not see, as the modern ‘Ulama did not 
see, that the ultimate fate of a people did not depend so much on organization as on 
the worth and power of individual men. In an over-organized society the individual 
was altogether crushed out of existence, gaining the whole wealth of social thought 
around him but losing his own soul: “Thus a false reverence for past history and its 
artificial resurrection constituted no remedy for a people’s decay.”259 The only 
effective power that counteracted the forces of decay in a people was the rearing of 
self-concentrated individuals, who alone revealed the depth of life, disclosed new 
standards in the light of which people begin to see that the environment was not 
wholly inviolable and required revision. The tendency to over-organization by a false 
reverence of the past, as manifested in the legists of Islam in the thirteenth century 
and later, was contrary to the inner impulse of Islam, and consequently invoked the 
powerful reaction of Ibn Taymiyya, who, for Iqbal, was one of the most indefatigable 
writers and preachers of Islam, and who had claimed freedom of Ijtihad for himself, 
rising in revolt against the finality of the schools, and went back to first principles in 
order to make a fresh start, and whose spirit could also be found in Muhammad ibn 
Abd al-Wahhab in eighteenth century Arabia. The essential thing to note, for Iqbal, 
was, although conservative in its own fashion and its vision of the past was wholly 
uncritical, and in matters of law it mainly fell back on the traditions of the Prophet, 
the spirit of freedom manifested in it. 
Iqbal then dwells on the contemporary events in Turkey, which were a good 
example of how the power of Ijtihad was manifested in recent thought and activity. 
Iqbal found that the idea of Ijtihad, reinforced and broadened by modern 
philosophical ideas, had long been working in the religious and political thought of 
the Turkish nation, something clear from Halim Sabit’s new theory of “Muhammadan 
Law”, grounded on modern sociological concepts. Two main lines of thought in 
Turkey, represented by the Nationalist Party and the Party of Religious Reform, 
showed that activity of independent reasoning. The point of supreme interest with the 
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Nationalist Party was above all the State and not Religion, which as such had no 
independent function. For them, the state was the essential factor in national life 
which determined the character and function of all other factors. They, therefore, 
rejected old ideas about the function of State and Religion, and accentuated the 
separation of Church and State. Iqbal believed that the structure of Islam as a religio-
political system did permit such a view, though personally he considered a mistake to 
suppose that the idea of State was more dominant and ruled all other ideas embodied 
in its system, since in Islam, the spiritual and the temporal were not two distinct 
domains, and the nature of an act, however secular in its import, was determined by 
the attitude of mind with which the agent did it. It was the invisible mental 
background of the act which ultimately determined its character. An act was temporal 
or profane if it was done in a spirit of detachment from the infinite complexity of life 
behind it; it was spiritual if it was inspired by that complexity. It was the same reality 
which appeared as Church looked at from one point of view and as State from 
another. It was not true to say that Church and State were two sides or facets of the 
same thing, because Islam, for Iqbal, was a single not analysable reality which was 
one or the other as the point of view varied. The Turkish Nationalists had assimilated 
the idea of separation of Church and State from the history of European political 
ideas. Primitive Christianity had been founded, not as a political or civil unit, but as a 
monastic order in a profane world, having nothing to do with civil affairs, and 
obeying the Roman authority practically in all matters. The result of this was that 
when the State became Christian, State and Church confronted each other as distinct 
powers with interminable boundary disputes between them. 
Such a thing, in Iqbal’s opinion, could never happen in Islam, for Islam was 
from the very beginning a civil society, having received from the Qur’an a set of 
simple legal principles which, like the twelve tables of the Romans, carried, as 
experience subsequently proved, great potentialities of expansion and development by 
interpretation. The Nationalist Party’s theory of State, therefore, was misleading 
inasmuch as it suggested a dualism which did not exist in Islam. The Religious 
Reform Party, on the other hand, led by Sa’id Halim Pasha, insisted on the 
fundamental fact that Islam was a harmony of idealism and positivism; and, as a unity 
of the eternal verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity, had no fatherland, stressing 
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the importance of freedom of Ijtihad with a view to rebuild the laws of Shari’a in the 
light of modern thought and experience. 
From Iqbal’s point of view, that “ancient mistake” arose out of the bifurcation 
of the unity of man into two distinct and separate realities which somehow had a point 
of contact, but which were in essence opposed to each other. The truth, however, was 
that matter was spirit in space-time reference. The unity called man was body when 
looked at as acting in regard to what was called the external world; it was mind or 
soul when looked at as acting in regard to the ultimate aim and ideal of such acting. 
The essence of Tawhid (Oneness), as a working idea, was equality, solidarity, and 
freedom. The State, from the Islamic standpoint, was an endeavour to transform these 
ideal principles into space-time forces, an aspiration to realize them in a definite 
human organization. It was in this sense alone that the state in Islam was a theocracy, 
not in the sense that it was headed by a representative of God on Earth who could 
always screen his despotic will behind his supposed infallibility. The Ultimate 
Reality, according to the Qur’an, was spiritual, and its life consisted in its temporal 
activity. The spirit found its opportunities in the natural, the material, the secular. All 
that was secular was, therefore, sacred in the roots of its being. The State, according 
to Iqbal’s interpretation of Islam, was simply an effort to realize the spiritual in a 
human organization. But, in that sense, all State, not based on mere domination and 
aiming at the realization of ideal principles, was theocratic. 
Modern culture, according to Sa’id Halim Pasha, was based on national 
egoism and, therefore, was only another form of barbarism, being the result of an 
over-developed industrialism through which men satisfied their primitive instincts and 
inclinations. Halim Pasha deplored that during the course of history the moral and 
social ideals of Islam had been gradually deislamicized through the influence of local 
character, and pre-Islamic superstitions of Muslim nations. Those ideals then [1930s] 
were more Iranian, Turkish, or Arabian than Islamic, and the pure brow of the 
principle of Tawhid had received more or less an impress of heathenism, and the 
universal and impersonal character of the ethical ideals of Islam had been lost through 
a process of localization. The only alternative opened to them was to tear off from 
Islam “the hard crust which has immobilized an essentially dynamic outlook on life, 
and to rediscover the original verities of freedom, equality, and solidarity with a view 
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to rebuild our moral, social, and political ideals out of their original simplicity and 
universality.”260 
To illustrate his ideas, Muhammad Iqbal then raises the issue of the abolition 
of the Caliphate in 1924. Although a pan-Islamist, and one of the most vocal 
supporters of the Caliphate, Iqbal wrote that the decision of the Turkish Assembly 
was justified, that the political system of Islam was republican, and that that decision 
had been an exercise of the power of Ijtihad. 
“Let us now see how the Grand National Assembly has exercised this power 
of Ijtihad in regard to the institution of Khilafat [Caliphate]. According to Sunni Law, 
the appointment of an Imam or Khalifa is absolutely indispensable. The first question 
that arises in this connexion is this: Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person? 
Turkey’s Ijtihad is that, according to the spirit of Islam, the Caliphate or Imamate can 
be vested in a body of persons, or an elected Assembly. The religious doctors of Islam 
in Egypt and India, as far as I know, have not yet expressed themselves on this point. 
Personally, I believe the Turkish view is perfectly sound. It is hardly necessary to 
argue this point. The republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent 
with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that 
are set free in the world of Islam.”261 
In order to understand the Turkish view on the Caliphate, Iqbal uses Ibn 
Khaldun’s theory, who mentions in his Muqadimma three distinct views of the idea 
of Universal Caliphate in Islam: 1) That Universal Imamate was a Divine institution, 
and was consequently indispensable; 2) That it was merely a matter of expediency; 3) 
That there was no need of such an institution, a view taken by the Kharijites. For 
Iqbal, modern Turkey had shifted from the first to the second view, i.e., to the view of 
the Mu’tazilah who regarded a Universal Imamate as a matter of expediency only. 
“The Turks argue that in our political thinking we must be guided by our past 
political experience which points unmistakably to the fact that the idea of Universal 
Imamate has failed in practice. It was a workable idea when the Empire of Islam was 
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intact. Since the break-up of this Empire independent political units have arisen. The 
idea has ceased to be operative and cannot work as a living factor in the organization 
of modern Islam. Far from serving any useful purpose it has really stood in the way of 
a reunion of independent Muslim States. Persia has stood aloof from the Turks in 
view of her doctrinal differences regarding the Khilafat; Morocco has always looked 
askance at them, and Arabia has cherished private ambition. And all these ruptures in 
Islam for the sake of a mere symbol of a power which departed long ago. Why should 
we not, they can further argue, learn from experience in our political thinking? For the 
present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, temporarily focus her 
vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful to form a living family of 
republics. A true and living unity, according to the nationalist thinkers, is not so easy 
as to be achieved by a merely symbolical overlordship. It is truly manifested in a 
multiplicity of free independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and 
harmonized by the unifying bond of a common spiritual aspiration. It seems to me 
that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor 
Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial 
distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of 
its members.”262 
Iqbal welcomed the liberal movement in modern Islam, but at the same time 
he alerted to what he considered as its dangers. In his opinion, Liberalism had a 
tendency to act as a force of disintegration, and the race-idea, which appeared to be 
working in modern Islam with greater force than ever, could ultimately wipe off the 
broad human outlook which Muslim people had imbibed from their religion. 
“Further, our religious and political reformers in their zeal for liberalism may 
overstep the proper limits of reform in the absence of check on their youthful fervour. 
We are today passing through a period similar to that of the Protestant revolution in 
Europe, and the lesson which the rise and outcome of Luther’s movement teaches 
should not be lost on us. A careful reading of history shows that the Reformation was 
essentially a political movement, and the net result of it in Europe was a gradual 
displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by systems of national ethics. The 
result of this tendency we have seen with our own eyes in the Great European War 
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which, far from bringing any workable synthesis of the two opposing systems of 
ethics, has made the European situation still more intolerable. It is the duty of the 
leaders of the world of Islam today to understand the real meaning of what has 
happened in Europe, and then to move forward with self-control and a clear insight 
into the ultimate aims of Islam as a social polity.” According to Iqbal, the Qur’an 
considered it necessary to unite religion and state, ethics and politics in a single 
revelation much in the same way as Plato did in his Republic. Islam was non-
territorial in its character, and its aim was to furnish a model for the final combination 
of humanity by “drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually repellent races, and 
then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing a self-consciousness 
of their own.” To do that, to attain that goal, it was necessary to reinterpret the 
foundational legal principles, a claim made by the “present generation of Muslim 
liberals”, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern 
life.263 
 
III.5.1. The capability of evolution in the Law of Islam 
“I have given you some idea of the history and working of Ijtihad in modern 
Islam. I now proceed to see whether the history and structure of the Law of Islam 
indicate the possibility of any fresh interpretation of its principles. In other words, the 
question that I want to raise is: Is the Law of Islam capable of evolution?” The 
answer, for Iqbal, was that, with the return of new life, “the inner catholicity 
[universality] of the spirit of Islam is bound to work itself out in spite of the rigorous 
conservatism of our doctors. And I have no doubt that a deeper study of the enormous 
legal literature of Islam is sure to rid the modern critic of the superficial opinion that 
the Law of Islam is stationary and incapable of development. Unfortunately, the 
conservative Muslim public of this country [India] is not yet quite ready for a critical 
discussion of Fiqh, which, if undertaken, is likely to displease most people, and raise 
sectarian controversies; yet I venture to offer a few remarks on the point before us.”264 
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Using History, Iqbal attempted to show that, from the earliest times practically 
up to the rise of the Abbasids, there was no written law of Islam apart from the 
Qur’an, and that from about the middle of the first century after Prophet Muhammad 
up to the beginning of the fourth century “not less than nineteen schools of law and 
legal opinion appeared in Islam”, a fact which, alone, in itself was sufficient to show 
how incessantly the early doctors of law worked in order to meet the necessities of a 
growing civilization. With the expansion of conquest and the consequent widening of 
the outlook of Islam, those early legists had to take a wider view of things, and to 
study local conditions of life and habits of new peoples that came within the fold of 
Islam. In the light of contemporary social and political history, a careful study of the 
various schools of legal opinion would reveal that they had gradually passed from the 
deductive to the inductive attitude in their efforts at interpretation. By studying the 
four accepted sources (the Qur’an, the Hadith, Ijma and Qiyas) of “Muhammadan 
Law” and the controversies which they invoked, the supposed rigidity of the 
recognized schools would evaporate and the possibility of a further evolution became 
perfectly clear. Iqbal then expands on each one of them. 
 
III.5.2. The sources of Law in Islam 
III.5.2.1. The Qur’an 
For Iqbal, the primary source of the Law of Islam was the Qur’an, although it 
was not a legal code, for its main purpose was “to awaken in man the higher 
consciousness of his relation with God and the universe. No doubt, the Qur’an does 
lay down a few general principles and rules of a legal nature, especially relating to the 
family - the ultimate basis of social life. But why are these rules made part of a 
revelation the ultimate aim of which is man’s higher life? The answer to this question 
is furnished by the history of Christianity which appeared as a powerful reaction 
against the spirit of legality manifested in Judaism. By setting up an ideal of 
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otherworldliness it no doubt did succeed in spiritualizing life, but its individualism 
could see no spiritual value in the complexity of human social relations.”265 
From Iqbal’s viewpoint, the Qur’an considered it necessary to unite religion 
and state, ethics and politics in a single revelation “much in the same way as Plato 
does in his Republic”, but the important point to note in that connexion was its 
dynamic outlook, which could not be inimical to the idea of evolution. Life was not 
pure and simple change, because it had within it elements of conservation also. Man, 
in his forward movement, could not help looking back to his past, facing his own 
inward expansion with a certain amount of fear. 
“The spirit of man in its forward movement is restrained by forces which seem 
to be working in the opposite direction. This is only another way of saying that life 
moves with the weight of its own past on its back, and that in any view of social 
change the value and function of the forces of conservatism cannot be lost sight of. It 
is with this organic insight into the essential teaching of the Qur’an that modern 
Rationalism ought to approach our existing institutions. No people can afford to reject 
their past entirely, for it is their past that has made their personal identity. And in a 
society like Islam the problem of a revision of old institutions becomes still more 
delicate, and the responsibility of the reformer assumes a far more serious aspect. 
Islam is non-territorial in its character, and its aim is to furnish a model for the final 
combination of humanity by drawing its adherents from a variety of mutually 
repellent races, and then transforming this atomic aggregate into a people possessing a 
self-consciousness of their own. [...] Turning now to the groundwork of legal 
principles in the Qur’an, it is perfectly clear that far from leaving no scope for human 
thought and legislative activity the intensive breadth of these principles virtually acts 
as an awakener of human thought. Our early doctors of law taking their clue mainly 
from this groundwork evolved a number of legal systems; and the student of 
Muhammadan history knows very well that nearly half the triumphs of Islam as a 
social and political power were due to the legal acuteness of these doctors. But with 
all their comprehensiveness these systems are after all individual interpretations, and 
as such cannot claim any finality. I know the ‘Ulama of Islam claim finality for the 
popular schools of Muhammadan Law, though they never found it possible to deny 
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the theoretical possibility of a complete Ijtihad. I have tried to explain the causes 
which, in my opinion, determined this attitude of the ‘Ulama, but since things have 
changed and the world of Islam is confronted and affected today by new forces set 
free by the extraordinary development of human thought in all its directions, I see no 
reason why this attitude should be maintained any longer. Did the founders of our 
schools ever claim finality for their reasonings and interpretations? Never. The claim 
of the present generation of Muslim liberals to reinterpret the foundational legal 
principles, in the light of their own experience and the altered conditions of modern 
life is, in my opinion, perfectly justified. The teaching of the Qur’an that life is a 
process of progressive creation necessitates that each generation, guided but 
unhampered by the work of its predecessors, should be permitted to solve its own 
problems.”266 
 
III.5.2.2. The Hadith 
The second great source of Muslim Law was the traditions of Prophet 
Muhammad, subject of great discussion both in ancient and modern times. Iqbal cites 
some European researchers of his time who questioned their historical authenticity. 
“Among their modern critics Professor Goldziher has subjected them to a searching 
examination in the light of modern canons of historical criticism, and arrives at the 
conclusion that they are, on the whole, untrustworthy. Another European writer 
[Nicolas Prodromou Aghnides], after examining the Muslim methods of determining 
the genuineness of a tradition, and pointing out the theoretical possibilities of error, 
arrives at the following conclusion: ‘It must be said in conclusion that the preceding 
considerations represent only theoretical possibilities and that the question whether 
and how far these possibilities have become actualities is largely a matter of how far 
the actual circumstances offered inducements for making use of the possibilities. 
Doubtless, the latter, relatively speaking, were few and affected only a small 
proportion of the entire Sunnah. It may therefore be said that . . . for the most part the 
                                                           
266 IQBAL, 1934: pp. 166-168. 
 151 
 
collections of Sunnah considered by the Moslems as canonical are genuine records of 
the rise and early growth of Islam (Mohammedan Theories of Finance).’”267 
For his purposes, Iqbal wanted to distinguish the traditions of a purely legal 
import from those which were of a non-legal character. Regarding the former, a very 
important question arose as to how far they embodied the pre-Islamic usages of 
Arabia which were in some cases left intact, and in others modified by the Prophet. It 
was difficult to make this discovery, for the early writers did not always refer to pre-
Islamic usages, nor was it possible to discover them, which were left intact by express 
or tacit approval of the Prophet, and were intended to be universal in their application. 
Iqbal uses Shah Wali Allah, reproducing the substance of his view, according to 
which the prophetic method of teaching was that the law revealed by a prophet took 
especial notice of the habits, ways, and peculiarities of the people to whom he was 
specifically sent. The Prophet, who aimed at all-embracing principles, however, could 
neither reveal different principles for different peoples, nor leave them to work out 
their own rules of conduct. His method was to train one particular people, and to use 
them as a nucleus for the building up of a universal Shari’a. In doing so he 
accentuated the principles underlying the social life of all mankind, and applied them 
to concrete cases in the light of the specific habits of the people immediately before 
him. The Shari’a values resulting from this application (e.g. rules relating to penalties 
for crimes) were in a sense specific to that people; and since their observance was not 
an end in itself they could not be strictly enforced in the case of future generations.268 
 
III.5.2.3. The Ijma 
The third source of Muslim Law, Ijma, was, in Iqbal’s opinion, perhaps the 
most important legal notion in Islam, and he considered strange that that important 
notion, “while invoking great academic discussions in early Islam, remained 
practically a mere idea, and rarely assumed the form of a permanent institution in any 
Muhammadan country.” For Iqbal, the reason for that situation was possibly due to 
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the fact that it was contrary to the political interests of the kind of absolute monarchy 
that grew up in Islam immediately after the fourth Caliph (‘Ali, caliph from 656 to 
661). The Umayyad and the Abbasid Caliphs wanted to leave the power of Ijtihad to 
individual Mujtahids rather than encourage the formation of a permanent assembly 
which might become too powerful for them. So, it was with extreme satisfaction that 
Iqbal saw the pressure of new world-forces and the political experience of European 
nations, which were impressing on the mind of modern Islam the value and 
possibilities of the idea of Ijma. The growth of the republican spirit and the gradual 
formation of legislative assemblies in Muslim lands constituted a great step forward, 
and the transfer of the power of Ijtihad from individual representatives of schools to a 
Muslim legislative assembly which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, was the 
only possible form Ijma could take in modern times and which would secure 
contributions to legal discussion from “laymen who happen to possess a keen insight 
into affairs. [...] In this way alone can we stir into activity the dormant spirit of life in 
our legal system, and give it an evolutionary outlook. In India, however, difficulties 
are likely to arise for it is doubtful whether a non-Muslim legislative assembly can 
exercise the power of Ijtihad.”269 
Retorting to Aghnides and his claim that Ijma could repeal the Qur’an, Iqbal 
says that there “is not the slightest justification for such a statement in the legal 
literature of Islam. Not even a tradition of the Prophet can have any such effect. It 
seems to me that the author is misled by the word :askh in the writings of our early 
doctors”. When used in discussions relating to the Ijma of the companions, that word 
only meant the power to extend or limit the application of a Qur’anic rule of law, and 
not the power to repeal or supersede it by another rule of law, and even if supposing 
the companions had unanimously decided a certain point, later generations were not 
bound by their decision on a question of law and its interpretation.270 
The legislative activity of a modern Muslim assembly had to consist mostly of 
men possessing no knowledge of the subtleties of “Muhammadan Law”, which could 
make “grave mistakes” in their interpretation of law. In order to avoid erroneous 
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interpretations of the Law, Iqbal considered important to reform the system of legal 
education in Muslim countries, to extend its sphere and to combine it with an 
“intelligent study of modern jurisprudence.” At the same time, and in order to at least 
reduce the possibilities of erroneous interpretation, Iqbal considered that the ‘Ulama 
should form a vital part of a Muslim legislative assembly helping and guiding free 
discussion on questions relating to law. However, this situation, and as the Persian 
constitution of 1906 had shown, by providing a separate “ecclesiastical committee” of 
‘Ulama, “conversant with the affairs of the world”, which had power to supervise the 
legislative activity of the Majlis [Assembly], was, in Iqbal’s opinion, a dangerous 
arrangement but probably necessary in view of the Persian constitutional theory, 
according to which the king was a mere custodian of the realm which really belonged 
to the Absent Imam. The ‘Ulama, as representatives of the Imam, considered 
themselves entitled to supervise the whole life of the community, though Iqbal failed 
to understand how, in the absence of an apostolic succession, did they establish their 
claim to represent the Imam. This arrangement was not free from danger, and could 
be tried, but only as a temporary measure in Sunni countries.271 
 
III.5.2.4. The Qiyas 
The fourth and last basis of Fiqh was Qiyas, i.e., the use of analogical 
reasoning in legislation. For Muhammad Iqbal, properly understood and applied, 
Qiyas was only another name for Ijtihad which, within the limits of the revealed texts, 
was absolutely free. Its importance as a principle could be seen from the fact that, 
according to most of the doctors, as Shawkani had asserted, it was permitted “even in 
the lifetime of the Holy Prophet.” So, for Iqbal, the closing of the door of Ijtihad was 
pure fiction suggested partly by the crystallization of legal thought in Islam, and 
partly by that intellectual “laziness which, especially in the period of spiritual decay, 
turns great thinkers into idols.” If some of the later doctors had upheld that fiction, 
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modern Islam was not bound by that “voluntary surrender of intellectual 
independence.”272 
Iqbal did hope to make it clear that neither in the foundational principles nor in 
the structure of the Muslim systems, as they were found in those days, was there 
anything to justify that attitude of “laziness” and “surrender”. For him, the world of 
Islam, “equipped with penetrative thought and fresh experience [...] should 
courageously proceed to the work of reconstruction before them”, a work which had a 
far more serious aspect than mere adjustment to modern conditions of life, keeping in 
mind the aftermath of the First World War, which had brought “the awakening on 
Turkey”, and new economic experiments in the neighbourhood of Muslim Asia, i.e. 
the Soviet Union and Communism. Muhammad Iqbal considered that Humanity 
needed three things in those days: 1) a spiritual interpretation of the universe; 2) a 
spiritual emancipation of the individual; and 3) basic principles of a universal import 
directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis. Modern Europe had built 
idealistic systems on these lines, but experience had shown that “truth revealed 
through pure reason is incapable of bringing that fire of living conviction which 
personal revelation alone can bring.” Pure thought had little influenced men, while 
religion had always elevated individuals, and transformed whole societies. The 
idealism of Europe never became a living factor in her life, and the result was a 
perverted ego seeking itself through “mutually intolerant democracies whose sole 
function is to exploit the poor in the interest of the rich.” Europe was then “the 
greatest hindrance in the way of man’s ethical advancement.” On the other hand, the 
Muslims were in possession of those ultimate ideas on the basis of a revelation, 
which, “speaking from the inmost depths of life, internalizes its own apparent 
externality”, which ought to make Muslims one of the most spiritually emancipated 
peoples on earth: “Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his 
social life in the light of ultimate principles, and evolve, out of the hitherto partially 
revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of 
Islam.” This Islamic democracy, equality and brotherhood of all Muslims, was against 
the notion of nationalism, and Islam’s political idea was one of transnational 
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community which transcended ethnical, racial and national bonds, based in an internal 
cohesion which stemmed from the community’s religious-political ideal unity.273 
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CHAPTER IV: 
SAYYID ABU’L ‘ALA MAWDUDI’S COACEPTIOA OF STATE 
IV.1. Bio-bibliography of Sayyid Abu’l ‘Ala Mawdudi until 1941 
Abu’l ‘Ala ‘Mawdudi (1903-1979) was born on the 25th September, 1903 in 
Aurangabad, a town in the former princely state of Hyderabad (Deccan), nowadays 
Andhra Pradesh, India. He traced his lineage to an old, well-known family of Delhi 
who had been associated with the Mughal court and had later served the nizams 
(rulers) of Hyderabad. The family took pride in the glorious days of Islam in India and 
was acutely aware of its downfall following the sack of Delhi by the British in 1858, 
harbouring, therefore, a dislike for British rule. Mawdudi’s religiopolitical awareness 
had first been aroused in Hyderabad, when the nizam’s authority had begun to wane, 
and where political activism had shifted the time-honoured balance of power to the 
Hindus. 274 
After the Great Mutiny of 1857 (see chapter I) and the entrenchment of the 
British Raj, Muslim politics, religious thinking, and social organizations, from Sayyid 
Ahmad Khan’s Aligarh movement to Muslim agitations in Bengal and Punjab, had 
been directed at reversing the continuous decline in Muslim political power before the 
rise in the fortunes of the British and subsequently the Hindus. The eclipse of 
Hyderabad’s Muslim culture and later of its Muslim community after the collapse of 
the nizam’s state in 1948 was to haunt Mawdudi in the subsequent years, leaving him 
with a sense of desperation and urgency directed at saving Islam from decline and 
eventual extinction, an attitude he shared with most Muslims of Hyderabad. Even 
before the partition these themes had appeared in Mawdudi’s writings. 
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Mawdudi came of age just as colonial rule was ending and Indian national 
consciousness was asserted, but the Muslims failed to salvage their status and restore 
the political prominence they had lost. Experiments with accommodation to imperial 
rule, such as those of Sayyid Ahmad Khan or Punjab’s Unionist Party, had failed to 
stop Hindu supremacy or assuage the ever increasing anxiety of the Muslim masses 
about life under Hindu rule. The Muslims of India had begun to think that restoring 
their political power was the only way to advance their interests and extricate 
themselves from their predicament. Mawdudi’s own disposition toward religion was 
quite marked throughout his life. From his childhood he received religious nurture, 
first at home and later in the traditional schools of Hyderabad, Bhopal, and Delhi, at 
the hands of his father and from a variety of teachers employed by him to ground his 
sons in the essentials of Islam, Islamic history, and in the literary heritage of the 
Arabic, Persian, and Urdu languages. With minimum formal education (three years), 
given in a madrasa, Mawdudi’s instruction included very little of the subject matters 
of a modern school, and European languages, specifically English, were not among 
the courses he followed. In fact, he only studied English some years later when his 
editorial work made knowledge of the language imperative. As a young man in Delhi, 
he studied the dars-i nizami curricula (a study curriculum used in a large portion of 
Islamic religious schools in South Asia) of the ‘ulama with Deobandi tutors and 
received the certificate which would have permitted him to join them, but he 
abandoned traditional education and the garb of the ‘ulama for an education in 
modern subjects. He studied English and Western thought on his own and embarked 
on a modern career in journalism. 
In spite of the strictness of his upbringing and his father’s determination to 
insulate the youngest son of the family against the influences of Western culture and 
education, as a young man Mawdudi had the reputation of independent mindedness 
and of being something of a rebel against traditional ways. Despite these tendencies in 
his youth, throughout Mawdudi’s long life, religion was the strong foundation upon 
which all else was to rest, and with the passing of time it became increasingly clear to 
him that he had a religious mission to fulfil among India’s Muslims. Beginning his 
public career as a journalist at the early age of seventeen, Mawdudi served as editor of 
the weekly Taj in Jabalpur, and he continued in journalism for about ten years, before 
turning to other pursuits. Between 1921 and 1924 he became involved in the Khilafat 
 158 
 
movement, which had been formed in the hope of preserving the Ottoman Caliphate. 
For a while, Mawdudi sympathized with the Indian National Congress Party, which 
was fully involved with the Khilafat Movement, being Gandhi one of the most 
important Hindu leaders to give his support to it. The peak of his career in journalism 
was the editorship of Muslim (1921-23) and al-Jam’iyat (1925-28), both of which 
were organs of the pro-Congress Jam’iyat-i Ulama-i Hind (Party of Indian ‘Ulama), 
position which he held from 1924 until he resigned in 1927. It was a position of 
extreme importance and influence for so young and inexperienced a man. It brought 
him into close contact with some of the leaders of Indian Muslim life and thought, and 
it gave him occasion to express himself on virtually every subject of importance to the 
world-wide Muslim community anywhere in the world. 
Mawdudi witnessed the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the failure of the 
Caliphate Movement to save that empire from being dismembered by Britain and 
France, which, added to growing Hindu assertiveness in the Indian Freedom 
(Independence) Movement, contributed to Mawdudi’s perception of the continued 
deterioration of Muslim power and the threat to Islam and the Muslim community. 
Mawdudi blamed European colonialism and the emergence of modern nationalism, a 
foreign and Western ideology which divided rather than united peoples, replacing the 
universal or Pan-Islamic ideal of solidarity with a more tenuous and divisive identity 
based upon language, tribe, or ethnicity. The Khilafat movement, that marked the 
beginning of open Muslim political activism in the context of the independence 
movement, was the best example of this trend. From early on Mawdudi revealed a 
deep concern with the notion of the Umma, a concern that surfaces in his writings at 
two points: when discussing the creation of a pure Islamic order at the local level, and 
when envisioning a universal Islamic order. Both developments were predicated on 
the creation of true Ummas. 
To understand Mawdudi’s worldview, it is important to discern how his 
conceptions of the universal and local Umma interacted, and when and how they 
separated. Early on, the notion of a universal Umma appeared to have been more 
important to Mawdudi than that of a local one. During his initiation into politics in the 
context of the Indian nationalist movement, even before he embarked on an activist 
agenda, he was impressed by pan-Islamism and its ideal of the universal Umma. 
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In 1921, Mawdudi had joined the Tahrik-i Hijrat (Migration Movement) to 
protest against British rule over India. The Tahrik was premised on the notion that 
since India was no longer part of Dar al-Islam, all Indian Muslims should migrate to 
Afghanistan, where Islam continued to reign. The traditional Islamic division of the 
world into Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb, which undergirded the Tahrik’s logic, 
framed the problem of British imperialism not as one of foreign rule over India, but as 
one of non-Muslim rule over Muslims, a problem not limited to one geographical 
territory or nation but involving all Muslims alike. Imperialism could not, therefore, 
be overcome by nationalism but through the creation and preservation of an Islamic 
Umma. In this case, sustaining an Islamic normative order in India was not enough; 
Muslims needed to move physically beyond the purview of British authority. Traces 
of a vision of the world divided into an Islamic Umma and non-Muslim Dar al-Harb 
would periodically continue to surface in Mawdudi’s works.275 
Similar considerations governed Mawdudi’s understanding of the aim and 
political function of the Khilafat movement. For him the Caliphate stood not only as 
the symbol of Muslim unity but as a sacrosanct institution that would preserve that 
unity and give shape to a transnational Umma whose borders would encompass all 
Muslim territories. The Khilafat movement was thus simultaneously a struggle against 
Western imperialism (which he viewed as the principal obstacle to Muslim unity) and 
an affirmation of the centrality of the Umma as an ideal, as well as a reality for 
Muslim life. The abolition of the caliphate by the new Turkish republic in 1924 (see 
previous chapters) ended the Khilafat movement in India, with major implications for 
Mawdudi’s thinking. He was greatly disturbed by Arab hostility to Ottoman rule, and, 
more importantly, by the way in which Turkey had discarded the Caliphate. In both 
cases he believed nationalists, in collusion with Europeans, had betrayed Islam. It was 
then that Mawdudi developed his deep-seeded suspicion of nationalism, which he 
came to view as a surreptitious form of Western domination and the foremost threat to 
the realization of the Umma. 
Despite his open hostility to nationalism, Mawdudi became cognisant of its 
seeming inevitability. The end of the caliphate had proved that nationalism, for better 
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or worse, was a force whose grip on the Muslim imagination was only likely to grow. 
Moreover, with the caliphate out of the picture, the Umma was unlikely to materialize 
as a territorial reality. However, it was likely to shape how Muslims might imagine or 
idealize their relations to “others” in the international arena. From that point on, 
Mawdudi tacitly accepted nationalism in the framework of his idealization of the 
Umma. He would seek to address and accommodate both, sometimes conceding the 
reality of the nation-state system and other times asserting the inevitable ascendance 
of the Umma. Consequently, without a clear-cut directive regarding the primacy of the 
nation or Umma, Mawdudi’s thinking on international issues was uncertain and 
ambiguous. 
Giving up his journalistic work in 1928 in favour of literary pursuits and 
historical research, he associated himself in 1932 with a journal called Tarjuman al-
Qur’an [Interpretation/Translation of the Qur’an], in Hyderabad, which would 
become Mawdudi’s sole responsibility in 1933. He began also to consider that a 
mission had been laid upon him: to invite the Indian Muslims to a renewed and 
purified commitment to Islam, launching himself thereupon into a work of criticism, 
analysis, and exposition of Islam designed to capture the allegiance of the Indian 
Muslim leadership and to redirect it into the path of Islam. 
Between the two World Wars some Muslim leaders turned to communalism, 
channelling their political aspirations and energies into the formulation of political 
agendas whose only strength lay in their manipulation of Islamic symbols. As a result, 
in the 1920s and the 1930s Islam was catapulted into the political arena, and its 
symbols were politicized and utilized for purposes of mass mobilization. The results 
were communal riots and the estrangement of some from the Congress party. 
However, communal agitation did not help either. The earliest organized expression 
of Muslim communalism, the Khilafat movement, to which Mawdudi had belonged, 
collapsed in 1924 and with it the hopes and aspirations of many of the Muslims of 
India. The Khilafat movement, however, led some Muslims to greater expressions of 
communalism throughout the following decade. Meanwhile, the home-rule (swaraj) 
effort, initiated by the Congress in 1924, had also come to naught. Hindu hostility and 
Muslim activism, which had emerged into the open in the wake of the Khilafat 
movement, continued to arouse the fears of the Muslim masses about their future. 
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Following the collapse of the movement in 1924, Muslims and Hindus perpetrated 
acts of violence all over India. The most noteworthy of the Hindu campaigns was the 
Shuddhi one, whose mission was to reconvert unwilling low-caste converts from 
Islam back to Hinduism, challenging the place of Islam in India and provoking angry 
responses from Muslims, resulting in more communal strife. In 1926 Swami 
Shradhanand (1856-1926), a renowned Shuddhi activist, was assassinated, causing 
much anti-Muslim bitterness in the Indian press and among the Hindus, and a feeling 
of desperation and apologetic resignation among Muslims.276 
Mawdudi witnessed all these events, and his political thinking was shaped by 
considering all the solutions with which Muslims experimented. He was not initially a 
revivalist; he simply wanted to solve the problems of his community. The search for a 
solution eventually led him to conclude that Islam was the best remedy for the 
problem. After Shradhanand’s murder, Mawdudi plunged into the communalist 
movement, making a choice which determined the direction of his lifelong struggle to 
preserve the place of Islam in Muslim life. In 1929 he published his book Al-Jihad 
fi’l-Islam [Jihad in Islam], not only a response to Hindu challenges to Islam 
following Shradhanand’s death, but also a prologue to a lifetime of religious and 
political effort. By 1932 the Muslim predicament had become the focus of Mawdudi’s 
life, and he increasingly looked to Islam for solutions and gradually adopted a 
revivalist approach. The result was the movement that Mawdudi’s followers regard as 
the heir to the tradition of Islamic tajdid [revival, renewal] and as its greatest 
manifestation in modern times. 
There were two basic Muslim positions in India during the interwar period. 
First, there were those Muslim intellectual and political leaders who supported the 
Congress Party, actively participated in its politics, and encouraged their fellow 
Muslims to do the same. They were fiercely anti-imperialist and viewed opposition to 
the British to be the foremost concern of their community. Secondly, there were those 
Muslim leaders, such as Muhammad Iqbal and Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), 
in the Muslim League, who did not view the struggle against the British to be the 
paramount concern of the Muslims and who remained apprehensive about living as a 
minority in a predominantly Hindu India. They believed that Muslims were best 
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advised to reassess their commitment to the Congress Party and to focus on 
safeguarding and furthering their communal interests before an uncertain future. 
Mawdudi articulated his views amid the lively and bitter debate between 
Jinnah and the Muslim supporters of the Congress Party. Some of Mawdudi’s 
expositions on the relation between religion, society, and politics were recorded in 
books on Muslim politics of the time. From 1937 to 1941, Mawdudi published in 
Tarjuman al-Qur’an a series of essays dealing with the political matters of India’s 
future independence and their implications for the Muslims. These essays were later 
printed in book form in the three volumes entitled Musulmanon awr Mawjudah 
Siyasi Kashmakash [Muslims and the Current Political Crisis], and in the volume 
Mas’alah-i qaumiyat [Question of +ationalism]. 
The particular source of Mawdudi’s apprehension was the stance of the Indian 
National Congress, which affirmed that all Indians constituted a single nation and that 
a future government in India had to be both democratic and secular. Echoing the 
thought of Muhammad Iqbal, Mawdudi simply did not believe that the Muslims of the 
subcontinent constituted one nation along with all other Indians. He insisted that the 
Muslims had an identity or nationality of their own which was Islam; they were 
bound together not by ties of race, geography, language, mutual interest, economics, 
or even culture, but by their commitment to follow the will of God in their lives. 
There were no claims which Muslims could raise against the British or anyone else on 
the basis of their common nationhood with other Indians; he stated quite 
unequivocally, in fact, that Islam was the polar opposite of nationalism and all that 
nationalism stood for. 
Within a united India, where all were Indians together, it would be construed 
as traitorous for Muslims to attempt to maintain their peculiar identity and sense of 
nationality. They would, in fact, be constrained to accept and manifest the identity of 
the Hindu majority. Although Mawdudi shared the desire of other Indians for freedom 
from British rule, independence from the British was not worthwhile in itself if the 
Indian Muslims were to exchange servitude to outsiders for servitude to the majority 
within their own country. Hence, he urged the Muslims not to participate in t
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freedom struggle being led by the Indian National Congress and its nationalist 
Muslim supporters. 
Mawdudi’s criticism and fear of democracy echoed a similar line of thinking. 
Democracy, he believed, was the kind of government in which the majority rules 
whether its views be right or wrong, and in which a minority may hope to have a 
voice in affairs only by transforming itself into the majority. No guarantees of rights 
or other safeguards that might be built into a democratic constitution could truly 
protect a minority in a democratic polity. Democracy, when reduced to its bare bones, 
amounted only to the tyranny of the majority. Since the Muslims were clearly a 
minority in India and likely to always remain so, the creation of democratic 
institutions in the country would be nothing less than a deadly poison for them, one 
that would destroy their culture, take away their identity, and finally force them even 
to give up their religion. He was not in favour of secular nationalism; however, this 
did not mean that he was oblivious to nationalist sentiments and arguments, or 
uninfluenced by the nationalist paradigm. For him, anti-imperialism would only make 
sense in an Islamic milieu, and he also firmly opposed the suggestion that the 
Congress Party represented Muslim interests, or that it could do so in a future Indian 
Republic. He was particularly sensitive to any suggestion that it was religiously 
incumbent upon Muslims to support the Congress Party in its struggle to free India 
from the clutches of British rule. This soon led Mawdudi into a heated debate with 
senior Indian ‘ulama who supported the Congress Party and who were bent on using 
Islam to mobilize support for the independence movement. 
In 1937, the Jamia’at-i ‘Ulama-i Hind, an organization founded in 1919 and 
led by Mawlana Husain Ahmad Madani (1879-1957), the renowned Indian Islamic 
leader, also head of the Dar ul-Ulum Deoband, was split with a faction which was 
supportive of the Muslim League’s demands, originating the Jamia’at-i ‘Ulama-i 
Islam, led by Shabbir Ahmad Usmani (1886-1949). In 1938, Madani wrote Islam awr 
mutahhadih qaumiyat [Islam and Composite +ationalism]277. In this book, Madani, 
who had spent some time in British jails between 1914 and 1917, depicted a 
multicommunal Indian state that would be compatible with the teachings of Islam, 
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and laid out in systematic form the positions that the author had taken in speeches and 
letters from the early 1920s on the question of nationalism as well as other related 
issues of national importance. Using various verses from the Qur’an, Madani, with 
his book, aimed at opposing the divisive policy of Muhammad Iqbal, Muhammad ‘Ali 
Jinnah and the Muslim League, dealing mainly with two aspects: the meaning of the 
term Qaum and how it was distinct from the term millat, and the crucial distinction 
between those two words and their true meanings in the Qur’an and the Hadiths. By 
proposing “composite nationalism”, this book strongly argued that despite cultural, 
linguistic and religious differences, the people of India were but one nation, and, 
according to the author, any effort to divide Indians on the basis of religion, caste, 
culture, ethnicity and language was a manouver of the ruling power. 
Mawdudi reacted strongly, attacking Madani in public speeches and in a 
number of tracts. Madani’s book, along with the Congress Party’s direct appeal to 
Muslims through such measures as the “mass contact movement,” which was directed 
at taking the Congress Party’s message to the Muslim masses and recruiting larger 
numbers of Muslims into the party, convinced Mawdudi that the first order of 
business was to close off the Muslim community to the Congress Party, articulating 
an Islamist ideology from that point on in order to preclude the possibility of a 
“composite nationalism.” 
Islamism, for Mawdudi, was the assertion of the Muslim community’s 
prerogative to determine the limits of individual moral behaviour and define the 
nature of a Muslim’s relation to Islam. But more importantly, and as a result, it was 
the means to create impregnable walls around the Muslim community. By interpreting 
Islam as an ideology for a vigilant community that emphasized puritanism, the 
external dimensions of the faith, and strict obedience to Islamic law, and by 
discouraging those customs and rituals that resembled Hindu practices or could serve 
as a bridge to Hinduism, Mawdudi moved to change the cultural milieu of Indian 
Islam, as well as the context in which Muslims were encountering the political 
choices before them. As the balance of relations between Muslims and Hindus would 
change at the national level and in neighbourhoods, towns, and villages, “composite 
nationalism” would cease to be a viable option. In the process, the resurgence of 
Islamic sentiments, as interpreted by Mawdudi, would lay the foundations for 
 165 
 
organization building and political activism. His conception of the revival (tajdid) and 
reform (islah) of Islam, therefore, was at its inception tantamount to radical 
communalism. Mawdudi’s vision was not anti-state or anti-imperialist per se - at least 
not at first - but it aimed at stymieing the progress of the Congress Party and the 
political ascendancy of the Hindu community. Those whom he viewed as “traitors” to 
the cause of Islam were not only secular or modernist Muslims but were the 
spokesmen of orthodoxy, i.e., the ‘ulama. 
The notion of “treason”, here, was not related to the faith, but to the communal 
interests of Muslims. Nor was Mawdudi’s conception of Islam driven by the yearning 
for an improbable utopia; it had a clear aim and a definite functional use. Mawdudi’s 
vision unfolded in the context of rapid polarization of the Muslim community. 
Following the Government of India Act of 1935 and the elections of 1937, the 
Congress began to make serious overtures to Muslims. Some were enticed into 
serving as junior partners to the Congress, thus acknowledging Hindu political 
ascendancy. Others in the Muslim League, under the leadership of Muhammad ‘Ali 
Jinnah, took the opposite course in the 1940s and demanded a separate state for 
Muslims, a demand embodied in the Lahore Resolution of 1940. Mawdudi did not 
join either party, choosing instead to form his own organization, the Jama’at-e-Islami. 
He started with the premise that Muslims should return to a pure and unadulterated 
Islam to brace themselves for the struggle before them. They should reject Hindu 
ascendancy and continue to lay claim to the whole of India. He was especially 
disturbed by those Muslims who were willing to accommodate Hindus, and saw their 
support of the Congress Party as acquiescing in the inevitability of a Hindu raj. His 
most venomous rhetoric was reserved for them. Irredentist as Mawdudi’s views may 
have appeared, they were communalist in form and content. Hence, his revivalist 
exhortations did not preclude an endorsement of the “two nation theory.” The struggle 
had to defend Muslim communalist interests in India and to preserve Muslim identity 
in the face of imminent Hindu challenges. But first Mawdudi had to vanquish the 
Muslim League, which he believed to be the sole impediment to his control of 
Muslim communal politics.278 
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As the creation of Pakistan became more and more likely, Mawdudi’s 
polemical attacks on the Muslim League also increased. He objected to the idea of 
Muslim nationalism because it would exclude Islam from India and surrender the 
domain of the Mughals to the Hindus, which would make the eventual extinction of 
Islam all the easier. The increasingly communal character of the Indian politics of the 
time, and the appeal made to religious symbols in the formulation of new political 
alliances and programmes by various Muslim groups as well as Muslim League 
leaders, created a climate in which Mawdudi’s theological discourse found 
understanding and relevance. 
 
IV.2. The Jama’at-e-Islami (1941-1947) 
Although predicated upon secular ideologies, the Pakistan movement was able 
to mobilize the masses only by appealing to Islam. Nationalism thereby became 
dependent on Islam and as a result politicized the faith. A number of Muslim religious 
and communal organizations, some of which remained nothing more than proposals, 
pointed to the importance of organizations for promoting Muslim political 
consciousness and communal interests. The Jama‘at emerged as part of this general 
organization of Muslim activism, which by the early 1940s had become the accepted 
channel for the expression of Muslim political sentiments. Rivalry with the Muslim 
League escalated with each step India took toward partition. 
After the 1937’s defeat of the Muslim League at the polls, Mawdudi’s thinking 
took an increasingly communalist turn, and following the Lahore Resolution of 1940, 
when the League committed itself to Pakistan, the Jama‘at was born as the “counter-
League.” Mawdudi’s response to the Lahore Resolution of 1940, which called for the 
establishment of autonomous states in the Muslim majority areas of the subcontinent, 
was to launch the work of Islamic reform into a new phase, and in 1941 the Jama’at-
e-Islami was founded, and headed by Mawdudi for thirty-one years (1941-1972). 
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Mawdudi characterized the period between the founding of the organization in 
1941 and partition of India in 1947 as the time of “organising and training”279. He had 
originally entered the political fray with the aim of halting the rise of Hindu power 
and converting the whole of India to Islam, in order to end forever the uncertainty of 
the Muslim place in the polyglot culture of India, but by 1940 Mawdudi had accepted 
the inevitability of some form of partition of the Subcontinent. He therefore shifted 
his attention away from the Congress party and toward the Muslim League and its 
communalist program. Mawdudi’s opposition to the League from this point had 
nothing to do with Jinnah’s calling for Muslim autonomy, and Mawdudi had simply 
decided that he should be the one to found and lead the Muslim state of Pakistan if 
there had to be one. 
As India moved closer to partition, Mawdudi’s political thinking became 
increasingly clear regarding the polity which he envisioned. He had to position 
himself to dominate the debate over Pakistan, and to do that he needed the Muslim 
League’s power and prominence, for he distrusted Jinnah’s intentions and even more 
the secularist inclinations of the League’s program. For Muhammad ‘Ali Jinnah, 
people in Pakistan would be free, free to go to temples, to mosques or to any other 
place of worship. The State would not have nothing to do with the religion or caste or 
creed of the citizens, who would be equals of one State: “Now I think we should keep 
that in front of us as our ideal and you will find that in course of time Hindus would 
cease to be Hindus and Muslims would cease to be Muslims, not in the religious 
sense, because that is the personal faith of each individual, but in the political sense as 
citizens of the State”.280 
The fate of Islam in Kemalist Turkey and Pahlavi Iran had no doubt served as 
a warning to Mawdudi and to those other Muslims whose rationale for a separate 
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Muslim state was the promise that it would preserve Islam in the Subcontinent. 
Increasingly, Mawdudi reacted directly to the Muslim League’s policies, and to its 
conception of what Pakistan was to be; these were the subject of his strongest attacks, 
denouncing nationalism and berating secular politics as disbelief (kufr). In 1947, 
following partition, Mawdudi was escorted to safety after violence broke out in the 
Gurdaspur District of Punjab, where the Jama’at was based, and was taken to Lahore 
by units of the Pakistani army. Mawdudi now demanded an Islamic state where he 
had once dreamed of an Islamic empire. His programme was no longer to save Islam 
in India but to have it conquer Pakistan. 
Mawdudi’s interpretive reading of Islam and its history began with 
denunciation of traditional Islam and its centuries-old institutions. He argued that 
Islam had no possibility of success as a religion or a civilization - which he argued 
was meant to be its fate and the reason for its revelation - unless Muslims removed the 
encumbrances of cultural accretion and tradition, rigorously reconstructed the pristine 
faith of the Prophet, and gained power. Politics was declared to be an integral and 
inseparable component of the Islamic faith, and the “Islamic state” which Muslim 
political action sought to erect was viewed as the panacea to all problems facing 
Muslims. As Mawdudi systematically mixed religion with politics, faith with social 
action, he streamlined the Islamic faith so that it could accommodate its newfound 
aim. He reinterpreted concepts and symbols, giving them new meanings and 
connotations. This allowed him to set down a political reading of Islam, in which 
religious piety was transformed into a structure of authority. Faith became ideology 
and religious works became social action. 
The resulting “system”, which Mawdudi referred to as din (literally, 
“religion”), defined piety. This perspective was enunciated ever more lucidly over the 
years and was gradually extended to incorporate the structure of Islamic faith. It was 
applied to every aspect of Islamic thought and practice, producing a comprehensive 
interpretative reading of Islam. In the hands of Mawdudi the transformation of Islam 
into ideology was complete. Mawdudi’s formulation was by no means rooted in 
traditional Islam. He adopted modern ideas and values, mechanisms, procedures, and 
idioms, weaving them into an Islamic fabric, thus producing an internally consistent 
and yet hybrid ideological perspective. Mawdudi’s vision was not modern through 
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and through, but purported to modernity; he sought not to resurrect an atavistic order 
but to modernize the traditional conception of Islamic thought and life. His vision 
represented a clear break with Islamic tradition and a fundamentally new reading of 
Islam which took its cue from modern thought.281 
Mawdudi’s vision was the product of a discourse with the “other,” the West. 
His perspective was formed in response to greater Hindu ascendancy in Indian politics 
of the interwar period. However, for Muslims to mobilize their resources to confront 
the Hindu challenge, argued Mawdudi, they had to free their souls from Western 
influence. Hence, Mawdudi’s discourse, although motivated by the Hindu challenge, 
was directed at the West. His ideology showed modernist tendencies, as did his 
political outlook. He premised his reading of religion and society on a dialectic view 
of history, in which the struggle between Islam and disbelief (kufr) ultimately 
culminates in a revolutionary struggle. The Jama’at was to be the vanguard of that 
struggle, which would produce an Islamic utopia. In a similar vein, its views on 
government, as well as on the party’s own operations, also confirmed Mawdudi’s 
break with Islamic tradition, while the terms “revolution,” “vanguard,” “ideology,” 
“democratic caliphate,” and “theodemocracy,” which turned up over and over in his 
polemic and defined the Jama’at’s agenda, attested to his modernism. His ideological 
perspective was openly hostile to both capitalism and socialism. Capitalism was 
denounced for its secularism, anthropocentrism, and association with the imperialist 
culture which had marginalized Muslims in India, and socialism for its atheism and its 
worship of society in place of God. Above all, both capitalism and socialism were 
seen as rivals which had to be defeated before Islam could dominate the life and 
thought of Muslims. In practice, however, Mawdudi always remained more wary of 
socialism than capitalism.282 
Ideology compelled action, which in Pakistan assumed the form of demanding 
an Islamic state. The Jama’at demanded a government inspired by and obedient to the 
writ of the Shari’a and which would promise a utopian order that gave direction to 
“Islamic” social action. For the Jama’at that state would be erected according to rules 
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and procedures stipulated by Mawdudi. Social action, however, did not imply 
revolution as the term is understood in the West. Mawdudi believed in incremental 
change rather than in radical ruptures. He did not subscribe to class war or disparaged 
violence as a political tool, and assumed that Islamic revolution would be heralded not 
by the masses but by the society’s leaders. Revolution, in Mawdudi’s view, did not 
erupt from the bottom up but flowed from the top of society down. The aim of Islamic 
revolution, therefore, was not to spearhead the struggle of the underclass but to 
convert society’s leaders. His notions of social action therefore had peculiar meanings 
and aims. 
Mawdudi’s perception of himself as the only leader capable of delivering 
Muslims from their predicament became increasingly more pronounced. He 
harboured ambitions to lead Indian Muslims as a scholar, renewer of the faith, and 
supreme political leader. His insistence on distributing his works far and wide in this 
period was part of an effort to establish his claim to the leadership of the Muslims. In 
Mawdudi’s writings the term employed to translate “secular” (la dini) in fact literally 
means “religionless”, although it should be evident that a religionless social system 
would be anathema to him. Theoretically, in a secular system, the government would 
adopt a neutral attitude towards all religious groups, treating them equally. What 
would actually occur, according to Mawdudi, was that the government would be 
secularist only toward the minority religious groups, neither helping nor restraining 
them, but it would be necessarily partisan toward the religion of the majority. 
Congress secularism, he believed to be based on Gandhi’s teachings about tolerance 
toward all other religions, was nothing but a drawing out of the implications of a 
specifically Hindu point of view. Congress policy would, therefore, result in the 
imposition of Gandhi’s religious views on the whole of India. Mawdudi’s answer to 
the situation of the Muslims in India was that they should become better Muslims. As 
the result of that very process they would achieve organization, discipline, and social 
effectiveness, enabling them to transform the whole of India into Dar al-Islam. 
While at an earlier time Mawdudi seemed to have in mind an all-Indian scale, 
by the time he settled in Lahore in 1939 he believed that the social and political 
ascendancy of the Hindus in India was irreversible. As idealistic as he may have been, 
by the late 1930s even he could see that the dream of converting the whole of India to 
 171 
 
Islam no longer seemed possible. For that reason Mawdudi increasingly succumbed to 
the communalist feelings that had all along influenced his turn to revivalism and 
political activism. If he was opposed to Congress’s secular nationalism - aimed at 
gaining independence for India - it was primarily because he was a Muslim 
communalist at heart. For Mawdudi, secular nationalism was a threat to 
communalism, and only for that reason did it feature in his ideological demonology, 
since secular nationalism meant Congress rule: a “Hindu Raj” in Mawdudi’s words. 
In 1938, in a lengthy article in Tarjumanu’l-Qur’an, Mawdudi wrote that 
Nehru’s promises of scientific progress and nationalist democracy would be 
“tantamount to the extinction of Islam, and hence Muslims.” In the same article 
Mawdudi systematically attacked the Congress’s position on secular nationalism and 
democracy as unworkable and detrimental to the interests of Indian Muslims. In its 
place he offered two “two-nation” schemes of his own, proposing a state within a 
state (riyasat dar riyasat) which echoed Muhammad Iqbal’s demand for a “Muslim 
India within India.” He then offered plans that would preserve the territorial integrity 
of India and still give Muslims substantial communal autonomy. The first plan 
favoured dividing India into two “culturally autonomous” democratic entities, which 
would form the “international federation” of India with a constitution similar to those 
of “Switzerland, Australia, or the United States”.283 
The constituent entities would be equal partners in running the state, would 
have distinct boundaries, and would be sovereign in their internal affairs, with the 
power to formulate and implement their own laws. For matters pertaining to the state 
as a whole, such as the formulation of its confederate constitution, a constituent 
assembly would be formed, the members of which would be chosen through elections 
based on proportional representation. Should the first plan not prove popular, 
Mawdudi devised a second one, in which India would again be reorganized along 
confederate lines, this time with fourteen territories, thirteen of which - Ajmer, 
Awadh, Baluchistan, East Bengal, Bhopal, Delhi, Hyderabad, Jawrah, Junagadh, 
North-West Frontier Province, North and West Punjab, Sind, and Tonk - would be 
awarded to Muslims, and a single large fourteen would be Hindu. The thirteen were 
“justly” suggested by Sayyid Abdul Latif (1891-1971) whom Mawdudi lauded for the 
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plan’s wisdom in redrawing the map of India along communal lines. Twenty-five 
years would be allotted for exchanging populations between the thirteen territories 
and their Hindu neighbour. The fourteen territories would be bound by an Indian 
confederacy, but would enjoy sovereignty over their internal affairs.284 
These plans clearly underscored Mawdudi’s communalist inclinations, but still 
in an Indian framework. But that would not be the case for long. Even at the end of 
this revealing article he wrote that if the second plan too was rejected, Muslims would 
“have no choice but to demand a completely autonomous unit, tied together [with its 
Hindu counterpart] only for defence, communications, and trade,” an idea which was 
not too distant from what the Congress, the Muslim League, and the viceroy were 
debating at the time. These ideas of Indian confederacy, however, increasingly gave 
way to sober realization of the fractious direction in which Indian politics were 
heading. Mawdudi, like most Muslim communalists, began to feel the constraint of 
the narrowing range of options before him. When asked in 1938–1939 about his 
choice of the title Dar al-Islam for his project in Pathankot, Mawdudi explained “it 
means only a Muslim cultural home and not a Muslim state, but if God wills it, the 
two may become one.”285 
By Muslim state, he no longer meant the entirety of India, for he had left 
South India two years earlier, having concluded that there was no future for Muslims 
in that region. It was following the elections of 1937, when Indians were given limited 
self-government, and over the course of the following decade that, like many of his 
coreligionists who resided in Muslim minority provinces, Mawdudi, too, began to 
succumb to the temptation of secessionism. As his dream of an “Islamic India” was 
shattered by harsh realities, talk of converting the whole of India to Islam gave way to 
talk of an “Islamic state” in a separate Muslim territory. From this point on, the 
Jama’at’s relations with the Muslim League became more complex, marked by both 
competition and concord. Beyond the rivalry which characterized the relations 
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between the two, the basis for a symbiotic relationship, anchored in their shared 
communal outlook, also emerged during this period. 
The Jama’at-e-Islami was founded on the idea of the Umma as an 
unadulterated and exclusive embodiment of the vision of Islam that would preclude 
cultural coexistence with Hindus. The party would serve as a vehicle for propagating 
this vision, and hence control Muslim politics of the time. Echoes of this original 
intent are clearly reflected in the subsequent development of Mawdudi’s discourse. 
The communalist directive couched in universalist rhetoric, whereby the quest for 
Umma serves to define a community separate from Indian society in national terms 
rather than purely theological ones, which made Mawdudi’s ideology ineluctably tied 
to questions of nationhood, separatism, sovereignty, territorial borders, and how these 
may be related to “Muslimness.” Still, the ideal of the Umma was significant in itself. 
No sooner had the Jama’at formed than Mawdudi established a bureau 
charged with translating his works into Arabic. Persian and Turkish translations soon 
followed. Clearly, Mawdudi felt a unity of purpose with Arab, Persian, and Turkish 
Muslims and viewed the Jama’at’s activities and his own ideas as relevant to their 
lives and causes. This universalist outlook was instilled in the Jama’at and became 
part of its mission. In time, the translation efforts entrenched the Universalist image of 
the party, as they promoted Mawdudi as an international Islamic thinker whose ideas 
had been instrumental in shaping Islamism across the Muslim world. The interplay of 
universalism and nationalism made Mawdudi’s position on international affairs quite 
complex and at times obfuscated its direction. At the utopian level, Mawdudi’s 
ideology was pan-Islamic in tone and intent, committed to the universalism of the 
Umma. In practice, however, it operated in the communalist and nationalist milieu 
from which Mawdudi’s political vision drew inspiration, and in which his 
organization and programme of action took shape. Western ideologies were important 
influences on Mawdudi’s thinking on international affairs. Mawdudi was always keen 
to compare Islam with socialism and capitalism rather than with Christianity, attesting 
not only to the fact that he saw Islam as a socio-political system and an ideology, but 
that he was preoccupied by Western political and institutional values and ideals. 
Mawdudi’s discourse, much like that of other Islamist thinkers, displays distrust and 
hostility toward the West, which was viewed as an evil force determined to destroy 
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Islam and subjugate Muslims politically and culturally. As a result, Mawdudi was 
eager not only to empower Muslims politically but to safeguard their cultural 
autonomy. Anti-Westernism largely defined Mawdudi’s understanding of modern 
international relations; nevertheless, his stance on the relations between Islam and the 
West was also informed by more nuanced thinking.286 
Like Hassan al-Banna (1906-1949), founder of the Muslim Brotherhood in 
Egypt, Mawdudi considered the Muslim societies as being dependent on the West, 
politically weak, and culturally adrift. Both in their early years had been anti-colonial 
nationalists who turned to religious revivalism to restore the Muslim community at 
home and universally. They drew on the example and concerns both of eighteenth-
century Islamic revivalist movements like the Wahhabi and nineteenth- and twentieth-
century Islamic modernist predecessors for their critique of Muslim society. They did 
not simply retreat to the past but instead provided Islamic responses, ideological and 
organizational, to modern society. They appropriated and reapplied the vision and 
logic of the revivalist tradition in Islam to the socio-historical conditions of twentieth-
century Muslim society, reinterpreting Islamic sources and beliefs to address modern 
realities. Yet they distinguished their method from that of Islamic modernism, which 
they equated with the “Westernization of Islam”. If Islamic modernists legitimated the 
adoption of Western ideas and institutions by maintaining their compatibility with 
Islam, al-Banna and Mawdudi sought to produce a new synthesis which began with 
Islamic sources and found either Islamic equivalents or Islamic sources for notions of 
government accountability, legal change, popular participation, and educational 
reform. Both shared a common anti-imperialist view of the West, which they believed 
was not only a political and economic but also a cultural threat to Muslim societies. 
Westernization was a threat to the very identity, independence, and way of life of 
Muslims, and the religious-cultural penetration of the West (education, law, customs, 
values) were far more pernicious in the long run than political intervention, since it 
threatened the very identity and survival of the Muslim community. For them, Islam 
was self-sufficient, an all-encompassing way of life, an ideological alternative to 
Western Capitalism and Marxism, and though hostile to Westernization, they were 
not against modernization. Both engaged in modern organization and institution 
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building, provided educational and social welfare services, and used modern 
technology and mass communications to spread their message and to mobilize 
popular support. Mawdudi wrote extensively and systematically, attempting to 
demonstrate the comprehensive relevance of Islam to all aspects of life. The range of 
his topics reflected his holistic vision: Islam and the state, economics, education, 
revolution, women. Their message, though rooted in Islamic revelation and sources, 
was clearly written for a twentieth-century audience, addressing the problems of 
modernity, analyzing the relationship of Islam to nationalism, democracy, Capitalism, 
Marxism, modern banking, education, law, women and work, Zionism, and 
international relations.287 
When India was partitioned in 1947, the Jama’at-e-Islami was also divided 
into separate Pakistani and Indian (and Kashmiri) units, sharing Mawdudi’s ideology 
but working through independent organizational structures defined in terms of the 
national polity in which they operated. Mawdudi justified this move by arguing that 
each organization would face different political realities under separate national 
circumstances and could not be caught in the middle of conflicts between Pakistan 
and India. By giving up his leadership of the Indian Jama’at-e-Islami and breaking 
the embryonic Umma along national lines, Mawdudi effectively surrendered the ideal 
of the Umma to the reality of the developing nation-state order in the region. In later 
years, new Jama’at-e-Islamis would emerge in Sri Lanka and Bangladesh, again 
independent of one another and of the Indian and Pakistani units. 
                                                           
287 ESPOSITO, 1999: pp. 129-135. 
 176 
 
IV.3. Analysis of The Islamic Law and Constitution288 
If we exclude the “Preface”, by the author, the “Introduction”, by Khurshid 
Ahmad, editor and translator, and the six “Appendices”, this work is divided in two 
parts, “Aspects of Islamic Law” (three chapters), and “Political and Constitutional 
Thought of Islam” (seven chapters), corresponding to conferences and articles that the 
author gave and wrote through many years, and which are: “The Islamic Law” (06 
January 1948), “Legislation and Ijtihad in Islam” (January 1958), “How to Introduce 
Islamic Law in Pakistan?” (19 February 1948), “Political Theory of Islam” (October 
1939), “Political Concepts of the Qur’an” (a synthesis of his thought as developed in 
the work Tafhim al-Qur’an [Commentary to the Qur’an], which the author started to 
write in 1942, and was published in six volumes between 1951 and 1972), “First 
Principles of the Islamic State” (November 1952), “Fundamentals of Islamic 
Constitution” (November 1952), “Rights of Non-Muslims in Islamic State” (August 
1948), “The Problem of Electorate” (1955), “Some Constitutional Proposals” (August 
1952). 
Having in mind the scope of this research, the analysis will mainly be on 
“Political Theory of Islam” (October 1939)289, “The Islamic Law” (06 January 
1948)290, and “Rights of Non-Muslims in Islamic State” (August 1948)291, where the 
author establishes the basis of his thought on what should be an Islamic State and 
which he repeated and developed in other texts written throughout his life. The other 
texts, as well the “Appendices”, deal mainly with the problems of elaborating a 
Constitution for Pakistan, a process which went on between 1952 and 1956, which is 
clearly outside of this research’s scope. 
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IV.3.1. Principles, institutions and characteristics of an Islamic State 
The need and justification for an Islamic state, for Mawdudi, followed from 
the nature of the universal order. The Islamic state, therefore, was part of a broad, 
integrated theology whose cardinal principle was the sovereignty of nature’s creative 
Lord. There was, Mawdudi reasoned, basing himself on the Qur’an as well as on his 
own observation, a law that governed everything that existed. That law was nothing 
other than the will of the Creator, who ordained that things should be as they were, 
that the heaven should be above the earth, the night should follow the day, and so 
forth. Most of nature - all of it, in fact, except the human race and even here only in 
respect to some social and moral matters - necessarily conformed to the divine law. 
Some men might entertain the illusion of their own independence, but there was no 
independence; all in reality was ruled by God.292 
In this sense the natural order respects the divine will, obeys it, and may for 
that reason be said to be Muslim, i.e., practice Islam, or in other words to be among 
those who submit themselves to the overlordship of God. It was not necessarily so 
with men, however, who alone among all creation had been endowed with free will or 
the capacity to choose whether, in their behaviour, they should follow the will of their 
creator or not.293 
For Mawdudi, an Islamic state was to be an effective tool of realizing the 
objectives set by Islam, which, from Mawdudi’s viewpoint, was a comprehensive 
reform programme consisting in propagating virtue and obliterating vice. The State 
was the instrument and relevant power to eradicate evils from society and establish an 
order conducive to human-welfare.294 
Mawdudi argued that all worldviews could be characterised by one of two 
different and mutually opposing basic attitudes: one accepting God as the Sovereign 
and Law-Giver, the other of defiance and rebellion against God. For him, Islam, as a 
worldview, delineated the nature of God, man and his place in the universe, the way 
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universe was created, shaped and organised, the modes of human behaviour in a 
social set up and its broader relationship within the cosmic order.295 
The Islamic state was based upon four principles: 1) recognition of the 
sovereignty of God; 2) authority of the Prophet; 3) the state was the vicegerent of 
God; and 4) the state had to conduct its affairs by mutual consultation (shura) among 
all the Muslims. 
The first principle of the Islamic state was its recognition of the sovereignty of 
God. The practical meaning of this recognition was that God, and not man, was the 
source of law in a Muslim society. God had to be the legal sovereign as well as the 
Lord of Nature. No man, therefore, should be allowed to pass down orders in his own 
right, and no one should be obligated to obey such orders if they were given, for the 
prerogative of command belonged only to God.296 
For Mawdudi, no individual, even a king, nor any class or group of people, nor 
the state, nor even the people as a whole, had the right to make law. God was the 
unique lawgiver and authority. There could be no legislation independent of God’s 
will in the Islamic state, and no one could change what God had decreed. The Qur’an 
denied the right of men to exercise any discretion in matters decided by God and the 
Prophet. The Islamic state had, therefore, to be founded on God’s law as delivered 
through the Prophet. Prescriptions or proscriptions laid down by rulers or 
governments would bear authority and be legitimate only to the extent that they rested 
directly upon what God had decreed, or followed from it. If a government disregarded 
the law revealed by God, its authority would not be binding upon Muslims.297 
Mawdudi acknowledged that the concept of sovereignty was difficult to 
comprehend and that it had caused great confusion for political theorists. Sovereignty 
was, he said, “the most disputed issue of political science”. The entire problem arose, 
however, because men tried to locate sovereignty in the wrong place: “the political 
philosophers have tried to place the cap of sovereignty on man, a being for whom it 
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was never intended and whom it, therefore, never fit”.298 True sovereignty could be 
ascribed only to God who was Creator, Sustainer, and Ruler of the universe. Basing 
himself on an analysis and interpretation of two words used for God in the Qur’an, 
rabb (Lord) and ilah (master and lawgiver), Mawdudi traced the root cause of most 
human misery and calamity to the tendency of men to dominate over other men, either 
by claiming themselves to be rabbs and ilahs or by investing objects, idols, political 
parties, nations, ideologies, etc. with the qualities of rabb or ilah and then 
manipulating the credulity of other men for their own purposes.299 
These problems, both the theoretical issues and the evil consequences of 
misconceived sovereignty, were obviated in the Islamic state by the state’s 
uncompromising submission to the sovereignty of God. Every issue of law in an 
Islamic polity had to be referred back to the will of God by reference to the Qur’an 
and the Sunna as the ultimate authorities. Thus, the basic source of everything the 
state would do was the divine will, and in this sense God was the only lawgiver. 
The second basic principle of the Islamic state, for Mawdudi, was the 
authority of the Prophet. Mawdudi considered that since the prophetic and personal 
status were enjoyed by the same being, they were likely to be overlapping and 
indistinguishable, and the prophets enjoyed perpetual contact and divine guidance, 
making them object of emulation. The Prophets, all of them, were representatives of 
God, and in that capacity they exercised the political and legal sovereignty of God 
Himself.300 They were entitled to the obedience of those who had pledged themselves 
to accept the sovereignty of God. “Whoso obeys the Messenger obeys Allah”, 
declared the Qur’an (4:80). This role of the prophets was the basis for Muhammad’s 
Sunna being considered one of the ultimate bases of law.301 
The third basic principle of the Islamic state was its status as the vicegerent of 
God. The state did not make or enforce law in its own name but acted as the agent of 
its suzerain. Again, the basis for this principle was Qur’anic, found in Sura 24:55 
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where God spoke of appointing caliphs or vicegerents in the earth. An Islamic state 
should properly, therefore, be called a caliphate for such was its nature. At the 
mundane level, when it was considered alongside other states in the world, the Islamic 
state might be called a sovereign state because it exercised authority within the 
territory that it controlled. This sovereignty, however, did not extend to disregard the 
law of God and gave it no ability either to change that law or to go beyond it. Further, 
the Qur’an vested vicegerency in the entire Muslim citizenry of the Islamic state. The 
right to rule belonged to the whole community of believers. There was no reservation 
or special prerogative in favour of any particular individual, family, clan, or class. 
Such a society could not tolerate class divisions, and it would not permit disabilities 
for citizens on the basis of birth, social status, or profession.302 Instead, it had to give 
unrestricted scope for personal achievement, always, of course, within the limits 
prescribed by God. Neither was there any room for the dictatorship of one individual 
or a group of persons. 
The key official in an Islamic state was its head or leader, who was called 
Imam, Caliph, or Amir. His was the major responsibility for the conduct of the state, 
and he was the real locus of power303 since he acted as khalifah or representative of 
God on earth, on the one hand, and as representative of the Muslim people, on the 
other. The ruler did not hold his position in his own right or because of the claims of 
his family or tribe to special status but rather as trustee of the divine law and the 
community’s affairs. In consequence, there were limitations on his powers and his 
actions. He had, first of all, to act according to the dictates of the Shari’a, and enjoy 
physical strength for the enormous burden he had to bear. The Islamic state would 
have neither political parties nor a political opposition; its policies would be 
calculated to meet the real needs of the population and to keep it satisfied. Hence, 
there would be no reason for elections at regular intervals or for a change of 
administration. In accordance with the general principle, that government had to be 
managed through mutual consultation, the ruler was to be selected, appointed, or 
elected (all three words are used) through a consultative process. Mawdudi asserted 
that Islam did not limit the scope of its possibilities by attempting to lay down exactly 
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how the choice of leader would be made. Different methods may be appropriate to 
different times and circumstances as was evidenced by the lack of uniformity in the 
ways of deciding the succession of the first four caliphs after the death of the Prophet. 
What was important was that the ruler chosen should have the full confidence of the 
nation, and this would happen so long as three principles were observed: 1) the choice 
of the head of state should depend on the general will with no one having the right to 
impose himself by force as ruler; 2) no clan or class should have a monopoly of 
rulership; and 3) the selection should be made without coercion.304 
As for qualifications of the ruler, they had principally to do with his moral and 
religious character. The object of the selection process in the Islamic state was to find 
the best man for the task. By “best” Mawdudi meant not only the person most 
knowledgeable of affairs of state and most capable of running them but also the 
person of most upright character and greatest piety. If personal devotion to Islam was 
basic for administrators of the state at large, it was doubly so for the ruler who held 
the reins that directed the entire social enterprise. For this reason, any person who 
actively sought an office of leadership, whether as ruler or as member of the 
legislative-cum-consultative body, was automatically disqualified from holding the 
post. The desire for public office represented a degree of greed and self-
aggrandizement in an individual that was incompatible with true fear of God or with 
trustworthiness of character. Thus, though the Islamic state might choose to elect its 
public officials, there could not be political campaigns or competitions for public 
favour; the personal characteristics of potential officials as well as the qualifications 
demanded of anyone holding office in an Islamic state would have to be made known 
through the agency of an Elections Commissioner or similar officer, not as a private 
undertaking. In legal terms the candidate for leadership had to meet four criteria: 1) be 
a Muslim; 2) be male; 3) be of adult age and sane; and 4) be a citizen of the Islamic 
state. These four, however, merely marked out the formal legal bounds to eligibility 
for the rulership of the Islamic society; far more important was the quality of the 
ruler’s commitment to Islam and the depth of his knowledge of what the Islamic 
system demanded. 
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Many of the considerations that governed the choice of a ruler also applied in 
the establishment of the legislative and consultative body which was among the basic 
institutions of the Islamic state. The purpose of the body was to carry out consultation 
about the affairs enjoined on Muslims. This body was chosen by some kind of 
reference to the general will, but the precise means was unspecified.305 In the time of 
the Four Rightly Guided Caliphs the consultative body was not elected, and Mawdudi 
attributed this fact to the circumstances of the time.306 The important thing about the 
selection process was that it should result in the choice of the best people by whatever 
means that result might be achieved. Like the ruler, the members of the Majlis-i-
Shura (Consultative Assembly), as this body was called, had to be trustworthy, good 
Muslims, male, adult, etc., and not active seekers of the office. 
In connection with a discussion of the scope of legislation in the Islamic state, 
Mawdudi went into the qualifications of members of the Majlis-i-Shura somewhat 
more fully. What was said there, presumably, may be understood also to apply to the 
Head of State, in a superlative degree. One who acted as representative of the Muslim 
nation in its legislature had, he said,307 first of all to have faith in the Shari’a and an 
absolute determination to observe it. He had also to have a good knowledge of the 
Arabic language in order to understand the Qur’an and to be able to derive the 
authentic Sunna. Sound insight into the Qur’an and the Sunna, both in respect to 
detailed injunctions and the general principles of the Shari’a was required. Also 
important was an acquaintance with the opinions and views of the mujtahidin (those 
who do ijtihad, experts in Islamic law) in previous generations. This Islamic 
knowledge, which was the foundation of all else, had to be balanced by a solid 
understanding of the problems of the time. But by far the most fundamental of all the 
qualifications for a legislator, however, was a commendable character and a record of 
good conduct, for laws made by corrupt individuals would not inspire confidence in 
people. Also of basic importance was the fact that members of the Majlis-i-Shura 
were not to be the hand-picked men of the ruler but rather persons who enjoyed the 
full confidence of the masses. 
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The function of the legislature was really that of law-finding, not of law-
making, and even that function was confined within quite strict limits.308 The 
legislation envisaged took four forms: 1) interpretation; 2) situations where the 
Shari’a had not laid down specific injunctions but had made provisions for analogous 
situations in which the same principles were in operation (qiyas); 3) inference from 
general principles to derive guidance for situations where the Shari’a had provided 
nothing specific; and 4) “province of independent legislation”, where the Shari’a was 
totally silent, or God had said nothing, having left it to the discretion and judgement 
of men to make the laws which they saw fit. The legislature or consultative body 
would be at the disposal of the ruler for him to consult, but in Mawdudi’s presentation 
of the matter its opinions and judgements were not binding either upon the ruler or the 
people of the Islamic state.309 
The ruler in an Islamic state was only one caliph or vicegerent of God among 
an entire community of caliphs, and he ruled only because the other caliphs had 
delegated their caliphate to him. He was answerable both to them, on the one hand, 
and to God, on the other, as indeed all individual Muslims were directly answerable to 
God. The ruler had to enforce the all-embracing divine law, but he could not 
legitimately go beyond its dictates to try to tell people what kind of dress they had to 
wear, what script they had to use when they wrote, or how they had to educate their 
children.310 His personal whims or preferences counted for nothing since he was but 
the agent of the agents of God on earth. Thus, “popular vicegerency” formed the basis 
of democracy in an Islamic state while “popular sovereignty” was its basis in a secular 
state.311 The practical meaning of this popular vicegerency was that the government of 
the Islamic state could be formed only with the consent of all the Muslims, or at least 
a majority of them, and could remain in office only so long as it continued to enjoy 
their confidence. 
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The fourth principle of the Islamic state was that it had to conduct its affairs by 
mutual consultation (shura) among all the Muslims. While Islam did not prescribe the 
institutional form in which consultation had to occur, leaving it to the community to 
devise the best and fairest means, as might suit the conditions of a particular time and 
place, it did insist that all people concerned in a decision had to be consulted, either 
directly or through their designated representatives whom they trusted. Further, this 
consultation should be completely free and impartial without duress of any kind; 
otherwise it was hardly to be considered a consultation at all. The rule of consultation 
applied, in the very first instance, to the choice of the head of state, and because 
consultation had to occur, there could be no question of dictatorship, monarchy, or 
despotism in the Islamic context. Another implication of consultation was to deprive 
the ruler under any circumstances of the right and the power to set aside the 
constitution at his own will, for had he that power, he would be virtually 
uncontrollable.312 
 
IV.3.2. The nature of an Islamic State as a theo-democracy 
For Mawdudi, the requirements that Islam laid down for mutual consultation 
and consent among the Muslims were the basis for the claim that the Islamic state was 
a democratic state. Mawdudi said that the most appropriate title for an Islamic State 
would be, perhaps, to call it the “Kingdom of God”, a notion that was rendered in 
English as “theocracy”. Nonetheless, Islamic theocracy was something altogether 
different from the theocracy of which “Europe had a bitter experience wherein a 
priestly class, sharply marked off from the rest of the population, exercises unchecked 
domination and enforces laws of its making in the name of God, thus virtually 
imposing its own divinity and godhood upon the common people. Such a system of 
government is satanic rather divine. Contrary to this, the theocracy built up by Islam 
is not ruled by any particular religious class but by [the] whole community of 
Muslims including the rank and file. The entire Muslim population runs the state in 
accordance with the Book of God and the practice of His Prophet. If I were permitted 
to coin a new term, I would describe this system of government as a ‘theo-
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democracy’, that is to say a divine democratic government, because under it the 
Muslims have been given a limited popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God”. 
This “theo-democracy”, for Mawdudi, was not to be compared with any other system 
of government that the world had ever known. It rested upon the twin principles of the 
sovereignty of God and the caliphate of man. It might be called theocratic in a sense 
because it based itself upon God’s command and would not depart from it. At the 
same time it was also democratic because it made every Muslim the agent for the 
realization of God’s will on earth and demanded their constant mutual consultation in 
the community. The Muslims, Mawdudi said, had a limited popular sovereignty, 
expressed principally in their right to depose the head of government and their right to 
express themselves on every public issue. All administrative matters and all questions 
about which no explicit injunction was to be found in the Shari’a were to be settled by 
the consensus of opinion among the Muslims. Every Muslim who was capable and 
qualified to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law was entitled to interpret 
the law of God when such interpretation became necessary: “In this sense the Islamic 
polity is a democracy”.313 
Among the numerous special characteristics that Mawdudi attributed to the 
Islamic state, two may be singled out for special consideration: the universal and all-
embracing nature of the state, and its ideological character. The purposes of an 
Islamic state were positive as well as negative, and the object of the state was not 
merely to prevent tyranny, to put a stop to evils of various sorts, and to protect its 
territory but, more fundamentally, to foster a balanced system of social justice and to 
encourage every kind of virtue. To accomplish these ends, political power was 
required, and they justified the state in using all of the means at its command, 
propaganda, public education, etc., for the task. A state with these purposes could not 
permit itself to ignore important segments of the lives of its people on the ground that 
they were beyond the scope of its authority. Its approach had necessarily to be all-
embracing and universal: “Its sphere of activity is co-extensive with human-life... In 
such a state no one can regard any field of his affairs as personal and private.”314 
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To sum up, the state was totalitarian, which Mawdudi saw as not just the 
state’s right but as its divinely ordained duty to exert control, based on proper moral 
and religious principles, over literally everything. To retreat from this position by 
permitting a large area of existence to remain beyond the state’s authority would be 
equivalent to denying God’s sovereignty over these excluded sections of life. In the 
controversy whether the best government was the least government or the most, 
Mawdudi was clearly on the side of those who favoured the maximum of government 
control. He admitted that there was a resemblance between the Islamic state which he 
described and the fascist and communist states of the modern world, in their mutual 
espousal of totalitarianism,315 but as in the case of good and bad democracy he 
distinguished between good and bad totalitarianism. 
Islamic totalitarianism, he assured his readers, did not suppress individual 
liberties just as the limitations placed on popular sovereignty by Islam did not 
suppress human freedom but rather protected it. There also could be no hint of 
dictatorship in the Islamic state; it would, presumably, be a totalitarian theo-
democracy. In comparison with the democratic states with their emphasis upon 
freedom on the one hand and the modern totalitarian states with the suppression of the 
individual on the other, Islam represented a balanced middle way that captured for 
itself the virtues of both of these extreme expressions of the political order, while at 
the same time avoiding their excesses and shortcomings.316 
Individual liberties, it would appear, had to do with such things as styles of 
dress, the script to be used, the modes of children’s education, already mentioned 
above in connection with the limitations on the powers of the ruler. Or, alternatively, 
they could fall within the great category of acts which, in Islamic law, were classified 
as neutral or permitted, neither mandatory, recommended, hateful, nor forbidden; the 
neutral type of acts was by far the largest category of all. 
In connection with the rights of citizens, Mawdudi also indicated some other 
restrictions on the power of the totalitarian state: it could not deprive its citizens of 
life, honour, or property, unless Islamic law specifically justified it doing so; it could 
                                                           
315 MAUDUDI, 1960: p. 146. 
 
316 MAUDUDI, 1960: p. 152. 
 187 
 
not deprive anyone of personal liberty in the sense of incarcerating him without a just 
cause in law and due process; and the state also had to follow freedom of opinion and 
belief, permitting people even in organised groups, to hold such views as they would 
and peacefully to practice them so long as they did not disrupt the life of the state or 
attempted to impose their ideology on others by force.317 
Another basic feature of the Islamic state consisted in its being an ideological 
state318: “All those persons who...surrender themselves to the will of God are welded 
into a community and that is how the ‘Muslim society’ comes into being. Thus, this is 
an ideological society – a society radically different from those which spring from 
accidents of races, colour, or country.”319 
 
IV.3.3. Rights of non-Muslims, minorities, 
and the question of human rights 
From Mawdudi’s point of view, the cementing factor among the citizens of the 
Islamic state was the ideology that they all held in common. This ideology aimed at 
the reform of human society, and the state was its instrument for that purpose. It 
followed that the state had to uphold its ideology and protect itself against every effort 
to subvert it. Every other ideological state, Mawdudi argued, did precisely the same 
thing, drawing the line at those activities which were calculated to destroy the very 
foundations of the system itself. The Islamic state did not insist that everyone living 
within its territories subscribed to its ideology, for it did permit the existence of 
minorities that were not Muslim and acted to protect them, but it clearly could not 
permit the system to be attacked “with impunity” either from within or without. 
Mawdudi did not write prolifically about human rights, and what he did write 
was not until later in his career. Human rights had not been important to conceptions 
of the state in the West when Mawdudi’s views on politics and statecraft were 
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formed. He only addressed the issue when the Islamic state came under attack for 
having authoritarian proclivities and excluding minorities. What is interesting is what 
Mawdudi’s treatment of human rights reveals about his universalist inclinations 
within a national framework. He argued that non-Muslim minorities’ rights in the 
Islamic state would be those specified in the Shari’a’s teachings on the dhimmis 
(protected subjects who were followers of a religion recognized by Islam), and he 
alluded to the Ottoman millet system, whereby the empire was organized along 
communal lines, to a significant extent, as an example of how the Islamic state might 
work. Before those who criticized the division of the population of the Islamic state 
between Muslims and non-Muslims and the treatment of non-Muslims as second class 
citizens, Mawdudi was unapologetic. He did not simply assert that such a division 
was mandated by the Shari’a, but justified his prescriptions in terms of Western 
conceptions of the state and the rights of the citizenry in them. He argued that the 
Islamic state was not defined solely by its territorial boundary; it was an ideological 
state, with Islam serving as its protector and raison d’être. Hence, preserving the 
purity of the state’s ideology was its foremost concern, and one that justified 
excluding from authority or from any position that could influence the working of the 
state those not subscribing to its ethos (e.g., voters). He added that Western 
democracies and communist regimes alike had treated their national and ideological 
minorities in a similar fashion, although they might not admit to it. He denied that the 
dhimmi-Muslim dichotomy was undemocratic, suggesting to the contrary that to force 
the majority to abide by the dictates of the minority would be undemocratic.320 
Two important consequences followed from viewing the Islamic state as being 
an ideological state. The first was that the state had to be controlled and run 
exclusively by Muslims. It was of particular importance that the head of the state, the 
locus of all power and authority, should be Muslim, and others were rigorously 
excluded from that most important of all positions. Of almost equal weight was the 
need to have faithful Muslims in those other posts of responsibility where state policy 
was formed and the general orientation of the state’s affairs determined. It was 
illogical, from Mawdudi’s viewpoint, to expect non-Muslims, who did not believe in 
the Islamic ideology to uphold it and work out its consequences in the life of 
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society.321 People of other religious persuasions could hold non-sensitive posts in an 
Islamic order, including fairly high ranks in the civil secretariat and even in the 
military, but they had to be rigorously excluded from influencing policy decisions.322 
The second consequence of the Islamic state being an ideological state was 
worked out in its conception of citizenship. Since Islam was straightforward and 
truthful, it plainly prescribed two kinds of citizenship in the Islamic state,323 one kind 
for Muslims who were domiciled within the territory of the state and the other kind 
for all those non-Muslims who agreed to be loyal and obedient to the Islamic state in 
which they lived.324 
Upon the Muslims fell the full responsibility for the conduct of the state, for 
they alone fully believed in it. It were they who had to assume the obligations Islam 
imposed, including defence, and in return they had the right to be members of its 
Parliament, to vote in choosing the Head of State, and to be appointed to key posts 
where state policy was laid down. The non-Muslim citizens or dhimmis were 
guaranteed protection of life and limb, property and culture, faith, and honour.325 
What they were not guaranteed was either full political expression or full equality 
with their Muslim fellow citizens. The Islamic state would enforce upon them only 
the general law of the land while leaving them free to use their own community 
personal law to regulate affairs in that sphere. They had a number of other guarantees 
and protections extended to them as well, including the guarantee of the state to 
provide the basic necessities of life, food, shelter, and clothing to all of its citizens 
without distinction. Islam, Mawdudi said, did not wish to abolish or destroy its 
minorities but to protect them, and this policy stood in the starkest contrast, he argued, 
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with state policy towards minority groups in every other political system in the 
world.326 
 
IV.3.4. The Shari’a and its role 
There was no question, for Mawdudi, that the divine will had laid down a law 
(Shari’a) for human conduct just as it had ordained a law for everything else. One’s 
attitude toward that law was the central issue of human life; upon it turned the 
decision whether one should submit to the divine will for the way in which life should 
be lived or whether he should rebel against it and go astray in error. Islam, which for 
Mawdudi meant submission, had brought in its train earthly blessing and heavenly 
reward while rebellion and refusal to submit produced only evil, unhappiness, and 
eternal punishment. Thus, the historical controversy that Islam had awakened had not 
had to do with whether God was the creator or not but with man’s willingness or 
refusal to recognize him as Lord; the issue was not the control of nature but rather 
who should claim the allegiance of men. The law that God had prescribed for men to 
follow was readily accessible to all who may be interested to learn its provisions; it 
was set forth in the Book of God, the Qur’an, and in the lives of those through whom 
God had revealed His book, the Prophets, especially in the practice of the last one, 
Muhammad. Prophecy was the means chosen by the divine to give concrete 
expression and exemplification to its will. These two, the Qur’an and the Sunna of 
the Prophet, therefore, were the ultimate authorities for all true Muslims in every 
question that might concern either their individual or their collective lives.327 
When the Qur’an and the Prophet spoke on an issue, there was no higher court 
of appeal, for to displace or impugn them would be an offense against the awesome 
majesty of God, to commit the unpardonable sin of associating others with the 
prerogatives that were exclusively His. There was one true and unimpeachable source 
of law, one rightful law-giver and only one, who had chosen to make his Shari’a 
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known through the agencies of revelation and prophecy. Everything that men enacted 
or observed as law in their societies was to be measured against the dictates and the 
spirit of the ultimate law found in the two great sources of all Islamic inspiration. The 
Shari’a in both its broad objectives and its specific provisions envisaged more than 
the fostering of good and the avoidance of evil in the lives of individuals. To be sure, 
the Shari’a prescribed the modes of worship for the individual and gave guidance for 
personal morality and action along with many other things of purely individual 
concerns, but it also prescribed directives for collective life as well. These directives 
touched such matters as “family relationships, social and economic affairs, 
administration, rights and duties of citizens, judicial system, laws of war and peace 
and international relations. In short it embraces all the various departments of life. [...] 
The Shari’ah is a complete scheme of life and an all-embracing social order where 
nothing is superfluous and nothing lacking.”328 
The Shari’a was also an organic and integrated whole whose many aspects 
and provisions did flow logically and ineluctably from the same basic principles. 
Mawdudi believed that the organic and all embracing nature of the divine law had 
been forgotten or neglected by Muslims for most of their history since the time of the 
Rightly Guided Caliphs (632-661). What was presently known as Islamic law, he 
said, was only part of the larger whole. It had no independent existence and could 
neither be understood nor enforced apart from the total system to which it 
belonged.329 
The establishment of the Islamic system in its entirety was the goal toward 
which he strove; only then could the provisions of Islamic law be properly 
implemented. One of the implications of the organic understanding of the Shari’a that 
is repeated over and over again in Mawdudi’s writings is that it did not recognise any 
division between religion and other aspects of life,330 and most specifically between 
religion and the state. There was, he insisted, no area of man’s activity and concern to 
which the Shari’a did not address it with specific divine guidance. Thus the 
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cultivation of private piety, worship, and the ordering of the individual’s relationship 
with God, the matters that were normally identified as “religion” in popular parlance, 
did not satisfy the demands of the Shari’a. True Islamic faith had to permeate into 
social actions and attitudes, had to strive for the creation of an Islamic society as well 
as for personal righteousness. 
Secularism, which Mawdudi equated with the separation of religion and state 
or with religionlessness, was considered to be the very contrary of Islam since it 
opened the way, as he saw it, to the exclusion of all morality, ethics, or human 
decency, from the controlling mechanisms of society. This, he thought, was precisely 
what had happened in the Western world whose governments and social bases he 
never tired of condemning as unutterably and irredeemably corrupt. In his mind, 
morality of any kind was simply inconceivable without religion and the sanction of 
eternal punishment to support it. When religion was relegated to the personal realm, 
men inevitably gave way to their bestial impulses and perpetrated evil upon one 
another. In fact, it was precisely because they wished to escape the restraints of 
morality and the divine guidance that men espoused secularism. The evils that arose 
from the domination of men over man could not occur in the Islamic system because 
it would not permit the life of the state to be carried on in isolation from the dictates 
of religion and the divine law. From the perspective of the Shari’a, life was a 
seamless whole that had to be lived in its entirety under the perspective and within the 
limits set by God.331 
A state or some other instrument that would exercise political power was the 
necessary consequence of this conception of a universal divinely ordained pattern for 
the life of men in the world. Not only would the realization of the objective of the 
Shari’a to foster good and interdict evil in society be impossible without the agency 
of the state and the power it commands,332 but the Shari’a itself specifically 
prescribed the creation of a state as witnessed in certain verses of the Qur’an but 
above all in the examples of the Prophet and the Rightly Guided Caliphs: “the reforms 
which Islam wants to bring about cannot be carried out merely by sermons. Political 
power is essential for their achievement. [...] The struggle for obtaining control over 
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the organs of the state when motivated by the urge to establish the din (religion) and 
the Islamic shari’ah and to enforce the Islamic injunctions, is not only permissible but 
is positively desirable and as such obligatory”. 333 
Accordingly, in Mawdudi’s understanding, the Shari’a also provided the basic 
outline of the state’s nature and characteristics. Guidance for Muslims about the state 
which they were obligated to establish, or in other words, materials for the 
constitution of an Islamic state, were to be found in four principal sources: the 
Qur’an, the Sunna of the Prophet, the conventions and practices of the Four Rightly 
Guided Caliphs, and the rulings of the great jurists of the Islamic tradition.334 
A careful study of these four sources, all of which were written down, readily 
accessible, and well known, was, according to Mawdudi, sufficient for the implicit 
and unwritten state constitution set out in the Shari’a to be reduced to systematic 
written form. For any careful student of these basic documents the necessity of an 
Islamic state would be inescapably clear, and it would also be abundantly evident 
precisely what an Islamic state was. Mawdudi rejected as ignorance or deliberate 
mischief-making the criticism of the many Muslims, mostly liberal and Westernized 
modernists, who ridiculed the idea of an Islamic state, who claimed that the basic 
sources of Islamic faith offered no guidance about the practical aspects of establishing 
and forming a state. The Islamic state, for Mawdudi, was a model of governance that 
was conceived in contradistinction to Western models and did not therefore represent 
a return to pre-modern socio-political organization.335 
Although Islamist thinkers, Mawdudi prominent among them, have sought to 
define the Islamic state in terms of Shari’a concepts and early Islamic institutions, 
there is little doubt that what they seek to define is a constellation of modern 
organizations, performing functions associated with modern states. That Mawdudi 
characterized the Islamic state in terms that emphasized its hybrid nature, such as 
“theodemocracy” or “democratic caliphate”, using adjectives that come from Western 
political ideals rather than from the Shari’a, attests to this tendency. The concept of 
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the Islamic state was therefore a tacit acceptance of the paradigm of the nation-state 
system, and through it an acceptance of an international one. Mawdudi did not 
subscribe to an abstract view of religion which consisted solely in the relationship 
between man and God with exclusion of all other worldly considerations. For him, 
Islam, the “true religion”, not only provided a belief system and ideational framework 
but also filled life in its diversified aspects into it. The whole of life was thus a 
religious life in which, from beliefs and worship, principle of civic life, economy and 
political power were knitted together.336 
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DISCUSSIOA AAD COACLUSIOA 
Islam and the State: three different conceptions by three different authors 
This research aimed at exploring the interaction between Muslim intellectuals 
and “Western” political concepts, particularly the concepts of “State” and “Nation-
State”, between the late 19th century and the middle of the 20th, in India. The rich and 
diverse political discourses of Muslim intellectuals, reflecting its diversity, showed 
that there is no such thing as an “authentic” and “unchanging” Islam, challenging the 
characterization of Muslim political discourse as a “return to an authentic Islam” or as 
an “imitation of Western political discourse”. It also sought to study how Islam was 
reinterpreted in the light of modern material and intellectual developments. If it is true 
that Mawdudi constructed Islam as an ideology and polity, Chiragh ‘Ali, on the other 
hand, confronted by Orientalist portrayals of a “rigid unchanging Islam”, argued that 
Islam was not inimical to the adoption of new Western political ideologies and/or 
institutions. In what refers to Muhammad Iqbal, in an attempt to link aspects of 
“Islamic heritage” to “Western” institutions, he considered that “Western” political 
concepts, as they were understood at the time, such as “Democracy” and 
“Republicanism”, were in fact Muslim political concepts that the British, through 
their Empire, were spreading throughout the world. Later, Iqbal would construct Islam 
as an ideology and polity, without advancing in concrete terms how that polity would 
work. Criticising the West, especially after the First World War and its brutality, but 
without abandoning what he had defended earlier in his life, Iqbal’s ideas would be 
very influential on Mawdudi, who was a friend of his. Mawdudi was very critical of 
those attempts to equate Islam with new “Western” political ideas and practices. He 
felt that the writing of apologetic pieces was the result of a defensive stance on the 
part of Muslim scholars, while, at the same time, he was being influenced by those 
same ideas, practices, discourses and language. 
As Quentin Skinner asserts, the idea of supreme political authority as the 
authority of the state was originally the outcome of one particular theory of civil 
association, a theory at once absolutist and secular-minded in its ideological 
allegiances. This theory was in turn the product of the earliest major 
counterrevolutionary movement in modern European history, the movement of 
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reaction against the ideologies of popular sovereignty, initially developed in the Dutch 
and French religious wars of 16th and 17th centuries, and subsequently restated in the 
course of the English constitutional upheavals of the mid-seventeenth century. Both 
the ideology of state power and the new terminology employed to express it served to 
provoke a series of doubts and criticisms. Some of the initial hostility stemmed from 
conservative theorists anxious to uphold the venerable ideal of one king, one faith, 
one law, repudiating any suggestion that the aims of public authority should be purely 
civil in character, and sought to reinstate a closer relationship between allegiance in 
church and state. Some wished in addition to make it clear that sovereigns were of far 
higher standing than mere representatives, and to insist that the powers of the state 
must be understood to inhere in them and not in the person of the state. 
Much of the initial hostility, however, came from radical theorists who wished 
to reassert the ideal of popular sovereignty in place of the sovereignty of the state. The 
contractarian writers of the next generation, including John Locke (1632-1704) and 
such admirers as Benjamin Hoadly (1676-1761), sought to avoid the terminology of 
state power altogether, preferring to speak of “civil government” or “supreme civil 
power”. Echoing similar suspicions, the so-called commonwealthmen maintained 
their loyalty to the classical ideal of the self-governing republic throughout much of 
the 18th century, and likewise eschewed the vocabulary of state power in favour of 
continuing to speak of civil associations and commonwealths. At the end of the 18th 
century, a renewed counterrevolutionary effort was made to neutralise these various 
populist doubts. Hegel (1770-1831) and his followers argued that the English 
contractarian theory of popular sovereignty merely reflected a failure to distinguish 
the powers of civil society from those of the state, and a consequent failure to 
recognise that the independent authority of the state was indispensable if the purposes 
of civil society were to be fulfilled. But this hardly provided an adequate reassurance. 
On the one hand, the anxiety of liberal theorists about the relationship between the 
powers of states and the alleged sovereignty of citizens gave rise to confusions which 
have never been resolved. And on the other hand, a deeper criticism arose out of these 
Hegelian roots, according to which the state’s vaunted independence from its own 
agents as well as from the members of civil society amounted to nothing more than a 
pious fraud. Given the importance of these rival ideologies, it is remarkable how 
quickly the Hobbesian conception of the state nevertheless succeeded in establishing 
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itself at the heart of political discourse throughout Western Europe. This is not to say 
that the concept was always well understood even by those who made prominent use 
of it. Rather it gave rise to a serious confusion which has continued to bedevil the 
analysis of public power ever since. The chief architects of the confusion were those 
self-consciously commonsensical writers who felt it obvious that the powers of the 
state must be reducible to the powers of some identifiable person or apparatus of 
government. 
Once the term state came to be accepted as the master noun of political 
discourse, a number of other concepts and assumptions bearing on the analysis of 
sovereignty had to be reorganised or in some cases given up. One concept that 
underwent a consequential process of redefinition was that of political allegiance. A 
subject or subditus had traditionally sworn allegiance to his sovereign as a liege lord. 
But with the acceptance of the idea that sovereignty was lodged not with rulers but 
with the state, this was replaced by the familiar view that citizens owed their loyalty 
to the state itself.337 
Political institutions and practices which had evolved in the West were 
considered by Western intellectuals and statesmen as the sole models of political 
modernity, models which had to be adopted by the rest of the world. Particularly 
important was the model of the modern nation-state, and the expansion in print media 
and education led to the rise of a new group of Muslim intellectuals who claimed 
authority not only to interpret Islam but also to act as spokesmen for the community, a 
fragmentation of religious authority which facilitated the rise of a number of 
intellectuals who sought to exercise ijtihad (independent reasoning) in order to 
provide solutions to contemporary problems, and who were active not only in 
acquiring new socio-political ideas from the West, but also in reinterpreting their own 
traditions in the light of these new ideas. Islam meant, and means, different things to 
different intellectuals, who attribute different meanings to it, and drew, and draw, 
from varying sources within and without the “Islamic” tradition in developing their 
socio-political thought. While Chiragh ‘Ali refused to accept the Sunna and Hadith as 
authentic sources of Islam, asserting that all sorts of political systems could and have 
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been defended by an appeal to traditions, Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi had 
different opinions. However, the three agreed that the Qur’an was the only authentic 
source to which Muslims could look back to formulate any socio-political 
interpretation. Their reactions to political realities, especially the acceptance or 
rejection of “Western” socio-political institutions and concepts, often depended upon 
or reflected their interpretation of Islam. Chiragh ‘Ali, Muhammad Iqbal, Mawdudi, 
and others, were intrinsically attached to Islam and they looked to Muslim history, 
theology, sources and its symbols to help them face the challenges of modernity. 
However, they did attribute varying meanings to Islam, and each believed that their 
interpretation was a return to the true authentic Islam. 
Chiragh ‘Ali, while dismissing claims that Islam presented its followers with a 
binding political and social structure revealed in the Qur’an and the Sunna, set about 
to prove, firstly, that the Sunna was not a reliable source on which to base an 
interpretation of Islam, and, secondly, he asserted that the Qur’an, accepted as the 
sole reliable source for an analysis of Islam, stipulated no socio-political structure. His 
dismissal of the Sunna and Hadith as authentic sources of Islam implied that there 
was no basis for “Muslim Common Law”, and that the true development of Muslim 
societies lay in the development of a “secular” state legal system, with a separation of 
“Church” and “State”, “Religion” and “Politics”, at a time when the modern State, in 
this case the “Nation-State” and Secularism as its ideology, was becoming the 
political norm, hand in hand with the idea, naive it must be said, that “Politics” were 
fully embodied in the “State”, while “Religion” was fully embodied in the “Church”, 
which is also a political organization and an institution characteristic of only a part of 
Humankind. 
For Muhammad Iqbal and Mawdudi, however, Islam was not just a 
relationship with God, but also a comprehensive and complete system, covering all 
aspects of human life, with no separation of “Religion” and “Politics”, in the case of 
Iqbal, or with a fusion of “Religion” and “Politics” in the case of Mawdudi. These 
reconstructions of Islam as a system were attempts to establish an “Islamic” ideal, a 
vision of life set against the “West” and its ideological and political domination. As in 
Islam there is no such thing as a “Church”, Iqbal considered that “Church and State 
were not the two sides of the same thing, because Islam was an unanalysable singular 
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reality, patent in the law”, something organically related, while for Mawdudi Islam 
had been since the time of the Prophet Muhammad “Religion” and “Politics”. 
Confronted by colonialism and the disempowerment of both the Muslims and the East 
in general, they looked to Islam to provide a solution to contemporary problems, a 
construction that emerged out of the interaction with colonialism and Western 
ideologies. 
 
(The World of) Islam and Politics nowadays 
Sami Zubaida asked how applicable the classic concepts of “state” and 
“politics” were to the world of Islam.338 Although there is convergence between the 
essentialist positions of the adherents of the Islamist movements and Westerners 
writing in the Orientalist tradition, modern states are products of social and cultural 
transformations accompanying the uneven expansion of a global capitalist economy. 
According to those essentialist positions, each postulates a cultural essence which 
underlies and unifies Islamic history and distinguishes it from an equally reductionist 
notion of the West. They see the territorial nation-state as an alien graft, imposed by 
the West but remaining “external” to Muslim society, “the game of intellectuals and 
politicians”. In Islamic societies, both Islamists and Orientalists argue, the global unit 
of solidarity is the Islamic community of the faithful, the Umma; the territorial nation-
state is incompatible with this higher unity. Western writers would add that alongside 
this global solidarity there is the more immediate solidarity of primary communities 
based on tribe, region, or sect, equally incompatible with the nation-state but played 
out within its alien political field under modern ideological labels like “nationalism” 
and “socialism”. However, different parts of the Islamic world have experienced the 
impact of the “Nation-state”. Although clearly of European origin, its diffusion to 
other parts of the world (including much of Europe itself) did not create replicas of 
the British or the French political systems, but has itself structured political processes 
and ideas in each region, and dominated the assumptions and forms of underlying 
political activity there. Even for those who would transcend the nation-state into pan-
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Arabism or pan-Islamism, the nation-state represents an elemental political fact and 
constraint. In fact, the assumptions and concepts of the nation-state underlie, 
implicitly or explicitly, most modern Islamist ideologies. In this and many other 
respects, they are not continuous with historical Islam but rather modern constructions 
influenced by current conjuctures. 
The “Islamic World” is a huge area of land integrating multiple different 
cultural, ethnic and political entities, nevertheless, sharing significant common 
characteristics. What does seem clear, and may make people mistake the premodern 
situation, is that in modern times religious institutions, movements, and beliefs have 
had more political importance in the Muslim world than in the West. This is often 
attributed to special features of Islam, which are of some importance, but there appear 
to be other causes, such as, first, different historical experiences in the West and in the 
Islamic world, and, second, the imperial and colonial experiences suffered by 
Muslims tended to make them defensive about Islam and to define (as did some 
Westerners) the situation in religious terms. 
During the twentieth century, and through the impacts of European 
imperialism and colonialism, two developments worked to modify the political 
situation in the Islamic world. One was the evolution of nationalism, and the other 
was the increasing importance of the structure of the state in society. These two trends 
often supported each other, as an independent nation-state had been the goal of many 
intellectuals and political activists. In the process, the ideals of the cosmopolitan 
Islamic community had not been forgotten, but they had to share the stage with the 
interests of the nation and the state. The Umma, the nation, and the state became 
sometimes competitors and sometimes complementary focuses of loyalty for 
Muslims.339 
As Gudrun Krämer argues, at the core of much contemporary writing are a 
number of shared assumptions: that all people are born equal, having been installed as 
God’s viceregents on earth (istikhlaf); that government exists to ensure an Islamic life 
and enforce Islamic law; that sovereignity (siyada, hakimiyya) ultimately rests with 
God alone, who has made the law and defined good and evil (al-ma’ruf wa’l-munkar), 
                                                           
339 VOLL, 1994: p. 153. 
 201 
 
the licit and the illicit (al-halal wa’l-haram); that the authority (sulta) to apply God’s 
law has been transferred to the community as a whole, which is therefore the source 
of all powers (asl al-sultat); and that the head of the community or state (imam, 
caliph, or president), is the mere representative, agent, or employee of the community 
that elects, supervises, and, if necessary, deposes, either directly or via its 
representatives. This simplified scheme of government does not constitute a sharp 
break with classical Sunni doctrines which, in contrast to Shi’i positions, declared that 
the caliphate was based on the consensus of the Muslim community (ijma’), not on 
any preordained divine order. But compared even to the widely quoted treatises of ibn 
Taymiyya, with their emphasis on the centrality of the Shari’a, modern positions 
mark a definite shift of emphasis away from the person of the ruler and the duty of 
obedience and acquiescence for the sake of peace and order, even under unjust rule, to 
the authority of the community and the responsibility of every individual believer, 
reflecting the impact of modern political ideas as well as the decline and final 
abolition of the historical caliphate, in 1924. What emerges as a core concern for 
modern Muslims is the desire to check and limit arbitrary personal rule and to replace 
it with the rule of law, which had already been the preoccupation of nineteenth-
century Arab and Ottoman constitutionalists, ranging from ‘Abd al-Rahman al-
Kawakibi and Khayr al-Din al-Tunisi, to Namik Kemal.340 
To use “Islam” and “Shari’a” as generalized categories, as some scholars do, 
presents some dangers, because one cannot speak of historical entities that are wholly 
or predominantly determined by Islam. Islamic leaders, communities, cities, and 
symbols are merely conceptual categories that unduly privilege the cultural and 
religious over the social and political. As concepts, they reside properly in the minds 
of their producers but obscure the nature of historical and social realities. Weberian 
scholars have tried to form an understanding of the Islamic City in comparison with 
and as distinct from the European City. As the social foundation of capitalism, 
industrialization, and modernity, the city has become a compelling category in 
understanding social formation and development. The judgment, generally, has been 
that, compared with the European City, the Middle Eastern entity may not be called a 
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city. Bryan Turner, the Weberian interpreter of Islam, characterized the Islamic City 
as “aggregates of sub-communities rather than socially unified communities”.341 
Aside from the negative view evidenced in the above statement, the debate 
about the Islamic City has also produced some interesting ways of understanding the 
unique “social aggregates” in Islamic civilization. Islam, as van Leeuwen argues, is 
not a “monolithic force” that shapes manners and customs, much less the nature of a 
complex city, and the same author regards any city to be consisting of “the various 
statuses of space, the regimentation of space within urban environments, the influence 
of social relations on spatial organisation, the role of spatial structures in the exertion 
of power, or the focuses of intertwining networks in spatial organisation.” The special 
case of cities occupied by Muslim peoples are but a measure of the “integration of 
several urban centres within one system which determines their type, and in this 
process cultural factors are only one of many causes,” with the possibility of 
“differences and divergent developments”.342 
From this perspective, it makes no sense to speak of an Islamic City with 
religion as its most distinctive feature. The religiocultural aspect of social forms is 
only one of several features, and cannot be used as a point of identification. Calling 
something an Islamic city, Islamic bank, or Islamic science implies that Islam is its 
major determining factor. In reality, such naming only hides and obscures other 
characteristics like ethnicity, ideology, and historical circumstances that equally 
determine social formation. However, such a critical deconstructivist approach to 
social forms has the risk of becoming extremely one-sided. While it clearly shows 
how social scientists and historians impose categories on the subject matter at hand, it 
fails to consider how the actors themselves work with such symbols, and fails to 
acknowledge the way in which indigenous actors create and contribute to the 
symbolic formation of society. No matter how elusive its character, the Islamic City - 
much like the Islamic leader, ritual, or court - is one of those compelling symbolic 
categories by which Muslims create history. The task of the social scientist, hence, is 
                                                           
341 TURNER, Bryan S. 1974. Weber and Islam. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, p.99. 
 
342 VAN LEEUWEN, Richard. 1995. “The quest for the Islamic City” in BOER, Inge E., MOORS, 
Annelies, and VAN TOEFELLEN, Toine (eds.). Changing stories: Post-Modernism and the Arab-
Islamic World. Amsterdam: Rodopi, p. 154-158. 
 203 
 
to locate these symbols in their broader social context, not to dissolve them, nor 
neglecting how indigenous actors contribute, positively or negatively, to the creation 
of social entities. As Aziz al-Azmeh argues, there are as many Islams as there are 
situations that sustain it, and critical reflection must contextualize them into the flow 
of historical and social forces, and thus deculturalize and demystify them.343 
 
Bringing Religion back into the study of Western Politics 
A common complaint from political scientists involved in the study of religion 
is that religious issues have been largely overlooked by political science. Steven 
Kettel shows that political science publications involving religious topics have been 
significantly fewer than those engaging with subjects typically regarded as being 
more central to the discipline, and where they have engaged with religious issues, 
these articles have also focused on a limited number of subject areas and been 
concentrated in specific disciplinary subfields.344 
At the same time, and now from a historical point of view, J.C.D. Clark offers 
a critical reconsideration of a central component of modernization theory. The model 
of secularization devised within the sociology of religion, when compared with the 
results of historical research in a range of themes and periods, is now often radically 
inconsistent with that sociological orthodoxy. He concludes that an older historical 
scenario which located in the early modern period the beginnings of a “process” of 
secularization that achieved its natural completion in the nineteenth or twentieth 
centuries is finally untenable, and proposes a broader, more historical conception of 
“religion” able to accommodate both persistent religiosity and undoubted changes in 
religious behaviour.345 
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Historical evidence shows that religion has been far more entwined with state 
formation than has been assumed. In Europe, organized religion thrived with the 
expansion of the modern state, using its fruits and apparatuses, including those 
governing fiscal regulation and violence, to augment its own powers.346 States in turn 
used religious institutions and appropriated church lands and property to augment 
their powers and revenue. Thomas Ertman writes that the church was important to the 
expansion of royal authority in the tenth and eleventh centuries in Latin Europe, and 
provided the Carolingian state with institutions through which to exercise authority 
and rule. The Carolingians totally integrated the church into state apparatuses to 
create state administration, and took over various papal territories and ecclesiastical 
resources, which accounts for the Christianization of the Frankish Empire of the 
Carolingians after 800.347 
Similarly, Robert Wuthnow has shown that as the rise in trade in the 1500s 
supported both rise of the state and the Reformation in central and northern Europe, 
there emerged a symbiosis between the two. In Sweden and Denmark the princes 
turned to the Reformation because it provided them with the opportunity to 
appropriate church lands, quadrupling Crown lands in the case of Gustav Vasa of 
Sweden, who dissolved monasteries in 1527 and took their land. This trend was also 
evident in England, where the Reformation was a revolution from above with broad 
implications for state power and capacity. In 1533 the king was proclaimed head of 
the Church of England, which placed all ecclesiastical affairs in England under state 
authority. In 1532 the Parliament forced the clergy to surrender ecclesiastical law to 
the jurisdiction of the Crown and forbade papal annates. The ties with the Vatican 
were further weakened in 1533 with the Act of Restraint of Appeals to Rome, which 
prohibited appeals by domestic courts outside the realm. In 1534 the Act of 
Supremacy named the king supreme head of the Church of England. In the same year 
the dissolution of monasteries began, which by 1539 placed all their lands in state 
hands; and in 1540 all property of the church was vested in the Crown.348 This 
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allowed the Crown to take over the ancient parish administration that had until that 
time been ecclesiastical. That administration was made into an instrument of poor 
relief and provided the Privy Council in London with a direct role in, and 
considerable control of, local affairs.349 The fusion of the Reformation and 
nationalism thus supported the expansion of state capacity and reach.350 
Philip Gorski has underscored the importance of the “disciplinary revolution” 
that followed the Reformation to shape later state formation in Holland and Prussia. 
Writing on the Dutch Republic of 1560–1650 and Hohenzollern Prussia of the 1640s 
to 1720, Gorski argues that it was Calvinism that provided primary support for the 
“social and organizational basis for establishment of a strong system of local 
government.”351 In both Holland and Prussia the state internalized Calvinist ethics and 
used the strong institutions that they had formed at the base of the society to 
strengthen the state. This process reached its apogee under Frederick William I, who 
favoured Calvinist recruits into state institutions. Gorski thus associates the strength 
of Dutch and Prussian state institutions, especially the bureaucracy, with Calvinist 
ethics. 
The successful use of religion to expand state powers led to the state’s 
assumption of some form of religious authority, which was most evident in the 
English king’s arrogation of the status of head of the Church of England, confirming 
the observation that successful use of religion to expand state powers requires the 
state to assume the requisite religious and cultural guise. It is also evident from the 
above cases that, as states use religion to expand, they ensure certain sociopolitical 
roles for religion and even expand the purview of its powers. Central and northern 
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European states used the Reformation to construct viable states, ensuring the 
domination over large parts of Europe.352 
Even nowadays there are many European countries with State religions, and, 
in the United States, Christianity, be it Protestant or Catholic, plays an extremely 
important role in politics, setting the moral boundaries and concerns within which 
political discussion unfolds, and hence can be considered the premiere political 
institution in some sense. Greater recognition must be given to the way Western 
concepts (religion, politics, secular, and temporal) reflect specific historical 
developments, and cannot be applied as a set of universal categories or natural 
domains. Although discussions of political motivation or class interest should 
continue to be important parts of accounts of contemporary Islam, they are not 
necessarily germane to a description of every problem the analyst poses. As Nikki 
Keddie wrote, religions do have a shape and influence coming from the past, although 
particular adaptions vary with time and circumstance.353 Hence, it is important to give 
more attention to religion and its relation with politics, but without reducing them to 
narrow categories as if “Politics” were fully embodied in the “State”, while 
“Religion” was fully embodied in the “Church” (which is also a political 
organization), or as if the relations between “religion” and “politics” could be reduced 
to the institutional relations between “Church” and “State” as if with the “Separation 
of Church and State”, “Religion” and “Politics” had been separated. 
 
Bringing everything else back into the study of Islamic Politics 
“Religion” means different things to different people: it can be an identitarian 
affiliation, a spiritual affirmation, or just faith, and all these factors have an impact in 
society, in the political process, which does not exhaust itself in the “State”. Muslims 
themselves have often considered Islam a total world view comprising religion and 
politics, however little this unity has been realized. This view on the totalizing aspect 
of Islam appears especially in periods of instability, rather than during stable political 
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environments. Although the Islamic revival of recent decades is in many ways novel, 
it has some important resemblances to revolts of the past. Among these resemblances 
is a return to the early (idealized) combination of religion and politics, with the 
enforcement of Qur’anic and legal provisions. Looking at several unconnected 
Islamic militant movements suggests ideological similarities that owe something to a 
widespread belief in what relations between religion and politics in Islam should be. 
In 1996, Ira M. Lapidus wrote354 that the history of the Middle East and of the 
wider Muslim world reveals a variety of institutional situations. The supposed 
Muslim norm of the integration of state (political organization) and religious 
authority, and the identification of state and religious community, actually 
characterized only a small segment of Middle Eastern and other Muslim populations. 
Undifferentiated state-religious situations were characteristic of lineage or tribal 
societies, as in Muhammad’s Arabia, North Africa and Morocco, early Safavid Iran, 
and as in the reformist period of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Even in such 
cases the conquest of an agriculture-based, urbanized society would start a process of 
differentiation that broke down the integral connection of state and religion. 
Conversely, the historic norm for Middle Eastern agro-urban-imperial societies has 
been the institutional differentiation of state and religion. Royal households or courts, 
political elites and the language and cultural style of the ruling classes were different 
from those of religious elites. In the Abbasid, Saljuq, Ottoman and Safavid empires 
the central fact is the differentiation of state and religious institutions, and the central 
problem has been to define the relations of the two. These relations vary across a wide 
spectrum from a high degree of state control over a centrally managed religious 
establishment, to a more independent but co-operative relationship (as in the Saljuq 
case), to full autonomy and even open opposition to state policies. Even in cases 
where Muslims, at least in principle, maintained their aspiration for an ideal society in 
which state and community were integrated, they were not necessarily committed to 
bringing it about in practice. In return for state support, the ‘ulama legitimized the 
reigning governments and taught the common people the virtues of acceptance and 
submission. Despite the common statement (and the Muslim ideal) that the 
institutions of state and religion are unified, and that Islam is a total way of life which 
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defines political as well as social and family matters, most Muslim societies did not 
conform to this ideal, but were built around separate institutions of state and religion. 
Thus we have two principal Islamic theories of the nature of an ideal Muslim 
political society. One looks to a unified state and society under the leadership of a 
caliph whose authority extends to all realms of personal and public concern. The 
second tacitly recognizes the institutional division between the structures of state and 
religion and looks to the religious sphere for personal and communal fulfilment. Each 
of these concepts of the Muslim political order - the unified and the separated state 
and community - has had a profound effect on the current history of Islamic societies. 
The contemporary Islamic revival (so-called fundamentalist) movements are inspired 
by the vision of a prophetic community. They attempt to return to the principles of 
Islamic morality and to a renewal of personal commitment to the symbolic 
foundations of Islam. They commonly aim to control the state and to use the power of 
the state to enforce Islam, although Islam means different things to different 
movements. 
Despite the appeal to the unity of state, religion and civil society, there is a 
considerable uncertainty about the ideal goals of those movements. The union of state 
and society envisioned in the neo-Islamic rhetoric is not an institutional arrangement 
or a commitment to any particular type of state institution, be it monarchical, 
representative, democratic, capitalist or socialist. The revivalist movements are not 
interested in constitutions; they are concerned rather with individual morals and 
ethical behaviour. To them the state is simply the force that requires the mass of the 
people to adhere to Islamic laws. The ideal state has no institutional form; it is 
embodied in the leadership of individuals dedicated to Islam who mobilize other 
individuals to realize religious values. Thus the revival movements have ambiguous 
political implications. While some revivalists believe that the control of the state is 
essential to the success of an Islamic social and moral programme, in practice it is not 
always clear that the revival movements give priority to political objectives. Many 
look upon states as inherently corrupt and incapable of realizing Muslim values. The 
state is not expected to embody transcendent values. Since they do not see the state as 
a realm of moral fulfilment, they do not expect that it will serve their aspirations for 
empowerment and economic well-being either. As in the case of their historical 
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predecessors, there is an ambiguity in their attitude towards political power which 
leaves the way open for a renewed separation of political and religio-communal 
concerns.355 
The historical actuality of the division of Muslim societies into a realm of 
political authority and a realm of religiocommunal affairs has other contemporary 
reverberations. The long-established differentiation of state and religious communities 
has legitimized political power apart from Islam. The Ottoman Empire in particular 
achieved a de facto legitimacy as a conquering state and defender of Muslims, apart 
from religious validation. Ottoman (and Iranian) rulers were conceived, too, as vice-
regents of God, direct agents of God’s authority on earth. Beyond the theory of 
Islamic states lay the reality of legitimate non-Islamic monarchies. Religious 
communities embody a corresponding tradition of political passivity, and a tendency 
to accept political actualities and state power based upon conquest and preserved by 
force as an inevitable reality. In this tradition the realm of Islamic authenticity lies 
within the soul of the individual, and in the behaviour of individuals in small 
communities. This historical orientation provides a template for the construction of 
modern Middle Eastern states around secular cultural identities and development 
goals defined in either capitalist or socialist terms. In such states as Turkey, Tunisia, 
Egypt, Syria, Iraq and Jordan, Islam had been disestablished or the Islamic religious 
establishment brought under state control. Islam no longer legitimates the state and no 
longer defines its moral or social vision. All of these states have set up secular 
educational and judicial systems which actually compete with, and even replace, the 
primary functions of Islam. Where Muslim religious life has in general become 
separated from state institutions, it flourishes in a differentiated “civil society”. The 
fact that the mass of the population has Muslim loyalties means that states give 
special consideration to Muslim symbols and Muslim practices. In recent years, with 
the rising importance of mass Islamic identifications and strong Islamist political 
movements, state elites have deferred to popular pressure for official recognition of 
the primacy of Islam and have relaxed, or even reversed, the earlier demand for 
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secularism; still, this has not led to the dismantling of secular legal or educational 
institutions. As far as the historic legacy remains an important factor in the 
contemporary Muslim world, its diversity is the basis of a corresponding diversity in 
the relations of states and religious communities. Today, as has been true since 
ancient times, we still find both integralist religio-political movements, states defined 
in Islamic terms, a de facto institutional differentiation of state and religion, and a 
great variety of relationships between the two.356 
As Irfan Ahmad argues357, the debate on the Islamic state has been conducted 
mostly in the field of Islamic studies or area studies and, not surprisingly, theological 
factors have weighed heavily in these debates. While sensitive to theology, social 
scientists should have an approach that gives primacy to the political factors and 
historical context in which philological interpretation is made and unmade, and 
critically subject theological arguments to the historical-political matrixes that shape 
them and, more importantly, the product of interpretation. An exclusively theological 
approach to the canonical texts, for example the Qur’an, has serious limits. It is not a 
pristine text that yields meanings on its own and by itself; it is rather the distinct 
social condition and the biography of the person reading the text which produces its 
meanings. As the contemporary Egyptian scholar Nasr Abu Zayd observes, “the 
Qur’an is at the mercy of the ideology of its interpreter. For a communist, the Qur’an 
would thus reveal communism, for a fundamentalist it would be a highly 
fundamentalist text, for a feminist it would be a feminist text, and so on”.358 
Contrary to what Ernest Gellner and others have said, that Islam “was the state 
from the very start”, the idea of an Islamic state is a distinctly modern development. 
The proposition by Bernard Lewis and Ann K. S. Lambton that, in Islam, from the 
beginning religion and the state were one and that the latter was an unsullied 
embodiment of Shari’a, “the revealed law of God” and hence immutable, is an 
ideologically de-historicized abstraction, and it does not help us to understand neither 
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the modern nature of the state nor the complexity of Shari’a, including how its 
meaning changed over time and space and the ways in which it was humanly recast. It 
is divine for Muslims (at least for those who are practicing the religion) to the extent 
that its frame of reference is the Qur’an and hadith, but it is fallible humans who have 
made and interpreted over time the body of conflicting juridical rules, instructions, 
and ethics generally called Shari’a.359 
To argue that Islam was the state from the very start is, then, to impose a 
distinctly modern term on a pre-modern social formation. Equally misleading is the 
dominant assumption - widespread across the academic disciplines - that the so-called 
“theological” character of Islam forces it to fuse religion and politics, and that prior to 
the European encroachment in the late 18th century Muslims rarely studied politics in 
isolation from their religion.360 This essentialist view on Muslim political literature 
neglects akhlaqi texts, “mirrors of princes”, aiming at instructing on the right political 
conduct in specific political contexts and which were concerned not just with ethically 
good actions but also the issues of statecraft, political culture and philosophy. A 
tradition of dissidence, “mirrors of princes” redefined Shari’a in a “philosophical, 
non-sectarian and humane” way as a kind of protest against an overly legalistic 
approach. In many important ways, these ethical-philosophical texts transcended the 
conventional positions of Shari’a to address the concerns of the larger humanity. The 
history and practices of the Indian Muslim rulers show that most of them did not 
follow Shari’a. Rather, independent of Shari’a, they framed secular laws, zawabit 
(administrative, standards, principles). Moreover, the meaning of Shari’a itself varied. 
Far from stable, it was not only a body of juridical rules propounded by theologians, 
but also included akhlaq texts.361 
Clearly, the concept of “the state” is quite modern, and entered the lexicon of 
the social sciences in the nineteenth century to understand the dramatic changes in 
early modern Europe from the seventeenth century onwards. To impose the modern 
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concept of the state on seventh-century Arab society is misleading. While this is not 
to suggest that seventh-century Arabia was bereft of any political formation, it was 
only during the early twentieth century that a fully developed political theory of the 
Islamic state emerged in the discourse of thinkers such as Mawdudi and al-Banna. 
The reason why the state became central to some thinkers was not because Islam 
theologically entailed it. Rather it did so because of the configuration of the early 
twentieth-century socio-political formations under which the state as an institution 
had acquired an unprecedented role in expanding its realm of action and the scope of 
its penetration. Since (political) Islam, or Islamism, was a response to the modern 
colonial state formation with its far-reaching consequences, it was only logical that 
the state became the centre of its discourse, which Mawdudi conceptualized as being 
indispensable to Islam. It was in the context of the separation between religion and the 
state that Mawdudi argued for a fusion of the state and Islam, making this argument 
because the colonial state had emerged as an omnipotent institution influencing every 
domain of life. 
As William Connolly wrote362, many scholars have argued that “political 
Islam” involves an illegitimate extension of the Islamic tradition outside of the 
properly religious domain it has historically occupied. Few, however, have explored 
this trend in relation to the contemporaneous expansion of state power and concern 
into vast domains of social life previously outside its purview - including that of 
religion. As it is known, through this ongoing process central to modern nation 
building, such institutions as education, worship, social welfare and family have been 
incorporated to varying degrees within the regulatory apparatuses of the modernizing 
state. Modern politics and the forms of power it deploys have become a condition for 
the practice of many personal activities. 
As for religion, to the extent that the institutions enabling the cultivation of 
religious virtue become subsumed within (and transformed by) legal and 
administrative structures linked to the state, the (traditional) project of preserving 
those virtues will necessarily be “political” if it is to succeed. Within both public and 
private schools in Egypt, for example, the curriculum is mandated by the state: those 
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wishing to promote or maintain Islamic pedagogical practices necessarily have to 
engage political power. This does not mean that all forms of contemporary Islamic 
activism involve trying to “capture the state”. The vast majority of these movements 
involve preaching and other da’wa (missionary) activities, alms-giving, providing 
medical care, mosque building, publishing and generally promoting what is 
considered in the society to be public virtue through community action. 
Nonetheless, these activities engage the domain we call the political both in 
the sense that they are subject to restrictions imposed by the state (licensing, etc.), and 
in so much as they must often compete with state or state-supported institutions 
(pedagogic, confessional, medical) promoting Western models of family, worship, 
leisure, social responsibility, etc. The success of even a conservative project to 
preserve a traditional form of personal piety will depend on its ability to engage with 
the legal, bureaucratic, disciplinary and technological resources of modern power that 
shape contemporary societies. This argument diverges from the common one that 
Islam fuses religion and politics, din wa dawla (religion and state), in a way 
incompatible with Western analytical categories. It is worth noting, however, that this 
frequently heard claim does not deny the fact that Muslim thinkers draw distinctions 
between din and dawla; only that the specific domains designated by these terms, and 
the structure of their interrelations do not mirror the situation in Europe in regard to 
European states and the Church. Moreover, this leaves aside the fact that the division 
between religious and political domains even in Western societies has always been far 
more porous than was previously assumed, as much recent work has made clear. 
As Mahmood Mamdani argues, we must make a clear distinction between 
religious and political identifications and understand that the two can (and often) 
operate at different levels for different persons. When we are mindful of this 
distinction we can approach the discussion of Islam and politics with the appropriate 
mindset, namely one that recognizes the importance of various interpretations of 
Islam about a particular issue. Furthermore, including a range of other individual, 
social, economic, and political factors, we can realize the complexity in what makes a 
person hold (or not hold) a particular position. Therefore, in the discussion of Islam 
and politics, the role of religion and religious interpretation may be minimal or highly 
relevant, depending on the circumstance. We need to be aware of how religious 
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interpretations are also used politically. Within that space, it is important to examine 
the different religious interpretations that do exist, as well as interpretations that can 
exist, and from that, attempt to analyze the political, economic, and societal effects of 
this on politics, and vice versa. It is important to illustrate to students and social 
scientists that different interpretations of Shari’a (and thus Islam) can, and do, 
exist.363 
 
Future research and closing remarks 
Categorisations and generalisations are natural to humans; they stemm from 
basic cognitive skills which help us give some order to the world. Although categories 
created by scientists are means to better understand what surrounds us, there is a 
problem when they become generalisations and when these begin to be considered as 
reality. When this is the case, instead of helping us, categories become a hindrance, a 
dangerous one since the subject being dealt with are humans, and their concrete 
lives.364 
More than ten years have passed since the events of 11th September 2001, and 
“Islam” and “Muslims” are again under the spotlight, this time due to a series of 
events which have shown that political reality is changing. As the 21st century dawned 
on the Arab World, the region grappled with a profound clash between inherited deep 
rooted traditional ideologies and the distinct calls globalization was putting forward 
both economically and culturally. Recent uprisings were a clear evidence of this 
collision as well as a reflection of the latent inconsistencies of the international 
system. Starting in Tunisia in December 2010 and waving out to Egypt, Syria, 
Algeria, Lybia, and other places, the revolutions, known as the “Arab Spring”, have 
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ushered in profound changes in political processes in the Arab world and in our 
understanding of them. Not only did they give the lie to a widespread assumption 
amongst policy analysts and, to a lesser extent, amongst academic commentators, that 
these processes differed fundamentally from what has occurred elsewhere, they also 
demonstrated that popular ambitions in the Arab world differed little from those 
elsewhere as well. 
Taking into account the various transformations occurred in the past decades 
in economic conditions, social imbalances, cultural and mental outlook, political 
change was something predictable, but to see it coming would have been to see 
something at odds with the way in which the “Middle East” and “Islam” were thought 
of. It would also have meant acknowledging that methods and theories seeking grand 
universal explanations (“the Muslim character does not permit change”; “in Islam, 
tyranny is preferred to no power”; “the Middle Easterners are incapable of managing 
their own affairs without Western assistance”; “Muslim women are silenced and 
oppressed”) were in danger of failing to match real situations (“change is happening”; 
“people do not want tyrants”; “they are organising change themselves”; “women are 
actively participating in what is happening”). 
In view of the endless analysis of politics in the Middle East and North Africa 
in recent years, commentators turned out to be generally ill-prepared to respond to 
these momentous events. It became evident that the demonstrations themselves were 
merely the prologues to complex and lengthy processes of transition that may take 
years to be completed, and assumptions about the role of political Islam - a 
phenomenon not explicitly prominent in the actual challenges to regimes but certain 
to play a major role in the political transformations that have followed them, as good 
electoral results by different parties embracing various shades of Islamist ideology 
show - have had to be revised. Another widely held myth that was debunked was that 
the denial of legitimate resistance and revolt by normative Islam left people without 
any but sectarian means to justify revolt. Comparison with pre-modern Europe would 
be useful. Did main-line European Christianity provide any more justification for 
revolt than did Islam? Although leading Muslim thinkers spoke and wrote against 
revolt, considering it worse than an evil ruler, there were ways around this in the 
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Islamic tradition. It was almost unknown to speak of one’s own movement as a revolt, 
and the words we translate as “revolt” were pejorative, as in Europe. 
Over the past thirty years, the field of research usually called “Middle East and 
Islamic Studies” has been transformed in a profound way and the existing body of 
knowledge has been questioned, revised and enlarged dramatically, but, of course, 
there continues to be a Middle East studies establishment, a pool of interests, “old 
boy” or “expert” networks linking corporate business, the foundations, the oil 
companies, the missions, the military, the foreign service, the intelligence community, 
together with the academic world. There are grants and other rewards, organizations, 
hierarchies, institutes, centres, faculties, departments, all devoted to legitimizing and 
maintaining the authority of a handful of basic, basically unchanging ideas about 
Islam, the Orient, and the Arabs.365 
However, it is fair to say that these fields of “Middle East” and/or “Islamic” 
studies have gone through remarkable changes in the past thirty years. An explosion 
in scholarly work and journals has occurred, and there has been an impressive body of 
work disputing and challenging these dogmas in two ways: firstly, by rigorous 
research done in the various specific fields, showing that reality is much more 
complex than what the essentialist theories about “Islam”, the “Middle East” and the 
“Islamic” world can account for; and, secondly, by rigorous research which looked 
into and questioned the ontological validity of those concepts. 
Gradually, Arabists and Islamologists are revising their views, body of work, 
and stereotypes. As examples, we have Assef Bayat366, or Sami Zubaida, who, in his 
recent work,367 tries to understand the “Middle East” while addressing the 
fundamental question in Middle East studies on the definition of the Middle East 
itself. To see it through the prism of Islam, he argues, in its religious aspects, as it is 
conventionally viewed, is completely to misunderstand it. Many characteristics that 
we think of as “Islamic” are products of culture and society, not religion. To think of 
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Islam itself as an essentially anti-modern force in the region rather than something 
shaped by specific historical-economic processes is, Zubaida argues, a mistake. 
Instead, he offers an alternative view of the region, its historic cosmopolitanism, its 
religious and cultural diversity, and its rapid adoption of new media cultures, 
revealing a rich, multi-faceted region with a complex identity. 
Using Jillian Schwedler’s reflections regarding the study of “Political Islam” - 
another questionable concept which in recent years has been extensively used as 
synonym of “Islam” - and applying them now on the fields of “Middle East” and 
“Islamic” studies368, much of the work done by researchers in specific fields, which 
enter under this broad categorization, has drawn little attention outside of academia 
despite the anxieties over Islam shared by policymakers and the general public. The 
many rigorous studies judiciously carried out by both academics and journalists, and 
grounded on extensive field research and use of primary sources in Arabic, Turkish, 
and Persian, are bundled together with bestselling books more consistent with the 
existing obsessions and stereotypes over the “irrational, West-hating Muslim fanatic”, 
and the “oppressed” (veiled) woman. Serious scholarship on Islam cannot ignore the 
stereotypes and fear-mongering which dominate mainstream debate about Islam and 
the Middle East, but in responding to these discourses it often allows this mainstream 
to dictate the analytic starting point. 
We could do what Martin Kramer defends, which is going back to the roots in 
Oriental studies to “restore some continuity with the great tradition” in order to 
explain and predict change in the Middle East369 or, instead, we can choose to 
approach reality’s complexities, its ontological and epistemological challenges, 
without trying to mould it according to a predefined model (what Kramer’s “explain 
and predict” euphemism stands for). 
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As Charles Hirschkind argued, terms such as “political Islam” frame the 
inquiries around a posited distortion or corruption of properly religious practice. In 
this way, the disruptive intrusions or outright destruction enacted upon society by the 
modernizing state never even figure in the analysis. In contrast, the various attempts 
of religious people to respond to that disruption are rendered suspect, with almost no 
attempt to distinguish those instances where such a critical stance is warranted from 
those where it is not. It is not surprising, in this light, that militant violence and public 
intolerance have become the central issues of so many studies of al-sahwa al-
islamiyya (Islamic awakening), while the extensive coercion and torture practiced by 
governments get relegated to a footnote.370 
Edward Said complained of the fact that, lamentably, there had been no 
demonstrable effect – if there had been a challenging gesture at all – made by Islamic 
or Arab scholars’ work disputing the dogmas of Orientalism; an isolated article here 
or there, while important for its time and place, could not possibly affect the course of 
an imposing research consensus maintained by all sorts of agencies, institutions, and 
traditions. The point was that Islamic Orientalism had led a contemporary life quite 
different from that of the other Orientalist sub disciplines, and only the Arabists and 
Islamologists still functioned unrevised.371 Ira Lapidus, in the above cited article,372 
questioned if the Islamic cases were really different from the Christian ones, or the 
Middle Eastern cases from the European, or if it was time to abandon the clichés 
concerning the unity of Islam in favour of a more complex and realistic appreciation 
of the issues. 
The main objective of this research has been to rethink critically the received 
wisdom on the dynamics of the state and Islam, using the thought of three Indian 
Muslim intellectuals, who lived between the middle of the 19th century and the middle 
of the 20th. Methodologically, the strategy employed was a combination of the ones 
advanced by Mohammed Arkoun and Quentin Skinner. Combining a critical review 
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of modern studies devoted to early and contemporary periods of what is generally 
called “Islam” with the systematic deconstruction of the original texts used in these 
studies as sources of genuine information, primary and secondary texts were read, not 
in order to discuss the facts themselves, but to problematize the epistemis and 
epistemological framework underlying the articulation of each discourse. 
The focus of this research has been on ideas put forward by Muslim thinkers 
and not with ideas which were “Islamic” or considered as such, since this would have 
detracted us from a study of the debates amongst various Muslim thinkers and the 
attempts by them to reinterpret and, in the process, shape Islam. While the study of 
theology and religious texts would have been important, far more significant are the 
political dynamics and historical context in which a given discourse ascended, gained 
acceptance, or lost salience. As Quentin Skinner points out, concepts not only alter 
over time, but are incapable of providing us with anything more than a series of 
changing perspectives on the world in which we live and have our being. Our 
concepts form part of what we bring to the world in our efforts to make sense of it. 
The shifting conceptualizations to which this process gives rise constitute the very 
stuff of ideological debate, so that it makes no more sense to regret than to deny that 
such conceptual changes continually take place. Concepts, or what we express 
through them, have a history. They rise and fall, and in some cases they finally 
disappear from sight, reflecting deeper transformations in social life.373 
Philological approaches to religious texts - the Qur’an and the Prophet’s 
sayings - have many limitations if we do not use them as an ancillary to a more 
historically grounded approach. There is therefore a need to go beyond merely 
structural explanations of social and cultural analysis and to take ideas, cultural 
imaginations and discourse in a serious manner. I also hope to have contributed to 
dispute the dogmas of Orientalism, which continue to have some influence, and thus 
go beyond the clichés concerning the unity of Islam, in favour of a more complex and 
realistic appreciation of the interaction of politics and religion in Islam. More is to be 
done, and I hope to further my investigation in the future, focusing on other Muslim 
intellectuals, not only in India but also in other parts of the Islamic world, and try to 
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assess how, in the face of the challenges posed by Europe in the 19th and 20th 
centuries, they tried to respond to them. At the same time, particular attention needs to 
be given to the role of Religion - defined in a more complex way - in the political 
process, not only in the world of Islam, but also in other cultural environments, 
including the West. The very important debate over modernity and modernization has 
been, and still is, shared throughout different political and religious realities of this 
World. 
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